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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Adaptive management—provides structured links between knowledge, management, 
evaluation and feedback over time. The process recognises that new knowledge is 
always becoming available and must be considered. It includes setting clear objectives, 
identifying and testing uncertainties, improving knowledge, ‘learning by doing’ and 
changing practices and policies in response to new knowledge. 
Allocation account—instrument for tracking an individual water user’s availability, use 
and balance of water in a season, and from season to season under carry over 
provisions. 
Allocation water—provides a specific volume of water to a water entitlement holder in 
a given water year (season), based on announcements provided during the water 
year. Allocation water is recorded in an allocation account and may be used by the 
entitlement holder (if they have an appropriate water access right) or transferred to 
another allocation account. Unused allocation water may be stored as carry-over into 
the next water year once such ability has beenced. 
Announcement—public declarations of seasonal water allocations and other policy 
decisions (e.g. carry-over conditions or changes in the ability to trade between trade 
zones) made during a given water year. These announcements may have an impact 
on the price or value of water access rights or allocation water, and may influence 
the decisions of persons considering buying or selling such rights. 
Annual crops—agricultural commodities that are planted, grown and harvested all 
within one season. As such, the decision to proceed (or not) with annual crops can be 
made independently each year depending on seasonal, price and other factors. 
Examples include cotton, rice, cereals etc. 
Basin Plan—the overarching document aimed at managing water resources in the 
MDB for social, environmental and economic outcomes. Once ratified, the Basin Plan 
will not be fully implemented until 2024 when various state and territory water 
resource plans expire. A review of progress toward Basin Plan outcomes will be 
undertaken in 2015. The current environmental water access right reduction target is 
3,200 Gigalitres. This figure may also change before full implementation. 
Basin states—Queensland (Qld), New South Wales (NSW), the Australian Capital 
Territory (ACT), Victoria and South Australia (SA). 
Bulk water entitlement—a large consolidated water access right held by an authority 
or irrigation infrastructure operator to extract water to supply water for irrigation, 
urban or other uses. 
Buy-back—program of reducing the pre-existing level of extraction in the MDB 
through purchasing water entitlements from willing sellers in the Basin. The current 
total budget is set at $3.6 billion over 15 years to 2024 (excepting 2012, which will not 
see any non-strategic buy-back activity). All water entitlements acquired through the 
program become part of the held environmental water portfolio of the CEWH. 
Cap—an upper limit on the volume of water available for consumptive use from a 
waterway, catchment, basin or aquifer. 
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Capacity sharing system—these systems disaggregate water access rights by 
defining rights to water in terms of shares of storage inflows, storage volume or 
losses. Users are then credited water based on either the water access right’s share 
of inflows or the amount of space remaining in the user’s ‘storage right’—whichever is 
the least. 
Carry-over—an arrangement that allows the holder of a water allocation account to 
retain allocation water not used in one water year (accounting period) and then take 
or trade it in the next water year (accounting period). 
COAG—the Council of Australian Governments is the peak intergovernmental forum 
in Australia, comprising the Prime Minister, State Premiers, Territory Chief 
Ministers and the President of the Australian Local Government Association 
(ALGA). 
Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder (CEWH)—federal government 
department established as the legal owner of held environmental water and charged 
with applying that held water (together with planned environmental water where 
appropriate) toward the satisfaction of environmental requirements as determined 
under the MDB’s Environmental Watering Plan. 
Consumptive use—describes the use of water for irrigation, industry, urban and stock 
and domestic use, or other private purposes. 
Dams or storages—infrastructure built within a watercourse, lake, wetland or aquifer 
for the purpose of extraction of significant volumes of water resources for 
consumptive or other purposes. 
Diversion—the movement of water from a river system by means of pumping or 
gravity channels. 
Economic efficiency—an activity is economically efficient if it maximises the wellbeing 
of the community through improving the way resources are allocate and used. 
Ecosystem functions—describes a community of plants, animals and microorganisms 
interacting with one another, and with the environment in which they live. Important 
functions include the physical, biological and chemical processes that support 
movement of nutrients, organic matter, re-oxygenation and sediment transfers in rivers. 
Ecosystem services—describe the benefit people obtain from ecosystems, such as 
food, water, timber and fibre. Less tangible services include: i) the regulation of climate, 
floods, disease, wastes and water quality; ii) recreational, aesthetic and spiritual 
benefits; and iii) soil formation, photosynthesis and nutrient cycling. 
Environmental assets—include water-dependent ecosystems, ecosystem functions 
and sites of ecological significance (e.g. Ramsar-listed wetlands, the Murray River 
mouth, etc.). 
Environmental requirement—describes a dependence of ecosystem functions on 
periodic or sustained flooding, waterlogging or significant inputs of surface water or 
groundwater to continue functioning. 
Environmental water flows—the water provided to wetlands, floodplains or rivers to 
achieve desired outcomes (under the Basin Plan). Outcomes include benefits to 
ecosystem functions, biodiversity, and improved water quality and water resource 
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health. At priority sites, these flows must be expressed in terms of flow volumes, 
duration, timing, frequency, cycle, inundation depth and dependence on groundwater. 
Environmental watering plan—as specified under the Basin Plan, safeguards 
existing environmental water, plans for the recovery of additional water and sets out 
arrangements to coordinate the use of environmental water throughout the MDB. As 
such, it is a voluntary agreement between the MDBA and the various holders of held 
environmental water, and/or managers of planned environmental water that is 
made to coordinate environmental water flows and application. 
Exit fee—a charge (often per megalitre) imposed on the permanent trade and 
subsequent loss of a water access entitlement out of an irrigation district or area. 
These fees are charged to maintain the delivery infrastructure or any stranded assets 
that remain after the water access entitlement has left the area. 
Extraction—includes the capture of surface water or groundwater that would otherwise 
flow directly into a watercourse, lake, wetland, aquifer, dam or reservoir. An extraction 
activity may include building new dams or storages on private property, constructing 
pumping infrastructure along a water course or establishing extensive tree plantations. 
General (low) security entitlement—a water access entitlement (right) that varies 
significantly from year to year, such that the water supplied is uncertain. The supply 
under general (low) security may be expressed as providing water in, for example, 40% 
of years. 
Gigalitre (GL)—equates to one billion litres of water. 
Held environmental water—water available under a water access right(s) for 
achieving targeted environmental outcomes. 
High security entitlement—a water access entitlement (right) that does not vary 
significantly from year to year and is expected to be available in all but the worst 
droughts. The supply under high security may be expressed as providing water in, for 
example, 98% of years. 
Inflows—water generated by rainfall that runs off the land and enters surface water or 
groundwater systems to form water resources. 
Irrigation infrastructure operator (IIO)—may be a company or corporation (or other 
legal person) that operates the infrastructure for delivering irrigation water. 
Lease—the passing of benefits and responsibilities associated with ownership of a 
water access right or allocation to another person for a fixed (long-term) period. 
Megalitre (ML)—equates to one million litres of water. One thousand megalitres 
equates to one gigalitre. 
Murray-Darling Basin (MDB)—Australia’s largest externally emptying catchment 
comprising the confluence of the Darling and Murray Rivers (and 21 other associated 
tributaries). Made up of 19 surface water resource areas and 23 groundwater resource 
areas the MDB represents 14% of Australia’s total land area. 
Murray-Darling Basin Authority (MDBA)—statutory body created under the Water 
Act (2007) to administer the MDB and oversee the creation of the Basin Plan and 
associated documents. 
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National Water Initiative (NWI)—agreement between the Australian, state and 
territory governments (Basin states) to: i) improve the management of the nation’s 
water resources and; ii) provide greater certainty for future investment. 
Off-allocation—when regulated tributary inflows or spills are sufficient to supply 
irrigation needs and downstream obligations. These rights have now been largely 
abolished. 
Option contract—an agreement entered into between two (or more) parties where the 
first party agrees to supply goods or services (e.g. allocation water) at a future time 
when the second party demands them. To bind the parties an initial (strike) price is set 
and paid to the supplier. When the second party activates the agreement terms, full 
settlement of the agreed remaining transaction price will take place. 
Over-allocation—the issuing of more water access rights to extract water than can 
be physically achieved and sustainably provided by the system in light of sustainable 
diversion limits. The inclusion of previously unconsidered environmental needs for 
water allows a higher probability of this scenario occurring. 
Over-use—a predominant application of water resources to one use, rather than to 
other available uses. 
Permanent crops—agricultural commodities that typically are planted, take 2-5 years 
to mature and then provide regular seasonal harvests for a prolonged period thereafter. 
As such, the decision to proceed (or not) with permanent crops cannot be made 
independently each year depending on seasonal, price and other factors and 
unfavourable input or output conditions must be endured. Examples include fruit trees, 
grapevines, nut plantations etc. 
Planned (rules-based) environmental water—water committed by legislation to 
achieving environmental outcomes, and which cannot be used for other purposes 
except under very specific circumstances. 
Private diverter—this is an irrigator who has invested in their own infrastructure to 
extract water from a river for productive gain. These types of users differ from those in 
irrigation districts, who have their water delivered through shared infrastructure 
arrangements. 
Ramsar convention—is an international treaty on wetlands of international 
importance, which provides a framework for national action and international 
cooperation for the conservation and use of wetlands and their resources. 
Refugia—comprise areas of refuge where animals and plants can survive when 
conditions are challenging (e.g. during extended drought). For example, 
semipermanent wetlands provide refuge areas for plants and animals when they 
cannot survive in other parts of the landscape. These populations can then breed and 
repopulate larger areas when conditions improve. 
Regulated streams—waterways where users are supplied by releases from storages. 
A water access entitlement for a regulated stream specifies a base water entitlement 
defining the holder’s share of the resources from the stream. 
Reliability—the frequency with which water allocated under a water access 
entitlement is able to be supplied in full. See also high security and/or general (low) 
security entitlement above. 
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Sales water—a (now defunct) Victorian term where inflows to the water resource are 
so large that greater than 100% seasonal allocation announcements can be made to 
water users. Allocations above 100% then become known as ‘sales water’. The 
maximum total sales water allocations in the Goulburn and Victorian Murray systems 
were 200%, while in the Campaspe Basin sales water allocations could reach 220%. 
Storage inflow—this is the volume of water that flows into storages over a period of 
time from upstream tributaries, storage catchment runoff and/or rainfall on the storage 
itself. 
Storage release—the volume of water released from a dam, weir or other storage 
facility to meet downstream demands. Note that this may be less that storage demand 
due to release or operational constraints. 
Storage spill—the volume of water discharged from a storage facility (usually over 
designated spillway structures or large capacity outlets) in excess of storage capacity 
and/or demand. 
Stranded assets—an asset that is worth less on the market than it is on the balance 
sheet because it has become obsolete before being fully depreciated by an irrigation 
infrastructure operators (IIO). In irrigation areas, when there is a permanent 
decrease in the demand for water delivery services the assets of IIO can become 
unused or underused and are then said to be stranded. 
Sustainable diversion limits—the maximum long-term annual average quantities of 
water that can be taken on a sustainable basis from the Basin’s total water resources 
and from each SDL resource unit (area). If exceeded, the extraction would likely 
compromise one or more of the following: 
 Key environmental assets of the water resource 
 Key ecosystem functions of the water resource 
 The productive (consumptive) base of the water resource 
 Key environmental outcomes for the water resource 
Third-party interests—other water users not involved in a trade, or non-water users 
who could potentially be impacted by a trade or carry-over decision. 
Trade—change of ownership (in this case of a water entitlement or allocation water), 
either absolutely or for a fixed period. 
Trade zone—a specific area-based district where water can be traded to and from. 
These are typically based on physical irrigation water delivery system boundaries. 
Unbundling—the legal separation of rights to land and rights to access water, have 
water delivered, use water on land or operate water infrastructure. 
Unregulated stream—streams that are not controlled or regulated by releases from 
storages. The ability to take water from unregulated streams may be based on 
opportunistic flood flows or events. 
Water access right(s)—any right determined by state law to hold and/or extract water 
from a water resource. Water access rights include stock and domestic rights, riparian 
rights, water entitlements and water allocations (in Qld). 
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Water entitlements—confer the owner with perpetual access to a share of water from 
a specified consumptive pool. Transferring a water entitlement shifts ownership of the 
access right from one legal entity to another. Water resources are only available under 
a water entitlement through provision of allocation water. 
Water recovery measures—represent ways to acquire water resources, other than 
through reduction of existing water entitlements, in order to return water to the 
environment. This can include purchasing water entitlements from willing irrigation 
sellers (buy-back) and/or investing in water saving technology, such as infrastructure 
water use efficiency improvement. 
Water resources—includes all surface water or groundwater such as a lakes, 
wetlands, watercourses or aquifers within or beneath the Murray-Darling Basin, 
excepting groundwater in the Great Artesian Basin. Also included are the water, plants, 
animals and other organisms and components that contribute to the physical state and 
environmental value of the water body. 
Water resource plans—set out how water resources will be managed, usually for a 
10-year period. Water resource plans are developed by the states or in certain 
circumstances by the MDBA under approval of the Commonwealth Water Minister. 
Water use efficiency (WUE)—improvements in the utilisation of water resources so 
that beneficial objectives (e.g. increased delivery volumes due to reduced leakage) or 
better outcomes (e.g. consistent crop yield from a lower volume of water applied to the 
field) can be achieved. 
Water year (accounting period)—describes a 12-month period from July 1 to 30 
June, similar to a financial year. For critical human needs the period alters to between 
1 June and 31 May. In the report this may also be referred to as a water season. 
 Water markets in climate change adaption  xi 
ABSTRACT 
Water markets were first introduced in Australia in the 1980s, and water entitlement 
and allocation trade have been increasingly adopted by both private individuals and 
government. Irrigators turned to water markets (particularly for allocation water) to 
manage water scarcity and Governments to acquire water for the environment 
(particularly water entitlements. It is expected that further adoption of water markets will 
be essential for coping with future climate change impacts. This report reviews the 
available literature related to the relationship between southern Murray-Darling Basin 
(sMDB) water markets and anticipated climate change effects; the economic, social 
and environmental impacts of water reallocation through markets; and future 
development requirements to enhance positive outcomes in these areas. 
The use of water markets by irrigators can involve both transformational (selling all 
water entitlements and relocating or switching to dry land) and incremental (e.g. buying 
water allocations/entitlements, using carry-over, changing water management 
techniques) adaptation to climate change. Barriers to both adaptations include: current 
and future climate uncertainty; poor (or non-existent) market signals; financial 
constraints; information barriers; mental processing limits; inherent attitudes toward or 
beliefs about climate change; institutional barriers and disincentives to adapt. 
A better understanding of trade behaviour, especially strategic trade issues that can 
lead to market failures, will improve the economic advantages of water trade. There 
remains community concerns about the impacts of transfers away from regional areas 
such as reduced community spending and reinvestment; population losses; loss of 
jobs; declining taxation base, loss of local services and businesses, regional production 
changes; and legacy issues for remaining farmers. However, it is hard to disentangle 
these impacts from those caused by ongoing structural change in agriculture. Rural 
communities that are most vulnerable to water scarcity under climate change and water 
trade adjustment include smaller irrigation-dependent towns. Communities less 
dependent on irrigation are better able to adapt. Further, where environmental 
managers use water markets to deal with water variability and to ensure ecological 
benefits, irrigators are concerned about its impact on their traditional use of markets to 
manage scarcity. 
Climate change and water scarcity management are intertwined, suggesting that 
policy, institutional and governance arrangements to deal with such issues should be 
similarly structured. Water users will adapt, either out of necessity or opportunity. The 
cost of that adaptation at individual, regional and national levels – particularly to future 
water supply variability – can be mitigated by the consideration of the existing 
advantages from future opportunities for water marketing in Australia. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In the past decade, Australia has used a range of programs and incentives, but in 
particular water markets, to reallocate water from consumptive users to the 
environment in the southern Murray-Darling Basin (sMDB). Irrigators used water 
markets as a risk-management strategy to manage water scarcity. The extremely dry 
period between 1998/99 and 2009/10 could be used as an indicator of future climate 
change impacts and water user adaptation. 
Across all water user groups, further adoption of water markets will be part of the 
package of adaptation strategies for coping with future climate change impacts. This 
report reviews the literature related to the relationship between sMDB water markets 
and future climate change effects; the economic, social and environmental impacts of 
water reallocation through markets; and discusses potential water market 
developments needed. It identifies how water markets augment national capacity to 
deal with future water scarcity issues under climate change. 
Predicted Murray-Darling Basin (MDB) climate change outcomes 
Predicted water scarcity outcomes include: 
 Population growth and climate change will put water security at risk. 
 Drought frequency will increase in the southern and south-eastern regions 
(e.g. sMDB), whereas heavy rainfall and tropical cyclone events will increase 
in the north eastern regions of the MDB. Southern drought impacts will be 
exacerbated by decreasing rainfall and increasing temperatures. 
 Total MDB surface water availability is predicted to decline by 11% in a 
median 2030 scenario, with reduced end-of-system flows in South Australia. 
 Supply reliability will suffer, with the security of general water entitlements in 
NSW and low security water entitlements in Victoria being particularly 
affected. 
 There will be an increase in extensive and prolonged flooding, causing 
infrastructure damage and production/environmental losses. 
Water user adaptation 
Water users will need to continue to adapt to changing water supply and demand 
conditions. Adaptation in response to perceived or actual climate change will likely 
occur via: 
 Transformational adaptation of livelihood, location or identity (e.g. farm exit 
and relocation to a different area, selling part or all of their water entitlements 
and/or shifting to dry-land farming practices); and/or 
 Incremental adaptation of actions, decisions or information sources (e.g. 
adopting water-use efficiency improvements, investing in more water or land 
and/or diversifying income from new commodity or off-farm sources). 
Barriers to adaptation include current and future climate uncertainty; poor market 
signals; financial constraints; information barriers; mental processing limits; inherent 
attitudes toward or beliefs about climate change; and disincentives to adapt. Irrigation 
productivity seems to be adaptable to drought in the short-run, but water supply and 
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water use efficiency will become increasingly important, and further research on long-
term impacts is needed. 
Water markets 
It is apparent that water trade (particularly water allocations) has become entrenched 
as a key risk-management tool to manage water scarcity, particularly during severe 
droughts. 
Periodic water shortages have driven the expansion and development of markets to 
reallocate scarce water resources between different users (including urban) in a 
relatively effective/efficient manner. As climate change is set to exacerbate water 
scarcity and variability, the usefulness of water markets as an adaptation tool 
becomes increasingly important. 
Economic impacts  
The economic benefits of water trade for climate change adaptation include 
allocative, dynamic and productive efficiency – which has resulted in reasonable 
reallocation of scarce water resources during the last few decades. Water markets 
have performed relatively well in drought impact mitigation, resource reallocation and 
economic production facilitation. 
The expansion of direct market intervention by governments since 2003 has brought 
focus on the progress, outcomes and development of water markets to deliver 
economic and environmental welfare changes. A better understanding of trade 
behaviour, especially strategic behaviour which can lead to market failures, will 
improve economic benefits. 
Social impacts  
Nevertheless, there remains limited evidence of negative social impacts from water 
trade. Community concerns over water transfers away from a regional area includes: 
reduced community spending and reinvestment; population losses; employment 
losses; declining taxation base, loss of services and businesses, regional production 
changes (e.g. shifts to dry-land farming); and legacy issues for remaining farmers 
(e.g. higher variable farm operating costs, stranded asset problems and/or pressure 
to rationalise marginal operations). Although repeatedly associated with water trade, 
many such social issues are associated with ongoing structural change in agriculture 
and it has been proven difficult to disaggregate them and establish causal 
relationships between trade and social change. 
Smaller irrigation-dependent towns are most vulnerable to water scarcity under 
climate change. Less dependence on irrigated agriculture makes rural communities 
more adaptable. Around 10 districts in the MDB have been identified as having a 
particularly low adaptive capacity index—several of them associated with irrigation 
areas (e.g. south of Griffith in NSW, south of Mildura in Victoria and along the SA 
Murray River). 
Environmental impacts 
For the most part, water trade has benefited the environment in terms of river flows, 
lower salinity, downstream movements, and a larger portion of water holdings for the 
environment. However, the largest negative consequence of water trade stemmed 
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from the activation of significant water entitlement volumes after a cap on extraction 
was imposed. Previously, these water entitlements were un-utilised or under-used, 
resulting in increased stream-flow. 
Other negative environmental impacts are difficult to identify—in part because of data 
issues. Common concerns include: 
 Concentrating water use in areas suffering from high water tables. 
 Moving water into locations where its’ use might have a negative impact on 
river water quality due to e.g. higher groundwater salinity levels. 
 Moving water use upstream, thereby resulting in reduced river flow from the 
new point of extraction to the old point of extraction. 
 Activating previously unused water leaving less water in the river to support 
ecosystems. 
In response, a variety of controls have been put in place by state governments to limit 
potential environmental harm increasing transaction costs. 
Modelling suggests that the hydrologic and environmental impacts between 1998/99 
to 2010/11 were small and largely positive; due to the downstream movement of 
water reducing summer flow stress without changing winter flow patterns. 
Regulatory change such as carry-over has enabled water users to avoid previous 
strategies of either consuming all of their water each season (which could result in 
increased seepage, high water tables, larger return flows) or trade surplus water on 
the market (enabling changes to location, timing and use of water) 
Future water market improvements 
This report has focussed on three broad areas of water market reform: 
Institutional: removing trade restrictions to allow for more efficient transfers to 
facilitate more fluid farm adjustment; better groundwater regulation to avoid over-
allocation; expanded water trade products and markets (and cross-sector interaction); 
improved approval procedures; and greater transparency where potential conflicts of 
interest may arise; 
Informational: more robust and detailed market price signals; greater use and 
prediction of future climatic information; improved seasonal water allocation 
announcements; and research into farm adaptive responses (and capacity) across 
regions and industry sectors; and 
Political: regulation for brokers to assure market confidence and avoid catastrophic 
(e.g. massive confidence loss) events; improved carry-over rules across states and 
districts; investigation into the opportunity cost of further infrastructure investments or 
alternative recovery programs; and education of farmers and rural communities in 
order to address climate change beliefs, attitudes and improve adjustment and 
adaptation responses. 
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1. EXPECTED SOUTHERN MURRAY-DARLING BASIN 
CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS 
1.1. Background 
This report constitutes the major deliverable component of a National Climate Change 
Adaptation Research Facility (NCCARF) funded project [SD11-16]. The project 
developed from a national need to better understand the relationship between water 
markets, irrigators’ adaptability to water supply variability, anticipated future climate 
change effects and consequent water reallocation requirements. 
1.1.1. Purpose of the report 
The purpose of this report is to undertake a literature review of the consequences of 
sMDB water markets. This review of the ecological, social and economic water 
market consequences provides some evidence of how water users can adapt to 
future climate change. 
To achieve this outcome the report seeks to cover a wide range of disciplines, 
building upon current National Water Commission (NWC) overviews into the social 
and economic impacts of water trade (for example, NWC, 2011b, NWC, 2012a, NWC, 
2011g, NWC, 2011f). In particular, we will detail how a range of water market 
participation strategies used (e.g. type of water market used, type of security traded, 
the timing and/or volume of sale/purchase) influence farm or ecosystem viability. 
Further, we will examine what effect changed institutional structures, water 
allocations, and rainfall events have on particular bidding and offering strategies 
among sMDB water users. Finally, we will provide evidence-based policy 
recommendations on how to make water markets more efficient and better positioned 
to allow water users to adapt to changing water supply conditions in the future. 
1.2. Introduction 
Water resources in Australia are under pressure due to rapid population growth and 
anticipated climate change and variability (Chowdhury and Beecham, 2012). The 
country’s population has doubled since 1955 and was 22 million in 2009. It is 
anticipated that an additional 4.5 million people will be added in the next quarter of a 
century. This projected population growth will increase water demand. A great 
challenge for the agricultural sector will therefore be to produce more food from less 
water, particularly in arid and semi-arid regions of Australia which suffer from water 
scarcity (Hassanli et al., 2009). 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007) has predicted that 
Australian average temperatures will increase by between 0.6 and 1.5°C by 2030, 
while annual rainfall will decrease in the southern and north-eastern region and 
available moisture will also decrease all over Australia. Drought frequency will 
increase in the southern and south-eastern region, whereas heavy rainfall and 
tropical cyclone events will increase in the north eastern regions. Therefore, both 
population growth and climate change will impose significant pressures on the 
country’s water security. 
Rainfall is the key climate variable that governs the spatial and temporal availability of 
water. Evidence of global warming is becoming widely accepted, for example IPCC 
(2007). However, evidence of change on a local scale can be more equivocal. Within 
Australia, the effect of changing climatic conditions in the MDB, which covers 14% of 
the land area, is of particular concern. Over the last one hundred and twenty years, 
there have been three particularly notable droughts affecting the MDB (see Figure 
11): the Federation drought which began in the mid-1890s and reached its 
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devastating climax in 1902; the World War II drought which started in 1937 and lasted 
until 1945; and the recent Millennium drought which was the worst recorded 
Australian drought. In the presence of climate change induced uncertainty, water 
systems need to be more resilient and multi-sourced (Horne, 2012a). This is partly 
because of decreasing volumetric rainfall trends in many parts of the world, which 
might have severe effects on reservoir yields and operational practices. Further, 
severe intensity rainfall events can cause flood inundation problems (Beecham and 
Chowdhury, 2012). 
In addition to this increased vulnerability, there is also strong evidence that the 
probabilities and risks of extreme events are changing in response to global warming. 
In their Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), the IPCC of the World Meteorological 
Organization and the United Nations Environment Program reports a worldwide 
increase in the frequency of extreme rain storms for the late 20th century as a result of 
global warming (IPCC, 2007, WMO, 2009). Based on climate model simulations with 
different future greenhouse gas (GHG) emission scenarios, IPCC (2007) furthermore 
concluded that it is very likely that this trend will continue in the 21st century. The 
consequences of these changes have to be assessed in a perspective of sustainable 
development. Water managers have to anticipate these changes in order to limit flood 
risks for communities.  
1.3. Rainfall Variability 
Australian rainfall exhibits a high degree of spatial and temporal variability 
(Chowdhury and Beecham, 2010). Knowledge and understanding of rainfall variability 
and the factors influencing the variability are important for managing water resources. 
In recent decades, the Australian climate has been changing, with higher 
temperatures and less rainfall. From 1910 to 2006, the mean temperature increased 
at a rate of 0.09°C/decade and from 1970 to 2006 this rate increased to 
0.19°C/decade. In the southeast region of Australia, from 1997 to 2006, only 2 years 
exceeded the 1961-1990 mean rainfall value (Murphy and Timbal, 2008). 
The period 2001 to 2005 has been identified as the driest period since 1968 and the 
warmest period for the New South Wales (NSW) region (Rakich and Wiles, 2006). 
According to Murphy and Timbal (2008), the southeast region has been experiencing 
an annual rainfall downward trend at the rate of 20.6 mm/decade since 1950. 
Simmonds and Hope (1997) suggested that many aspects of climate experienced 
change around 1950. They describe how these changes are reflected in the 
persistence nature of Australian rainfall. 
In recent years most of Australia has been suffering from an extended dry period that 
has led to a number of economic and environmental impacts. The River Murray, 
which is the largest river system in Australia, received only 40% of the long-term 
mean inflows during 2001 to 2005 (MDBC, 2006b). In the lower Murray region, 
floodplains and wetlands have been under severe environmental threat due to the 
lack of flooding in recent years. South-eastern Australia (Victoria, parts of New South 
Wales and South Australia) has been experiencing low rainfall since 1997, and a 61% 
decline has occurred in the autumn season (March-May) (Murphy and Timbal, 2008). 
Taschetto and England (2009) investigated post 1970 Australian rainfall trends. They 
identified an increasing trend to the west (except coastlines) and a decreasing trend 
on the northeast coast. Smith et al. (2000) reported a significant decrease in winter 
rainfall in the southwest region of Western Australia since the 1960s. The recent 
decline in rainfall in some parts of Australia affects the availability of freshwater and 
subsequently agricultural production.  
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1.3.1. Trends in Rainfall Processes 
Due to natural climatic and sampling variability it is difficult to distinguish trends from 
variability (e.g. Frei and Schar, 2001, Rauch and de Toffol, 2006, Verworn et al., 
2008). The smaller the scale or the more extreme the values, the more difficult this 
becomes. Averaging over larger regions reduces the natural variability more than 
averaging over smaller areas. Due to the climate oscillations, trend testing results 
may be biased (as discussed previously) but may also strongly depend on the period 
selected. For example, in Australia, the relatively low rainfall in the first half of the 
twentieth century provides some precedent for the decreases since 1990. It is 
plausible that there are a few abrupt changes in rainfall and temperature time series, 
perhaps influenced by annual changes in ocean currents, rather than some more 
systematic trends. 
1.3.2. Climate Indices and their Influence on Australian Hydro-climatic 
Variables 
The concept of “drivers” of climate variability is useful and is widespread in similar 
studies overseas (Chowdhury and Beecham, 2010). However, it is important to note 
that indices that have predictive power in the current climate may have lesser 
influence in a future changed climate. 
Among various hydro-climate variables (rainfall, evapotranspiration, temperature, 
humidity), rainfall is the most important and most studied variable because of its 
significance for sustainable water, agriculture and ecological management. Several 
previous studies have investigated rainfall characteristics, variability and trends as 
well as mechanisms for their spatial and temporal changes in Australia (Murphy and 
Timbal, 2008, Chambers, 2003, Chowdhury and Beecham, 2010, Beecham and 
Chowdhury, 2010) and around the world (Cheng et al., 2004, Ventura et al., 2002, del 
Río et al., 2005, Rauch and de Toffol, 2006). Generally, Australian rainfall exhibits a 
high degree of spatial and temporal variability. Chowdhury and Beecham (2010) and 
Beecham and Chowdhury (2010) have identified significant temporal variability at fine 
temporal scales (sub-daily). The persistence characteristics of Australian rainfall have 
been identified by Simmonds and Hope (1997). 
Australian rainfall is believed to be influenced by several natural climate phenomena 
that originate from the Pacific, Indian and Southern Oceans. Identified key climate 
drivers include the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO), the Pacific and Indian Ocean 
sea surface temperature (SST) variability, the sub-tropical ridge, the Southern 
Annular Mode (SAM) and the Madden-Julian Oscillation (MJO) (Cai et al., 2011, 
Chowdhury and Beecham, 2010, McBride and Nicholls, 1983, Smith et al., 2000, 
Drosdowsky, 2005, Donald et al., 2006, Hendon et al., 2007, Meneghini et al., 2007). 
Recent studies have claimed that the ENSO and Indian Ocean Dipole (IOD) 
phenomena significantly influence eastern and southern Australian rainfall, 
respectively (Cai et al., 2011). In addition to the Pacific Ocean SST, influence from 
the Indian Ocean SST was identified in some previous studies (Ummenhofer et al., 
2008, England et al., 2006). 
The influences from these climate phenomena generally vary spatially within 
Australia. The relative influence of these phenomena on rainfall and their 
teleconnection pathways is of current research interest. Recent variability in 
Australian rainfall imposes a challenge for the sustainable management of water 
resources. Understanding this variability and the factors influencing this phenomenon 
are very important for water managers and policy makers.  
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1.4. Hydro-climatic Projections of Rainfall and Runoff 
Projection of water availability in a changing climate is a well-researched area. Three 
steps are generally followed in hydrological projections. First, global climate models 
(GCMs) are used to predict scenarios of climate variables. Second, an appropriate 
stochastic or dynamic downscaling technique is used to generate catchment scale 
climate scenarios from the GCM outcomes. Third, a calibrated hydrologic model is 
applied for runoff scenario development. Several studies examine the changes in 
rainfall patterns and their effects on hydrology, stormwater management, agricultural 
practices and stream ecosystems (Willems and Vrac, 2011, Chiew et al., 2010, 
Beecham and Chowdhury, 2012, Cheng et al., 2004). Among climate variables, 
rainfall is the key parameter that significantly affects runoff scenarios (Chiew, 2006, 
Xu, 1999). Therefore both rainfall and hydrologic modelling processes are important 
in climate change impact assessment on catchment hydrology. 
A large number of studies have been carried out in rainfall modelling in order to 
generate synthetic rainfall data considering future climate change and variability 
scenarios (Srikanthan et al., 2005, Rosenberg, 2004, Coombes et al., 2003). Several 
stochastic and dynamic downscaling techniques have been used for catchment scale 
rainfall scenario generations (Chiew et al., 2009, Chiew et al., 2010). While each 
technique is adequate in reproducing historical rainfall characteristics, a wide range of 
variability has been observed in generated rainfall scenarios. These lead to a wide 
range of variability and uncertainty in hydrological projections. 
Climate change adaptation and mitigation policies are generally developed based on 
projected changes in rainfall and runoff (Kirono et al., 2007). Hydro-climatic 
projections are particularly important for Australia, where rainfall and runoff exhibits 
significant spatial and temporal variability (Chowdhury and Beecham, 2010, Beecham 
and Chowdhury, 2010) and where supply of water resources is a major constraint for 
spatial urban area development (Evans and Schreider, 2002). 
The recent Millennium drought from 1997 to 2009 caused severe reductions of water 
runoff and water use in the southern MDB. The impact of climate change on rainfall 
and resource reductions is uncertain. In Australia areas with severe below average 
rainfall conditions are located in the south-east, the south-west, and south-east 
Queensland (Figure 1). Similar future conditions are likely to occur with slight regional 
runoff reductions in southern coastal areas under wet extreme projections (Figure 2). 
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Figure 1 Rainfall deciles across Australia (01.01.97 – 31.12.2009) 
based on climatology 1900 – 2009 
Source: CSIRO (2008b) 
 
 
Figure 2 Change in average annual runoff for 1°C global warming (2030 vs. 
1990) 
Source: CSIRO (2008b) 
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In general, average annual runoff could only be maintained in north-west Australia. 
Most severe reductions are seen to be in the south-west of Western Australia (-25%) 
and the southern MDB (-10%). 
1.4.1. Murray-Darling Basin Hydro-climatic Projections of Rainfall and 
Runoff 
Several studies have projected hydrological consequences of climate change in 
Australian catchments (Chiew and McMahon, 2002, Chiew, 2006, Chiew et al., 2009, 
Chiew et al., 2010, Evans and Schreider, 2002, Schreider et al., 1997, Whetton et al., 
1993, Close, 1988, Nathan et al., 1988). Most of them have developed annual runoff 
availability scenarios for some regions. Limited studies have actually focused on 
catchment scale projections of hydrological characteristics and their possible 
consequences. 
As discussed above, the recent Millennium drought had a major impact in these areas 
due to reduced storage levels in reservoirs, less allocated water for irrigation 
especially in the southern MDB, urban water restrictions, and partly suspensions of 
water sharing arrangements. It is likely that such conditions—similar to characteristics 
of the Millennium drought—will become more frequent in the future with major 
economic, environmental and social impact. South-eastern Australia comprising the 
entire MDB was heavily affected by the recent drought period (Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3 Difference (%) between mean annual rainfall and runoff in 1997 – 
2008 and the long-term means (1895 – 2008) 
Source: CSIRO (2008b) 
Before continuing, it must be noted that in this report we focus much of our discussion 
on the southern MDB, because that is where much of the Basin’s water trade takes 
place. This is in no small part due to the nature of the interconnected river systems 
and trade regimes. This should not be interpreted as a measure of disinterest on our 
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part in the northern Basin and its issues. On the contrary, there are many interesting 
and important trade issues that will form part of a Nation Water Commission project 
exploring emerging groundwater markets, water quality markets and other surface 
water trade issues outside the MDB. However, for our purposes a larger proportion of 
data and measures are available from the southern trade zones, so we tend to focus 
our discussion on that context. 
Compared to the long-term mean, runoff in the southern MDB during the recent 
drought period was far below the long term mean and mostly twice as low as the 
lower mean rainfall. Reduced runoff has never been as severe as during the 
Millennium drought. By 2030 the impact of climate change on average runoff is seen 
to be relatively minor (reduction), whereas the amplitude of annual and decennial 
variability is projected to be much stronger. In the future, droughts are predicted to be 
more intense while floods may become less frequent (Saleth et al., 2011). The 
discrepancy between water supply and demand may therefore increase. By 2070 the 
average runoff could reach a level similar to levels during the recent drought. 
The most comprehensive analysis so far in the MDB has been the MDB Sustainable 
Yields Project, conducted by CSIRO for MDBA. The MDB Sustainable Yields Project 
assessed the anticipated impacts of climate change, catchment development and 
increasing groundwater extraction on the availability and use of water resources in 
the Basin. The report uses long-term (1895-2006) and recent (1997-2006) historical 
data, as well as future climate scenarios applying multiple global climate models and 
considering potential developments (Figure 4). 
 
 
Figure 4 Overview of Murray-Darling Basin Sustainable Yields Project regions 
Source: CSIRO (2008b) 
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The report findings suggested that downstream at the mouth of the River Murray the 
total flow of water has been reduced by 61%, with the river not flowing through the 
mouth 40% of the time. The question of how climate change will affect the system is 
not without uncertainty. A range of scenarios were considered: median, dry extreme 
and wet extreme. It seems highly likely that surface water availability will decline in 
the MDB. By 2030 the surface water availability is projected to be reduced by 11% in 
the median scenario (i.e. 2,481 GL/year less surface water across the MDB), ranging 
from 9% in the northern part of the MDB and 13% in the southern MDB. 
Under the median water availability decline scenario, total surface water use would 
reduce by 4% under current water sharing arrangements. Consequently, there would 
be larger impact at the mouth of the river, with flows reduced by 24% and losses 
increased by 12%. About two thirds of the total diversion reduction would occur in the 
regions Murray, Goulburn-Broken and Murrumbidgee. This reduction would mean that 
less than a third of the total flows would reach the Murray mouth. Therefore, it can be 
stated that future volumetric reduction is rather caused by climate change impacts on 
environment than by changes in water use. The effect on reduced surface water will 
be much greater in years of drought. 
In support of these findings are the more recent key findings from the south eastern 
Australian climate initiative (SEACI) project (CSIRO, 2010, CSIRO, 2012). This 
project finds that climate drivers in the region have shifted southward, translating into 
considerable reductions (between 2 and 22 per cent south of 33° latitude) to winter 
and annual rainfall runoff if the average global temperature increases by 1°C. 
Predictions for northern MDB climate change were less certain across models, with 
some rainfall and runoff increases predicted. In general, the SEACI recommendations 
were for water managers and users to identify robust and adaptive processes to suit a 
wide range of future uncertain climate and stream-flow scenarios. To assist water 
users adapt to stream-flow variability, the Australian Bureau of Meteorology (BoM) 
has been tasked with providing improved stream-flow forecasting tools, which may 
interact with water markets to enhance regional information provided to users during 
extreme events (see for example http://www.bom.gov.au/water/ssf/ ). 
A strong variation of surface water diversion development in the future is very much 
dependent on the regions within the MDB. At the regional level, under median global 
warming scenarios water diversions in driest years would fall by 10% in most NSW 
regions (increasing to around 20% in Murray and Murrumbidgee), and by between 
35% and 50% in Victorian regions by 2030. Considering the extreme dry scenario 
these numbers would change to 40-50% in NSW (or over 70% in Murray), and 
between 80% and 90% in Victorian regions. 
By 2030 surface water diversion could also reduce up to 10% in the Wimmera region 
related to historical climate and current water resource developments. Other above 
average affected regions are Gwydir and Lachlan (both 8%), Moonie, Loddon-Avoca, 
and Goulbourn-Broken (all 6%), and Campaspe (5%). Obviously, on the basis of 
these predictions Victorian water regions would be more affected. The extent of 
surface water availability and use would vary greatly according to extremely dry or 
wet conditions. The impact of climate change is seen to be greatest in the south-east 
MDB (Figure 5). The Murray, Goulburn-Broken and Murrumbidgee regions would be 
most affected by reduced surface water availability. The major issue regarding the 
relationship between projected available water, water use and a potential continuation 
of current water sharing is the water supply for the environment within the system. 
Consumptive water users would be less affected. 
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Figure 5 Percentage changes in average surface water availability by region 
(median 2030 climate projection) 
Source: CSIRO (2008b) 
 
1.4.2. Groundwater in the MDB 
By 2030 groundwater use in the MDB could nearly double from currently 16% to over 
25% as a share of total water use, although such estimates may significantly 
underestimate future demand pressures (Barron et al., 2011). In many high-use 
groundwater areas practices are unsustainable, with 11 out of 14 national 
groundwater aquifers determined to currently experience between 60% and 80+% 
use by agriculture, domestic and town supply and/or commercial and mining uses 
(Barron et al., 2011). 
Regarding the future development in ground water, changes in rainfall recharge and 
ground water levels would be relatively small compared to future changes in 
extraction, which could reach nearly 1,800 GL/year by 2024 (MDBA, 2011b); much of 
that increase at costless or heavily discounted access prices for users (Cosier et al., 
2012). 
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Table 1 Proposed changes in MDB water extractions by catchment/region 
Catchment  Trading Zone  Net Change in Volume 
  Groundwater Surface water 
Condamine  Northern  29.8  -60.0  
Border Rivers QLD  Northern  95.7  -8.0  
Warrego Paroo  Northern  264.0  -9.0  
Namoi  Northern  0.0  -10.0  
Central West  Northern  0.0  -65.0  
Maranoa Balonne  Northern  19.9  -40.0  
Border Rivers Gwydir  Northern  353.0  -49.0  
Western  Northern  277.9  -6.0  
Lachlan  Unconnected  481.2  -48.0  
Murrumbidgee  Southern  0.0  -320.0  
North East  Southern  0.0  -32.9  
Murray 1  Southern  0.1  -7.9  
Goulburn Broken  Southern  -21.6  -387.3  
Murray 2  Southern  1.3  -131.0  
North Central  Southern  0.0  -194.5  
Murray 3  Southern  1.1  -117.9  
Mallee  Southern  84.8  -30.4  
Lower Murray Darling  Southern  0.1  -13.2  
SA MDB  Southern  210.8  -101.0  
 TOTAL 1,798.0  -1,631.0  
Further Reduction Trading Zones:   
 Northern  -143.0  
 Southern  -971.0  
 Total surface reductions  2,745.0  
 TOTAL Net Change 
(Ground + Surface) 
  
-947.0  
Source: (MDBA, 2011b) 
Regions like Border Rivers, Lower and Upper Lachlan and the SA Murray would not 
be sustainable due to increases in ground water extraction levels. Rainfall recharge of 
groundwater is expected to slightly decrease in the south and slightly increase in the 
north of the MDB under median climate conditions by 2030. Overall, water exchange 
would see no net impact across the MDB. Extreme climate conditions such as the 
recent Millennium drought period are likely to become more common. If and to what 
extent such developments are attributable to global climate change remains uncertain 
although research indicates a potential relationship. 
CSIRO (2008c) also revealed that high reliability water, e.g. for town water supplies, 
will not be affected by climate change. However, ‘general security’ and ‘low reliability’ 
water products would be more affected in future regarding average seasonal 
allocation volumes and the portion of time when 100% allocation could be assigned. 
Regions with relatively high surface water use would be most affected by reduced 
water reliability. The same applies to regions which water availability is highly 
vulnerable to climate change. Also water products that are already on a low reliability 
level will be more affected by reliability reduction. The regions Murray, Goulburn-
Broken, Campaspe, Loddon-Avoca and Wimmera would see highest reductions in 
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water reliability. Under the dry extreme 2030 climate reliability reduction would 
generally be larger. Therefore under current development and given historic climate 
patterns, the relative level of MDB surface water use could increase by 4% to 60%. 
This is because surface water use would reduce less than surface water availability. 
1.5. Effects on Evapotranspiration 
Finally, in terms of water markets and particularly irrigation, it is important to 
understand how climate change will influence not only rainfall and runoff but also 
evapotranspiration and other parts of the water balance including infiltration to 
groundwater. Evapotranspiration (ET) is the sum of evaporation and plant 
transpiration. Evaporation is the movement of water to the air from sources such as 
soil, vegetation interception and water bodies. Plant transpiration is the movement of 
water within a plant and the subsequent loss of water as vapour through stomata in 
its leaves (Rothfuss et al., 2010). Changes in evapotranspiration over land are 
controlled by changes in precipitation and solar-radiation intensity and the changes 
would, in turn, impact on the water balance of runoff, soil moisture, water in 
reservoirs, the groundwater table and the salinization of shallow aquifers (IPCC, 
2007). 
A plant’s water requirement is very complex to predict in practice. For agricultural 
crops, in order to achieve optimum yield, irrigation and rainfall should replace the total 
water lost through evapotranspiration (Nouri et al., 2012). In many agricultural 
systems, there is a uniformity of plant density, height, vigour and water availability 
which provide a straight forward approach for evapotranspiration measurement, 
although estimating the water requirements of such environments is not without 
challenge. With climate change, evaporative demand, or ‘potential evaporation’, is 
projected to increase almost everywhere (IPCC, 2007). This is because the water-
holding capacity of the atmosphere increases with higher temperatures. However, 
relative humidity is not projected to change markedly. Water vapour deficit in the 
atmosphere increases as a result, as does the evaporation rate (Trenberth et al., 
2003). 
1.6. Discussion 
In general, long-term historical trends due to anthropogenic climate change are 
difficult to quantify and verify because of limited data, instrumental or environmental 
changes, inter-annual variations and longer term climate oscillations. The problem of 
data limitation is very relevant when analysing trends. As highlighted by Frei and 
Schär (2001) and Schmidli and Frei (2005), the signal-to-noise ratio in a trend 
analysis depends on the record length, the trend magnitude, the ‘noise’ level (e.g. the 
magnitude of the variations), and the frequency of events under consideration. 
In the case where a historical trend is present and can be detected, extrapolation of 
this trend to future decades can be made but these will have an even higher degree 
of uncertainty. 
1.7. Key points 
The major points from this section include: 
 It has been predicted that Australian average temperatures will increase by 
between 0.6 and 1.5°C by 2030, while annual rainfall will decrease in the 
southern and north-eastern region and available moisture will also decrease 
all over Australia. Drought frequency will increase in the southern and south-
eastern region, whereas heavy rainfall and tropical cyclone events will 
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increase in the north eastern regions. Therefore both population growth and 
climate change will impose significant pressures on the country’s water 
security. 
 In the presence of climate change induced uncertainty, water systems need to 
be more resilient and multi-sourced. This is partly because of decreasing 
volumetric rainfall trends in many parts of the world, which might have severe 
effects on reservoir yields and operational practices. In addition, severe 
intensity rainfall events can cause flood inundation problems, and the 
probabilities and risks of extreme events are changing in response to global 
warming. 
 It has been predicted that surface water availability will decline in the MDB, by 
up to 11% in the median scenario by 2030, with more impact expected in the 
southern MDB. Flows as the end of the river would also be reduced, and more 
variability would be experienced in various regions (with Victoria most 
affected). In particular, the regions of Murray, Goulburn-Broken and 
Murrumbidgee would be most affected by reduced surface water availability. 
By 2030 groundwater use in the MDB is predicted to nearly double, and there 
are indications that in many high-use groundwater areas practices are 
unsustainable. 
 Security of water products will be affected, and in particular, ‘general security’ 
and ‘low reliability’ water products would be most affected in the future. 
 There are a range of measurement, data collection and analysis issues that 
must be taken into account when making and assessing climate change 
impacts predictions. However, the aggregate global and regional assessments 
of changes to Australian agriculture are expected to be significant over the 
next 20 to 30 years. 
  
 16 Water markets in climate change adaptation 
2. AGRICULTURAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS 
2.1. Agriculture and Water Supply 
Water is critically important in food production regionally and worldwide. More than 
80% of global agricultural land is rain-fed with crop productivity depending solely on 
precipitation (IPCC, 2007). In many arid and semi-arid regions, including Australia, 
the productivity of this land is limited by climate and as such agricultural production is 
very vulnerable to climate change (FAO, 2003). 
Irrigation accounts for approximately 70% of total water withdrawals worldwide and 
for more than 90% of consumptive water use. While irrigation only accounts for 18% 
of agricultural land it generates about 40% of total agricultural output. This is because 
irrigated crops yield on average 2–3 times more than their rain-fed counterparts 
(FAO, 2003). While too little water leads to vulnerability of production, too much water 
can also have deleterious effects on crop productivity, either directly by affecting soil 
properties and by damaging plant growth, or indirectly by harming or delaying 
necessary farm operations (IPCC, 2007). Extreme precipitation events, excessive soil 
moisture and flooding disrupt food production and rural livelihoods worldwide 
(Rosenzweig et al., 2002). Therefore by affecting crop productivity and food 
production, water plays a fundamental role in food security. 
Water availability for food production may well be threatened by climate change, as a 
result of projected mean changes in temperature and precipitation regimes, as well as 
due to projected increases in the frequency of extreme events, such as droughts and 
flooding (Rosenzweig et al., 2002). Climate impact assessments of food production 
depend strongly on the GCM precipitation projections used (IPCC, 2007) as 
discussed in Section 2. A wide range of precipitation scenarios is currently available. 
Hence it is very important to understand climate change and variability in order to 
assess the increased vulnerability in a future climate. 
The likely impacts of climate change need to be understood within an established 
history of climate variability in Australia. Farmers have always had to deal with 
climatic unpredictability. However, the way climate change and the uncertain, variable 
factors that traditionally shape Australia's climate will interact is unclear (NWC, 
2012b). Farmers therefore will be faced with a greater degree of unpredictability in the 
future. Moreover, the likelihood of greater uncertainty about water availability and 
decreased water security due to climate change need to be set within a wider context 
of increasing demand for water from agriculture, industry, urban populations and an 
increasing demand for the formal inclusion of an environmental flow (Bjornlund et al., 
2013, Chiew et al., 2011). In this sense, climate change will exacerbate an existing 
trend toward multiple, competing demands for water. Bjornlund, et al. (2013) point out 
that at present, there is increasing consumptive demand for water, as well as an 
increased push for better environmental flows. Yet the likelihood is that there will be 
decreasing supply because of climate change and limited potential for water 
infrastructure development. 
Lower latitude countries like Australia are more likely to be significantly affected 
because they are close to the limits of heat tolerance and moisture levels. Adaptation, 
not just mitigation, is crucial and will depend on the existence of effective strategies 
and the capacity to implement them. Limits to climate change are absolute obstacles 
to adaptation and cannot be overcome, while barriers are obstacles that can be 
overcome. Despite the lack of certainty about the impact of climate change on what is 
already a highly variable, unpredictable climate, it can be safely said that climate 
change will have significant consequences. It is likely to entail a number of features 
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which will have obvious implications for individual farm management and agriculture 
as a whole. These changes are likely to be both incremental and involve extreme 
weather events; they include: 
 increases in temperature (both mean temperature and variations in 
temperature); 
 increase in the number of heatwaves; 
 decreases in both rainfall and runoff; 
 increases in events of extreme rainfall falling within a short space of time ; 
 increases in areas experiencing exceptionally dry years; and  
 increases in the number of dry years (NWC, 2012b). 
Australia is likely to be more affected by climate change than any other country, and 
agriculture is likely to be most adversely affected of any sector with a projected 
decline of 17% in productivity by 2050. This has significant consequences for many 
family farms and for rural communities. It has been found, for instance, that rural 
industry stakeholders do not like the term climate change because of scepticism 
about its existence and cause. Others found that farmer's willingness to act on climate 
change was hampered by their uncertainty and conflicting views about its reality, lack 
of clear information and a belief that any occurrence was natural (Buys et al., 2011). 
It is suggested that the farm profitability cycle observed in the past (3 years profit, one 
year loss, 4 years breakeven) may change to one year of profit and three years of 
loss. These risks will have to be managed. The NWC endorses this point by 
observing that one means of adaptation to reduced water supply is accepting lower 
yields and returns while continuing production (NWC, 2012b). In addition to the risk 
posed by climate change, managing the uncertainty is a key element of risk 
management (NWC, 2012b). 
2.1.1. Irrigation in Australia 
Pearson (2008) suggests that more research has been directed toward understanding 
the impact of climate change on dry-land farming than on pasture based enterprises. 
Less is known about grazing, dairy, viticulture and horticulture. 
The size of the pie-charts in Figure 6 symbolise the volume of irrigated water used in 
Australian states. The exception is that the use of irrigation water in Western 
Australia, Tasmania, and Northern Territory was significantly smaller than the pie-
charts indicate and the charts were enlarged (indicated by lines). 
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Figure 6 Water use (GL) in 2004-05 by state and irrigation commodity 
Source: (Prosser, 2011) 
The Millennium drought caused a 70% reduction in irrigation water use in the 2000s. 
However, the gross value of irrigated agricultural produce fell only by 14%. Hence, 
irrigation productivity seems to be relatively adaptable to drought, mainly influenced 
by increased prices—especially in dairy and cereals—but also because of water trade 
and flexible adaptation of production in annual crops for example cotton (Prosser, 
2011). 
If we compare industries by water consumption in Australia, agriculture uses most 
water by far. On the other hand, when considering gross value per used water, mining 
and manufacturing are the two major high value users followed by forestry and 
fishing, and electricity and gas supply (Kiem and Austin, 2012). 
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2.1.2. Irrigation in the MDB  
Table 2 summarises the major agricultural commodity activities for each of the 
southern MDB regions. Generally, agricultural production can be categorised into 
horticultural (e.g. fruit trees or wine grapes), rice and other annual crops (e.g. cereal, 
pasture and vegetables), dairy cattle using purchased or self-grown feed and mixed 
farming operations where irrigated and dry-land production is combined (Grafton and 
Jiang, 2011). 
Table 2 Predominant irrigated agricultural commodities in the  
southern MDB 
Region Horticulture Rice/Annuals Dairy Mixed 
farming 
NSW Murray     
Murrumbidgee     
SA Murray     
Victoria Goulburn     
Victoria Murray     
These different agricultural production activities have different water demand 
schedules as a result of varying elasticities of demand, which also drive water trade 
activity. For example, horticultural production is relatively water demand inelastic in 
the short-term due to high risks of investment loss should the crops fail/die. Water 
allocation trade will be used by horticultural producers in times of low supply, and/or 
water entitlements may be purchased to provide additional security/reliability. Rice 
and other annual crops, conversely, can be decided on a yearly basis when water 
availability, prices and marginal commodity returns are known. Water demand 
elasticity for annual crops is therefore relatively elastic. 
Dairy farmers also enjoy a degree of flexibility in their production options, selecting 
between the purchase of water allocations to grow their own feed crops or selling 
some (all) their water allocations to fund the purchase of off-farm hay to meet some 
(all) of their feed requirements—depending on the relative price differential between 
water and hay. As such, dairy farmers’ water demand elasticity can also be relatively 
elastic. Finally, mixed farmers have highly elastic demand schedules for water, since 
they can substitute irrigated for dry-land farming production relatively quickly and 
easily based on price differentials between the commodities that they grow and water 
market prices. Giving evidence to these water demand elasticities, an inverse 
relationship between announced annual allocations and the volume of water 
allocation trade can be identified. Between 2001/02 and 2005/06 increasing 
announced allocations result in decreasing volumes of water allocation trade, while 
the period between 2006/07 and 2010/11 experienced relatively higher volumes of 
water allocation trade as announced allocations decreased during low inflows. 
It might be expected that if water is scarce, agricultural production will decrease and 
drive commodity prices higher. However, since commodity prices are typically 
established from world demand and international terms of trade it is often impossible 
to identify strong differentials between cropping and water market prices. On the other 
hand it is possible to identify a strong inverse relationship between seasonal 
allocation levels and both the prices of, and trade in, agricultural water. As shown, 
during 2007/08 to 2009/10 early-season (i.e. July to October) water prices are 
unstable as uncertainty persists about water availability from limited market supply 
and/or future announced water allocation levels. 
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2.2. Water User Adaptation 
Water users across the sMDB will have to adapt to climate change and reduced water 
allocations more so in the future. Water supply and use efficiency becomes more and 
more important for agricultural irrigation because of lower water availability 
projections and increasing irrigation demand. Past experience shows that there has 
been much adaptability by farmers and irrigation communities, as classes of users; 
especially given recent drought experience. 
Adaptation has been defined as adjustments in human-environmental systems in 
response to observed or expected climatic changes. It is influenced by a farmer’s 
willingness to adopt new strategies. Park et al. (2012) outline a theory of Adaptation 
Action Cycles, where they define the difference between incremental and 
transformational adaptation. Transformation adaptation occurs when ecological, 
economic, or social conditions make existing systems untenable, and it signifies a 
major change in livelihood, location or identity. Incremental adaptation is more 
related to the adoption of actions that do not require major decisions or information to 
adopt. 
We have classified various adaptation strategies for water users into the two 
categories of incremental and transformational change. Table 3 (Wheeler et al., under 
review, used with permission) illustrates a wide range of incremental adaptation 
measures irrigators, for example, can adopt to improve their water use efficiency, 
reduce climate change and water security risk, and restructure their farm. Adopting 
these measures (from each of the categories of information, trade, agronomy, farm 
structure, land, infrastructure and environment) will be crucial for many irrigators who 
have sold water entitlements, if they want to remain farming in the future. 
Table 3 Incremental Irrigation Adaptation Measures 
Type Strategy Specifics 
Information  Utilise a variety of 
information to predict 
risk of water scarcity for 
the season, through a) 
utilising historic records 
of inflows and 
allocations; and b) 
utilising Southern 
Oscillation Index data 
and a range of climate 
projections for rainfall 
and evaporation 
predictions 
 Utilise info. on water 
trade patterns to 
understand intra-
seasonal prices/demand 
 Provides better predictions about risk of crop 
failure, whether to plant or trade water for the 
season 
 Similarly, use crop insurance to hedge 
against climate risk 
 
 
 
 
 Can sell/buy water allocations/entitlement at 
the point in the intra-season where private 
gains are maximised 
Trade 
 Utilise alternative water 
market products 
(options, entitlement 
leasing) 
 Buy (or sell) more water 
allocations and/or 
entitlements 
 Helps to even out price hikes, provides more 
certainty about prices and returns over the 
medium term 
 Swap lower security entitlements for higher 
security entitlements 
 Make greater use of resources not yet fully 
allocated or subject to formal extraction caps 
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Type Strategy Specifics 
 
 Carry-over 
(such as groundwater) 
 Use carry-over techniques (where available) 
& buy water allocation when cheaper to carry-
over 
Land 
 Buy (or sell more land) 
 
 
 Increase (or decrease) 
irrigated areas (e.g. 
irrigate a larger section 
and improve input 
efficiency or only irrigate 
part of an area) 
 
 Dry-land practices 
 Larger enterprises provide a number of 
benefits in terms of business scale – a larger 
enterprise can build in greater flexibility and 
may have the capacity to respond more 
quickly to changed conditions or to withstand 
volatility 
 If production is limited by available water 
supply, irrigators may need to abandon the 
idea that production can be maximised on 
individual paddocks. It is likely that optimal 
farm performance in irrigated settings will be 
arrived at by sub-optimal paddock 
performance & spreading the water where 
land is abundant 
 Learn & implement dry-land practices (e.g. 
stubble retention and/or supplementary feed 
for livestock) to increasingly diversify in future 
Farm 
structure 
 Increase off-farm work 
 
 Portfolio management 
 
 
 Develop ownership 
structures to better 
manage risk 
 Reduce risk associated with one income 
source 
 Have a number of undertakings to optimise 
responsiveness to water availability, such as 
a mix of permanent & annual plantings. Put 
mechanisms in place to share/transfer risk 
 This may mean further consolidation, possibly 
at an accelerating rate, to larger, better 
capitalized family enterprises or corporate 
structure agricultural enterprises. Establish 
succession early on for the farm 
 Develop longer-term supply contracts 
Agronomy 
 Change basic agronomy 
and management farm 
practices 
 Different crop mixes, diversify, varieties, 
planting dates, irrigation & fertilizer regimes, 
soil management practices, substitute bought 
feed for produced feed, fallow production 
area, shift timing of livestock reproduction; 
focus on more water flexible & annual/semi-
annual crops; use deficit irrigation when 
needed 
Infrastructure 
 Adopt more efficient 
irrigation water 
infrastructure 
 
 Improve irrigation 
management 
  E.g. install automatic bay gates, drip 
irrigation, laser grade paddocks, update 
reuse system, recycling system, solar energy 
use, on-farm water storage 
 E.g. improve irrigation scheduling, soil 
moisture monitoring, decrease furrow lengths 
Environment 
 Employ sustainable 
practices on farm 
 Plant trees, crop cover, grade banks, improve 
soil management, conservation tillage 
 
Such strategies highlight the individual nature of adaptation to changing water 
availability and security under climate change, as discussed in detail below. 
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2.2.1. Influences on irrigator adaptive variability 
There is a general agreement that water markets have devolved greater responsibility 
for managing water and its part in farm management to individual irrigators (Loch et 
al., 2012, NWC, 2012b, Bjornlund, 2006a). Others argue that there has been a more 
general shift in the way farming is conceptualised, and responded to by policy 
makers. In the neoliberal regime that has governed Australian agriculture for the past 
three or four decades (see Section 1), policy emphasis has shifted away from 
emphasising the structural influences on agriculture to placing greater onus on 'farm 
productivity' and 'farmer efficiency' (e.g. NWC, 2006, Brooks and Harris, 2008, 
Qureshi et al., 2011). This changing orientation places greater weight on the capacity 
of individual farmers to adapt to, and effectively manage, uncertainty. The onset of 
climate change is likely to increase the demands on individual farmers to manage 
uncertainty and risk. Risk management will become an integral aspect of farm 
management and challenges will come from many directions. Previous research has 
clearly shown that early-adopters in the initial water markets (up until mid-2000s) 
played an important role in assisting irrigators in managing supply risk (Bjornlund, 
2006a). 
The NWI risk assignment framework delineates how the risks of reduced water 
availability and increased uncertainty about water availability will be shared among 
water entitlement holders and governments (Crase, 2012b). It aims to provide 
entitlement holders with certainty in planning and investment by providing clear 
indications about how changes in water availability will be dealt with. This will 
generate a transparent and sustainable planning and entitlement framework. 
However, the implementation of this framework has not been fully implemented and 
some stakeholders are unclear about some elements of risk assignment. Risk 
assignment is crucial in the context of climate change and the framework clearly 
specifies that entitlement holders are to bear the risks of any reduction in their 
entitlements. However, in some instances, governments will assume complete or 
partial responsibility for changes in the underlying reliability of that entitlement where, 
for instance policy changes or there is improved knowledge about the level of 
extraction that is compatible with sustainability (NWC, 2012b). 
2.2.2. Influences on irrigation community adaptive variability 
Despite the existence of several strategies to adapt to drought, a major factor limiting 
the capacity to incorporate climate change into water resource management is not 
access to information, but rather uncertainty about potential adaptive responses and 
their effectiveness. This can be exacerbated by minimal specialist skills and a limited 
number of resources (Kiem and Austin, 2012). 
The impacts of climate change will depend on the vulnerabilities of industries, 
communities’ assets and regions. In turn, this vulnerability is influenced by degree of 
exposure and the sensitivity to that exposure by populations, economic assets, 
human activities and natural and physical systems. In turn, sensitivity is influenced by 
demographics, physical geography, production characteristics, wealth and income 
distribution and government policy (regardless of whether it is related to climate 
change. Accordingly, the impact of climate change on an irrigation community will 
depend on extent of reduced water availability (exposure) and extent to which the 
community is dependent on irrigation (sensitivity) (NWC, 2012b). The degree of 
adaptive capacity is also an important function of vulnerability. This refers to the 
capacity of a given sector / vector to adapt to climate change stimuli, their impacts 
and the associated risks. 
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For example, people in an irrigation community may be able to change their water 
use and crop types, or they may have the capacity to develop other industries in 
response to less available water (NWC, 2012b). Pearson and Langridge (2008) add 
weight to this observation by suggesting there are two ways of conceptualizing 
vulnerability. One (outcome vulnerability) is well suited to modelling linear changes in 
a tightly controlled system. A second way of thinking about vulnerability 
acknowledges the importance that context plays in shaping both the extent to which 
vulnerability exists and the way in which context can shape response to that 
vulnerability. While there may be biophysical limits to the way crops are vulnerable to 
changed climate patterns, the vulnerability of communities to climate change, and 
their capacity to respond, are likely to be more flexible and variable (Pearson et al., 
2008). 
2.2.2.1. Barriers to adaptation 
Factors that reduce adaptive capacity or willingness to adopt are therefore potential 
sources of limits and barriers to achieving farm-scale climate change adaptation. 
Limits to adaptation are absolute obstacles that render adaptation ineffective as a 
response to climate change and as such cannot be overcome, while barriers are 
obstacles that can be overcome with, for example, concerted effort, creative 
management, or changed thinking (Kolikow et al., 2012). 
The list below considers some barriers to adaptation: 
 Uncertainty: Much literature has focussed on the social factors that impede 
uptake of adaptation strategies. Uncertainty is likely to be a bigger barrier to 
adaptation than risk or climate variability. Farmers are unlikely to commit to 
adaptation in the face of uncertainty about climate change and what it will 
mean and in the absence of certainty about the long-term effectiveness of 
adaptation strategies (Kolikow et al., 2012). 
 Lack of Market signals: Even where there is partial recognition of the need to 
adapt to climate change, market signals don't always give the right impetus for 
individuals and business to make the necessary changes. Market mechanisms 
might not allow for climate change, nor do they always provide the information 
or incentives to make changes. Further, they don't necessarily facilitate 
cooperation needed for effective information (DCCEE, 2010). Economic 
factors are more likely to prompt the adoption of innovative practices that are 
relatively simple to implement. 
 Financial factors: Debt levels, access to finance, stage in the farm investment 
cycle, are all likely to influence response and adaptation to climate change 
(NWC, 2012b). 
 Information barriers: Even when information is available, the tools and 
capability to translate it into decisions and actions are sometimes lacking; in 
other instances, specific information is not available. At other times, the skills 
and abilities to change farming techniques or modify crop mix are not 
available. 
 Cognitive barriers: These arise from psychological factors that influence 
understanding of, and response to, climate change. Attachment to place and 
lifestyle can limit the willingness to take effective action. While agriculture has 
a long history of managing climate related risks and variability, there is a 
concern that climate change will present agriculture with challenges beyond its 
normal capacity for change and flexibility. Failure in agriculture will have huge 
consequences for rural communities. Sociological factors can be more closely 
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linked to the adaptation of innovative practices that are more complex, 
particularly in relation to acquiring new knowledge or skills. This is particularly 
the case because such factors are likely to have to be somewhat tailored to 
individual farms, which makes the information more complex and harder to 
obtain. A further factor is that some innovations are somewhat invisible in 
terms of their effects and may only be realized in the medium to long term. 
 Disincentives for preparedness. For instance, many households are under-
insured in relation to risks associated with extreme weather events. This can 
give rise to moral hazard if governments become, in effect and by expectation 
the insurer of last risk, as happened with the Queensland floods and the 
National Drought Policy. The Productivity Commission suggests that 
exceptional circumstances support programs do not encourage adaptation 
among farmers. It has been suggested that future government action should 
be directed toward encouraging farmers to improve their resilience and 
capacity to manage risks. This includes training in managing risks, trialling of 
innovations, assisting landholders to tap alternative income streams and 
natural resource management (DCCEE, 2010). 
 Climate change Beliefs: The debate about whether or not climate change is 
occurring—and its causal factors—mean that cognitive variables may play a 
more prominent role in climate change adaptation than other adoptions. Farm 
surveys suggest that Australian farmers are far more sceptical about climate 
change than the general public. Donnelly et al. (2009) found that only 27% 
believed in climate change in 2009 (n=148), while Hogan et al. (2011) found 
the figure to be 55% in 2008 (see Box 2.1), and Wheeler et al. (forthcoming-a) 
found it to be 32% in 2010-11. Buys et al. (2011) make the point that people's 
understanding and conceptualization of the science underpinning knowledge 
of climate change is influenced by their existing socio-cultural frameworks and 
belief systems. For example, people of conservative persuasion are much less 
likely to accept the science of climate change. This certainly applies in 
Australia, where those of conservative political values are much less likely to 
agree that climate change is anthropogenic. Despite a long history of adapting 
to climate, Hogan (2011) found that the majority of farmers were unwilling to 
make long term adaptations because of short term pressures (commodity 
prices, input costs, condition of on-farm resources, drought). The daily 
(routine) challenges encountered by farmers was a major barrier to adapting; 
hence they need to be convinced that climate change is likely to exceed any 
previously encountered climate variability. Anything that affects farmers will 
also affect rural communities and it is therefore important to understand how 
they conceptualize climate change (Buys et al., 2011). 
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Box 2.1: Australian Farmer Clusters 
Hogan et al. (2011) point out that there is a considerable body of research that identifies 
significant differences among farmers, including cultural and socio-economic differences. 
Recent work has begun to explore how farmers differ in their willingness and capacity to 
adapt. This means it is important to study sub-populations of farmers. Hogan et al. identified 
three clusters of farmers in their study of general Australian farmers: 
Cluster 1: cash poor, long-term adaptors (55%) 
They report high (42%) or medium (31%) level of belief in climate change and expressed very 
strong levels of wish for government financial help (only 6% expressed no desire for such 
assistance). They reported high levels of social connectedness (52%) and were not inclined to 
use sources of information with 57% being lower level users. 49% reported high levels of 
adverse farm conditions, while only 15% reported low levels of adverse farm conditions. A 
large majority reported feeling financially pressured by the adaptations required by climate 
change; only 23% reported having the finances necessary to make the required changes. 
Cluster 2: comfortable, non-adaptors (26%) 
They tended not to believe in climate change, with 39% reporting low levels of belief in climate 
change. Few had a desire for government assistance, with just 1% reporting high level of need 
for such. As a cluster they had high levels of social connectedness. They were more mixed 
than cluster 1 (primarily business oriented) in regarding the farm as both business and 
lifestyle. With the exception of facing market pressure, 92% did not report problems with farm 
conditions and they considered they faced low levels of risk. On the whole, they were not 
concerned about their financial viability in the face of climate change. Few among this group 
were interested in making adaptations in the face of climate change, though 51% reported 
having the funds to make changes if they wished to do so. As a whole, they tended to think 
climate change was real and that there was a moral imperative to reduce greenhouse 
emissions, but they didn't take extreme weather events as evidence of climate change (Hogan 
et al. 2011: pg. 4063). 
Cluster 3: Transitioners (19%) 
Most believed in climate change, with 39% expressing high levels of belief. They were much 
more mixed than other clusters in their desire for government assistance and reported low 
levels of social connectedness in comparison to the other clusters. Farm conditions were poor, 
with two-thirds saying they had high levels of adverse farm conditions. A significant majority in 
this cluster said they could not cope with any more change. About half believed in climate 
change, while the rest were uncertain or did not believe it. Yet, they were still concerned with 
the moral imperative to reduce greenhouse emissions. 
 
Wheeler et al. (forthcoming-a) investigated the influences associated with sMDB 
irrigators’ planned adaptation behaviour. Their index of adaptability was made up of 
three broad strategies: a) expansive: those designed to increase efforts and 
production; b) accommodating: those that seek to accommodate change by adopting 
more efficient infrastructure and changing crop mix; and c) contractive: those that 
involve a reduction in effort and resource ownership. Incremental adoption was 
examined only. Overall, the study found that incremental adaptation was positively 
associated with younger (and healthier) farmers, farms that have identified 
successors, more productive farms, and more innovative, traditional and/or 
environmentally focused farmers. They also found that farmers who believe in climate 
change are less likely to be adapting their farm overall, especially if they are far less 
likely to plan for more expansive farm strategies. Believing in climate change was 
associated with implementing more accommodating strategies. 
Wheeler et al. (forthcoming-a) also found that belief and planned behaviour was often 
endogenous (i.e. there could be no direct causal link initially established between 
them). In particular, they suggested endogeneity was more likely to be found with 
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accommodating planned behaviour than expansive type planned behaviour. These 
results suggest that, as well as attitudes influencing behaviour, adaptation behaviour 
can influence attitudes, and this loop is most likely to occur for water risk 
management strategies. Finally, the paper suggested there is an element of path 
dependence in farmer behaviour. Once farmers are on a certain track of 
expansionary or contractive behaviour, this will continue to influence planned 
behaviour. This may be a result of cognitive factors, socio-demographics, spatial or 
market factors. 
2.3. Consequences of Climate Change for Industry and 
geographical variation 
2.3.1. Industry 
Different agricultural sectors have differing levels of capacity to respond to 
fluctuations in water availability. Horticulturalists and dairy farmers must have access 
to water during drought; both have high capital investments, often associated with 
high debt that requires constant service. Annual crops, on the other hand, can reduce 
their water use without such dire consequences and they can be compensated by 
selling water to higher value producers (Bjornlund et al., 2013). Efficiency gains will 
be easier in a sector such as dairying, because there is currently such a variation in 
efficiency capabilities. However, such gains are likely to be harder to achieve in 
sectors with a high degree of efficiency throughout the sector; they will therefore face 
particular challenges if more gains are required (e.g. rice). Industries such as cotton 
are likely to need to substantially change the way they irrigate crops (Stubbs et al., 
2010). 
Rising costs of water is likely to promote an increased proportion of regular water use 
going to horticulture and viticulture, which are higher up the value chain. However, in 
those sectors where water is a much larger proportion of costs, and the return per unit 
of water is lower such as rice and cotton, productivity will suffer. A shortage of water 
might lead to some industries moving to a dry-land model to free up water for 
industries in which water is essential, such as perennial crops. Dairy farmers, for 
example, may curtail irrigation and substitute it by buying in fodder. Such 
developments are likely to drive closer links between irrigated and dry-land agriculture 
(Stubbs et al., 2010). 
Modelling by Quiggin et al. (2010) predicts increasing salinity will initially lead to a 
transition away from stone fruits to grapes, with no stone fruit being produced in the 
sMDB by 2030 (Goesch et al., 2009). This will be followed by a transition away from 
grapes toward citrus as salinity continues to increase. By 2050, the area devoted to 
grapes is estimated to decline by around seven per cent while the area devoted to 
citrus is estimated to increase by around 30 per cent (Goesch et al., 2009). 
Quiggin et al. (2010) found that water availability in the MDB would be significantly 
reduced in the future. In regard to this finding, adaptation is found to be a useful and 
effective response in the middle-term (until 2050). In the far future adaptation alone 
may not be a sustainable response due to further inflow reduction projections. A 
complementary effect between adaptation and mitigation is expected. 
Quiggin et al. (2010) also found that under some climate change scenarios the 
Darling River system may eventually develop into a disconnected system (i.e. no 
longer contribute to the Murray River flows and trade), meaning that irrigated 
agriculture therefore could not be practiced sustainably. Using a state-contingent 
analysis they found that: i) costs of securing a constant water supply, e.g. for 
horticultural crops, are seen to increase; ii) opportunity cropping without irrigation 
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during droughts will be more prevalent in the future; iii) a further response to climate 
change and severe droughts in agriculture is likely to be limiting irrigation to only the 
most critical areas; iv) crop changes will be more common; and v) shifts from high 
water consuming production of citrus and grapes to less demanding vegetables such 
as tomatoes or rockmelons are expected. 
2.3.2. Location 
The geographic location of production may shift as a result of climate change. Hotter 
temperatures are likely to have a southward drive, while a desire to minimize 
evaporation losses will tend to push production up the Basin. Reduced water 
availability will tend to shift production away from areas of heavy flood soils to areas 
of lighter dry soils, a process that will be facilitated by the development of suitable 
water application technology (Stubbs et al., 2010). The production of certain 
commodities will cease in some areas and be replaced with new ones. This would 
have significant consequences for specific agricultural sectors and regional 
economies, such as: 
 Viticulture could move to areas previously considered too cool, notably 
southern Victoria and Tasmania. 
 Dairy production in southern Victoria and Tasmania could expand at the 
expense of dairying in the sMDB. 
 Cereal crops may be grown in areas previously deemed too cool or wet. 
 Wine grape varieties developed to suit particular areas could be adversely 
affected by higher temperatures and extreme weather (frosts and heatwaves). 
 As a consequence of higher summer temperatures and less winter chill some 
areas currently producing stone fruits might not be able to continue to do so in 
the longer term. 
 Higher temperatures in MDB dairying areas are likely to create stress for 
livestock and higher energy demand for cooling production sheds (NWC, 
2012b). 
2.3.3. Costs 
Reduced runoff will lead to less secure entitlements for irrigators and could shrink the 
size of the irrigation sector and change the mix of permanent and annual crops 
grown. This could lead to rural water supply networks being less well utilized, 
increasing the cost of supply or reducing the viability of supply to a contracting 
customer base (NWC, 2012b). The NWC also suggests that the increased water 
costs resulting from the generally increasing price of electricity generation will be 
limited—because energy is a relatively small cost for most businesses, in terms of 
overall cost. However, the Renmark Irrigation Trust suggests otherwise. They argue 
that they are already facing a 27% increase in electricity prices. This will increase 
further under the introduction of the carbon tax, with the increase in costs flowing 
through to individual irrigators (ABC News, 2012a). 
Salinity may also pose a serious, albeit less recognized, cost hazard. It is estimated 
that globally about 1/3rd of irrigated land is effected by salinity; adding extra irrigation 
water is usually regarded as the best solution (Connor et al., 2012). Climate change is 
likely to make the issue of salinity worse, while reducing traditional ways of dealing 
with it. Climate change impacts on salinity are expected to occur in two ways: i) the 
first is decreased salt loads from less drainage; and ii) increased salt concentrations 
from reduced flows. Reduced flows, however, have the greatest impacts (Connor et 
al., 2012). Increases in salinity are likely to be proportionately greater in downstream 
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sections of the river. Irrigators’ incomes can also be affected by changes in salinity 
(Goesch et al., 2009). Connor et al. (2012) conclude that increasing variability in 
supply is likely to drive up irrigator costs in excess of those associated with lower 
overall flows. This is likely due to increased variability leading to increased 
opportunistic cropping that requires leaving irrigation assets idle during periods of low 
water availability. Further, during drought irrigators employ 'deficit irrigation', which 
leads to reduced productivity even while fixed costs remain the same (Connor et al., 
2012). Increased variability of supply is likely to pose particular challenges for those 
growing perennial rather than annual crops (Connor et al., 2012). 
2.4. Key points 
The major points from this section include: 
 Irrigation accounts for approximately 70% of total water withdrawals worldwide 
and for more than 90% of consumptive water use. Irrigation also generates 
about 40% of total agricultural output, yet irrigated land only represents 18% 
of global agricultural land. 
 Australia is likely to be more affected by climate change than any other 
country, and agriculture is likely to be more adversely affected of any sector 
with a projected decline of 17% in productivity by 2050, with corresponding 
influences on farm profitability. 
 The Millennium drought caused a 70% reduction in irrigation water use in the 
2000s. However, the gross value of irrigated agricultural produce fell only by 
14%, indicating that irrigation productivity can adapt in periods of crisis, but 
future water supply and use efficiency will become more important. 
 Adaptation is adjustments in human-environmental systems in response to 
observed or expected climatic changes. Transformation adaptation signifies a 
major change in livelihood, location or identity (e.g. farm exit, sell all water and 
go dry-land) while incremental adaptation is more related to the adoption of 
actions that do not require major decisions or information to adopt (e.g. adopt 
irrigation infrastructure, buy more water/land, diversify). 
 Barriers to adaptation include uncertainty, lack of market signals, financial 
factors, information barriers, cognitive barriers, climate change beliefs, and 
disincentives to change or adapt. 
 Costs of climate change will include rising energy costs, more frequent 
droughts (hence loss of production), increased salinity, reduced water 
availability. 
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3. AN INTRODUCTION TO WATER MARKETS 
3.1. Background 
Current programs by Australian governments to reallocate water from consumptive 
(i.e. irrigation) to environmental uses in the southern Murray-Darling Basin (sMDB) 
are unprecedented in history. Australia provides a leading example that other 
countries are watching closely. Water markets play a key role in those program 
outcomes—including the potential for environmental water trade. However, in the face 
of recent extreme water shortages irrigators have also increasingly adopted water 
markets as a strategic tool to manage water scarcity risks and farm viability 
requirements. Therefore, across all water user groups it is expected that further 
adoption of water markets, as well as improved water management and use, will be 
essential for coping with future climate change impacts. 
The purpose of this report is to undertake a literature review of the consequences of 
climate change for (in particular) sMDB water markets. As such, it is not to provide a 
literature review of all other water markets in the world. For readers interested in 
worldwide water market trade issues, useful references include Grafton et al. (2011b) 
(2011a) and Maestu (2013). 
3.2. Water market background information 
Water marketing involves the exchange of water rights or shares between willing 
sellers and buyers within a market framework Griffin (2006). Although different from 
state to state in Australia, rights to access water are commonly divided into two 
categories: 
 Water entitlements: a set share of the total consumptive pool of water 
resource(s) with a reliability of supply factor (low, general or high), and1 
 Water allocations: an amount of water that the water entitlement holder 
receives during a given water year (season), dependent on the available water 
in storages, expected inflows, system losses, demand expectations, delivery 
capacity and other factors (NWC, 2011a). 
Water entitlement trading can be motivated by changes in long-term demand patterns 
as well as changes in the location and purposes of local water use. Examples include 
transfers of previously unused water entitlements to greenfield irrigation sites, or 
changes in use as irrigators with surplus water sell to environmental managers 
(Hanemann, 2006). Water allocation trade can be motivated by the need to adjust to 
short-term changes in seasonal conditions, commodity prices or other strategic 
decisions by reallocating water between different users for the duration of a season 
(Clifford et al., 2004). 
General drivers of water trade therefore include: i) prices; ii) irrigation demands for 
different commodities; iii) short- and longer-term climate change effects; iv) regulatory 
impacts designed to address past over-allocation and uncertainty over future water 
                                               
 
1
 Where regulated water supply systems are supported by major water storage infrastructure (e.g. dams) 
higher reliability water entitlement holders receive their water ahead of lower reliability holders. For 
example, a water entitlement holder with an estimated reliability factor of 90% would expect to receive an 
allocation in 90 out of every 100 years. Levels of water reliability vary by supply district and 
infrastructure; see 0 for further detail. 
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use and trade; v) varying trade rules and processes; vi) water charges; vii) water 
product attributes and reliability differences between states; and viii) recent 
government participation in water markets to recover environmental water (NWC, 
2011a). Many of these drivers interest economic analysts, who have long taken an 
interest in the efficient allocation of water resources through market-based structures 
that lead to beneficial social outcomes in aggregate. 
3.2.1. Economic efficiency from water markets 
The main economic advantage of water markets is that, under reduced market failure 
conditions, they should enable limited resources to be put to their most productive 
uses (i.e. economic efficiency) by distributing them to those that value them most 
highly over short- and long-term periods (Bennett, 2005). This reallocation results in 
three distinct forms of economic efficiency, dependent on the timeframe involved: 
 Allocative efficiency: Changes in water resource demand or use motivated 
by seasonal conditions, commodity price adjustments, cropping choices and 
other short-term decision-making requirements is most often achieved through 
water allocation trade. 
 Dynamic efficiency: Changes in water resource demand or use that stem 
from structural alterations such as new investment opportunities, regulatory 
shifts in access arrangements (e.g. extraction limits or embargos) or personal 
strategic choices (e.g. retirement) is most often achieved through water 
entitlement trade. 
 Productive efficiency: Changes in the price of both water entitlements and 
allocations offer incentives for the efficient use of water resources as either an 
investment or input for productive outcomes. 
As such, water markets require four key elements to drive efficient use and outcomes. 
These include: 
1 A fixed limit to resource availability (set consumptive pool) that is ideally: i) 
credible and based on accurate science; ii) monitored and enforced; and iii) 
consistent with sustainable levels of extraction;2 
2 Once the consumptive pool is set, users are provided with entitlement shares 
in the form of secure property rights to that consumptive pool, but which 
cannot exceed the total limit; 
3 These shares, and the water allocated to them each season, are tradeable 
under low transaction costs and entry/exit barrier conditions such that 
ownership, control and use can change over time; and 
4 Prices for these shares and allocations that take into account externality costs 
to third-parties are established in a market using the value placed on water 
use from a depth of well-informed buyers and sellers (NWC, 2011f, ACCC, 
2010). 
  
                                               
 
2
 Sustainable levels of extraction relate to permitting water diversions that contain environmental change 
(i.e. health of the environmental resources) within socially acceptable boundaries, and no others 
(CSIRO, 2008a). 
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In Australia, the MDB provides a dominant example of differences between water 
resource supply and demand due to highly episodic and stochastic inflow patterns 
(Musgrave, 2008), an emphasis on irrigated agricultural development over time 
(Watson and Cummins, 2010), and where institutional arrangements have developed 
over time to manage divisive water-sharing and use issues (Scanlon, 2006). 
3.2.2. Water Market Operations - Seasonal allocations 
Historically, irrigators used to receive all their water entitlement, and indeed, those 
with high security entitlements used to receive more water than they actually owned. 
This situation first started changing in the late 1990s, and significantly changed in the 
2000s. As shown in 0, a significant number of water entitlement holders, particularly 
in South Australia, for the first time in 2002/03 did not receive their full (i.e. 100%) 
seasonal allocation. 
This outcome arose from declining rainfall and storage inflows that began in the late 
1990s and continued through to 2010/11 (Figure 7). Annual rainfall during this period 
was typically below average levels; potentially mimicking likely future climate change 
outcomes. Water storage levels fell from highs of around 70% to 90% in the early 
1990s to around 15% for three consecutive seasons between 2006/07 and 2008/09. 
Spatial differences in water availability due to the hydrologic nature of the MDB (Craik 
and Cleaver, 2008, Williams, 2011), as well as relative differences in water demand 
elasticities among agricultural users drove water trade activity in the southern MDB 
(Wheeler et al., 2008b, Loch et al., 2012). 
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Table 4 Closing water allocations in the sMDB (by security type) 
 High reliability entitlements Lower reliability entitlements 
Year 
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1998-99 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 0% 100% 93% 85% 
1999-00 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 0% 90% 35% 78% 
2000-01 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 0% 100% 95% 90% 
2001-02 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 0% 100% 105% 72% 
2002-03 57% 100% 100% 100% 100% 0% 29% 10% 38% 
2003-04 100% 100% 100% 95% 95% 0% 0% 55% 41% 
2004-05 100% 100% 97% 95% 95% 0% 0% 49% 40% 
2005-06 100% 100% 97% 95% 100% 0% 0% 63% 54% 
2006-07 29% 95% 69% 90% 60% 0% 0% 0% 10% 
2007-08 57% 43% 50% 90% 32% 0% 0% 0% 13% 
2008-09 33% 35% 95% 95% 18% 0% 0% 9% 21% 
2009-10 71% 100% 97% 95% 62% 0% 0% 27% 27% 
2010-11 100% 100% 100% 100% 67 % 0% 0% 100% 100% 
2011-12 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 0% 0% 100% 100% 
LTAAYa 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.9 0.35 0.24 0.81 0.64 
a % of total LTAAY (long-term average annual yield) accounted for by that type 
of water security in that region; 
Source: NWC (2011b) and Wheeler et al. (under review)  
Seasonal allocations for MDB users are calculated on the basis of the nature of the 
water entitlements being either high or general (low) security, the volume of water in 
storages and the sum of minimum expected inflows and system losses for a water 
year; that is, 1 July to 30 June (Deloitte, 2011). Rainfall and subsequent inflow 
reductions in much of the MDB from 1997/98 (Figure 7) meant that storage levels 
decreased resulting in lower seasonal allocations—especially lower opening 
allocations. Similar extended periods of low inflows had not been experienced since 
the World War II Drought (1937-1945), which predated much of the extensive 
irrigation/rural community development and its reliance on water infrastructure. 
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Figure 7 Rainfall & storage levels - major MDB dams 1989/90 - 2009/10 
Source: NWC (2011a, pg. 19) 
Consequently, seasonal allocations for irrigators declined sharply from 2002/03, 
especially for general (low) security water entitlements respectively in New South 
Wales and Victoria. In Victoria, the calculation for seasonal allocation levels was 
altered in 1998 from using total average expected inflows to using the expected 
minimum inflows over the season to set opening allocations and then adjusting the 
levels during the season according to actual inflows. This resulted in significantly 
lower opening allocations, effectively shifting the risk management burden associated 
with variable seasonal inflows from water managers to irrigators (Bjornlund, 2006a). 
This shift subsequently had an important impact on the use of water markets in the 
whole of the MDB. 
Until 2005/06, relatively little interstate transfers of water had taken place. However, 
as low supply and seasonal allocation variation became the norm, South Australian 
irrigators imported significant volumes of allocation water from New South Wales in 
order to maintain high-value permanent crops (e.g. wine grapes). In 2009/10 Victoria 
also imported relatively high levels of allocation water from New South Wales for 
agricultural crop maintenance By 2010/11 higher than average rainfall saw seasonal 
allocations return to 100% levels. The following section provides further detail. 
3.2.3. Water Market Intermediaries, IIOs and Irrigator Numbers 
Water market intermediaries’ is a general term that includes water brokers and water 
exchanges. Water brokers such as Waterfind and Percat Water in South Australia 
and Water Trading Australia in Victoria perform a number of roles for their clients 
including finding a trading partner, advising their customer on price and water trading 
rules, negotiating with a trading partner, and/or completing the necessary paperwork 
for a trade to proceed. Not all brokers perform all these services. For example, some 
brokers will find a trading partner and complete the necessary paperwork but will not 
provide advice about price. Brokers also often conduct trades through exchanges. 
Water exchanges operate as a trading platform by matching buyers and sellers, either 
through an automated process or a bulletin board. 
Water exchanges also organise and submit the necessary paperwork to the relevant 
trade approval authority (ies), and may also provide information on trading rules, 
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prices and trading volumes. There are a number of water exchanges operating 
currently, including WaterExchange, Murray Water Exchange, Murrumbidgee Water 
Exchange and the National Water Market. There has been much flux with water 
exchanges, for example, WaterMove recently shut down in mid-2012, with its future 
unknown at this stage. These exchanges match bids to buy with offers to sell, as well 
as co-ordinating the paperwork required for trade approvals. ACCC (2010) provide a 
breakdown in Appendix A of the range of brokerage costs across exchanges and 
brokers, and found costs ranged from 1% to 4.4%. 
An irrigation infrastructure operator (IIO) is any person or entity who owns or operates 
water service infrastructure for the purpose of delivering water to another person for 
the primary purpose of being used for irrigation. As at 2010-11, there were at least 19 
IIOs in the MDB, with a wide diversity in entitlements and customers. Table 5 
illustrates this diversity, and suggests that in 2010-11 there were over 26,500 
irrigation customers of IIOs in the MDB. However, many of these customers were not 
irrigation farmers and just own a few ML for stock and domestic use. ABS (2011) 
suggested that there were 15,347 irrigating farms in the MDB in 2010-11, with an 
average of 78 hectares irrigated per farm, and 294 ML water used per farm. 
Table 5 Characteristics of reporting IIOs in the MDB in 2010-11 
Irrigation infrastructure operator 
Irrigation 
customers 
Water access 
entitlement (GL) 
2010−11 
revenue ($’000s) 
Goulburn-Murray Water (GMW) 14792 1244.7 70066 
Murray Irrigation Limited (MIL) 2125 958.7 26050 
Murrumbidgee Irrigation Limited (MI) 3191 995.1 25516 
Lower Murray Water (LMW) 2785 132.4 13498 
Coleambally Irrigation Co-operative 
Limited  473 433.5 9933 
Central Irrigation Trust (CIT) 1268 129.3 6825 
Western Murray Irrigation Limited  431 55.2 2797 
SunWater 55 50.1 2758 
Renmark Irrigation Trust  551 41.1 2234 
Trangie-Nevertire Irrigation Scheme  43 67.4 1474 
Narromine Irrigation Board of 
Management  123 49.5 1459 
West Corurgan Private Irrigation 
District  250 61.5 1165 
Jemalong 115 80 1133 
Moira Private Irrigation District  94 38 691 
Marthaguy Irrigation Scheme  24 12.3 567 
Tenandra Irrigation Scheme  28 28 428 
Buddah Lake Irrigators Association  14 32.5 397 
Hay Private Irrigation District  90 8.1 301 
Eagle Creek Pumping Syndicate  79 17.2 161 
Source:  ACCC (2012) 
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3.3. The Murray-Darling Basin (MDB) 
The Murray-Darling Basin (Figure 8) represents an iconic area for agricultural 
economic production, ecological importance, recreational significance and cultural 
values.  
 
 
Figure 8 The Murray-Darling Basin with major irrigation districts 
Source: (MDBA, 2012c) 
Agriculture is an important economic function of the MDB, where over one-third of 
Australia’s food supply is produced (Figure 9). This pattern would have changed 
dramatically after 2000/01 during the Millennium Drought, particularly in the case of 
broadacre, annual cropping and dairy cattle uses. However, following return to wetter 
conditions these patterns may be re-emerging in the landscape. Typically, where 
0.6% of land in Australia is allotted to irrigation production, in the MDB irrigated land 
accounts for 2% of total use. Overall, 65% of all irrigated land in Australia is located in 
the MDB (MDBA, 2010a). The Basin therefore produces 53% of all cereals (including 
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100% of the rice crop and 93% of the cotton crop), 95% of all oranges, and 54% of 
the national apple crop. In livestock terms, the MDB accounts for 28% of the national 
cattle herd, 45% of sheep and 62% of pigs (MDBA, 2009, DAFF, 2011). Much of that 
production is dependent on the reliable and economically efficient supplies of 
irrigation water. 
 
 
Figure 9 General land use patterns in the MDB, 1996/97 - 2000/01 
Source: (Bryan and Marvanek, 2004) 
There is considerable variability in rainfall and runoff across the MDB (Figure 10). For 
example, the Murrumbidgee, Goulburn, upper Murray, Mitta, Ovens, Broken and 
Loddon river catchments account for a significant 35% of total runoff, but comprise 
only 12% of total surface area. The Darling system in contrast, contributes up to 32% 
of runoff from 60.4% of the MDB area. During very wet years (e.g. 2010/11), some 
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86% of the MDB is expected to contribute virtually no runoff into the extended river 
systems (MDBC, 2005b). Australia experiences higher runoff variability than any 
other continental area, save Southern Africa (Rowan et al., 2011), and the MDB is no 
exception to this (Figure 11). Much of the surface runoff also flows into wetlands, 
floodplains and floodplain lake systems where it evaporates. Under pre-water 
resource development conditions, up to 11,000 GL per annum evaporates or 
percolates into groundwater systems, while only an estimated 12,890 GL of runoff 
reaches the sea (MDBC, 2005b). 
As such, the MDB is characterised by significant variability in regard to the flows and 
volumes of water made available in each season—which does not lend itself well to 
‘average’ or ‘mean/median’ assessments of river, water usage and/or environmental 
conditions. 
 
 
Figure 10 Average MDB annual rainfall distribution patterns 
Source: (MDBC, 2005b) Source: (CSIRO Land & Water, 1999) 
The Basin is also home to over 2 million people requiring access to reliable water 
supplies. The Basin also supplies approximately half of Adelaide’s water needs via 
pipeline connections to the Murray River. Agricultural and community access to water 
in the MDB is subject to naturally high variation within years, between years and 
across lengthy periods. To smooth the supply of water to MDB users, major 
infrastructure (e.g. dams and weirs) has been constructed. The total storage volume 
available from MDB water infrastructure is just under 35,000 gigalitres (GL). 
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Figure 11 MDB water inflows, 1890 to 2011 (ML) 
Source: (MDBA, 2012f). 
A breakdown of how MDB water resources (including groundwater) are allocated 
across users is provided in Table 6. The share of water entitlements created in each 
water product category is also shown as a percentage of the total resource. As 
indicated, a total of 75% of total surface water resources have been assigned to 
consumptive (e.g. irrigation) users in the MDB (Black and King, 2009). Groundwater 
users have been assigned an estimated 58% of the total resource to use for 
consumptive purposes. 
Table 6 Total water resources in the MDB—2010 
 Total Resource 
(GL) 
Entitlements (GL) Percentage* 
Groundwater 2,450ǂ 1,424 58% 
Surface water inflows 31,599 2,733a 8% 
  10,890b 33% 
  13,788c 42% 
Outflows from Basin  5,142 16% 
Inter-Basin transfers 954   
Total surface water 32,553 32,553 100% 
* Expressed as a percentage of the total available water resource 
ǂ Sustainable annual yield for groundwater from the Basin (Goesch and Hafi, 2006) 
a
 Interceptions 
b
 Watercourse diversions 
c
 Water used by environment and losses. 
Sources: (MDBA, 2012e) 
Table 6 highlights the significant role that MDB surface and groundwater resources 
play in the Basin’s economy. However, the MDB is also home to critical ecosystems 
and natural habitats, all of which require water resources to maintain ecological health 
and sustainable refugia during times of reduced water supply (MDBA, 2010a). 
 Water markets in climate change adaptation 39 
Reducing the volume of water currently extracted by consumptive users and returning 
it to important hydrologic and key ecosystem functions will assist Basin managers to 
achieve an environmentally sustainable level of take (ESLT). Stemming from higher 
order Basin-wide environmental objectives and the need to protect key environmental 
systems, assets or productive bases the ESLT allows local environmental targets to 
be determined along with a range of management options to achieve those outcomes 
(MDBA, 2012c).  
Finally, how much individuals (consumptive, social and environmental alike) rely on 
access to natural resources such as water can be an important influence on their 
decision-making and ability to adapt to change (Shorten, 2012). Water markets assist 
users to reallocate water when needed to suit their strategic decision-making, and we 
can examine evidence of this activity in broad MDB trade statistics. 
Water trade has expanded rapidly during periods of drought, particularly in the sMDB. 
Over 90% of national trade is located in the sMDB hydrologically-connected zones, 
where water transfers are possible across large distances and over state borders. By 
2009/10 a decade of drought had seen the annual turnover from water trade reach $3 
billion—accounting for 11% by volume of water entitlements issued in the MDB and 
approximately 20-30% of water allocation in major NSW systems alone (NWC, 
2011f). Importantly, without access to water trade sMDB drought impacts would have 
been significant—totalling between $2-3 billion each year in 2007/08 and 2008/09. 
However, with access to water trade arrangements sMDB production was estimated 
to be $4.3 billion higher between 2006/06 and 2010/11. Regionally, water trade in that 
period is estimated to have helped avoid state gross production reductions in NSW (-
$760 million), Victoria (-$2,256 million) and SA (-$419 million) respectively (NWC, 
2012a). 
The development of water trade in Australia is examined briefly in the following 
section in order to establish some important drivers and influences of market 
development; most typically periods of extended drought. 
3.4. A brief water market history 
Although water markets in Australia may be thought of as relatively recent institutions, 
in fact their basis can be traced back to the period around Federation (Figure 12). 
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Figure 12 The evolution of Australian water markets 
Sources: (NWC, 2011f, adapted from Musgrave (2008) and Watson and Cummins 
(2010)) 
The Victorian Irrigation Act 1886 sponsored by Alfred Deakin encouraged the 
reduction of traditional riparian rights to water, instead vesting the right to use, flow 
and control of water resources with the states. Deakin’s view was that, by vesting 
ownership and control with the states, greater utilisation of water over larger areas 
could be achieved through centralised management (Musgrave, 2008). In many other 
countries (e.g. the United States) the continued existence of riparian rights under first-
in-time first-in-right principles is a major impediment to the development of efficient 
water markets; as each right is different and location specific (NWC, 2011f). State 
control of water resources allowed the creation of entitlements to water that varied in 
accordance with climatic conditions (i.e. provided a proportion of available flow rather 
than a fixed volume), which was novel in comparison with the rest of the world 
(Connell, 2007). 
Prior to Federation, state claims to the use of the River Murray centred on navigation 
and trade. While SA fought to retain its rights to river navigability on the basis that 
benefits could be generated from transport to the river mouth, NSW and Victoria were 
beginning to introduce irrigation settlements that required different access to water 
resources (Craik and Cleaver, 2008). At the time of Federation in 1901, Sec. 100 was 
included in the Australian Constitution stating that the Commonwealth would not ‘by 
any law or regulation of trade or commerce, abridge the right of a state or the 
residents therein to the reasonable use of water for conservation and irrigation’ (Waye 
and Son, 2010, pg. 433). This meant that continued cooperation between the states 
would be required to facilitate the appropriate use and management of River Murray 
water resources (Clark, 2002). 
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3.4.1. The origins of water markets 
However, cooperation was difficult to achieve. Tension between the states continued 
until the signing of the River Murray Waters Agreement (RMWA) in 1915, which 
provided for equal flow-sharing between NSW and Victoria at Albury, state control of 
tributaries below that point, and a guaranteed minimum entitlement for SA (MDBC, 
2007a). The RMWA marks the beginning of serious federal government involvement 
in water resource planning and irrigation financing (Smith, 1998).3 Although the 
RMWA was altered twelve times during its life, the states continued to control 
operation and use of River Murray water resources with little or no federal 
government interference—other than to provide financial assistance (Hatton 
MacDonald and Young, 2001). This financial assistance funded government 
investment in irrigation activities in the sMDB between 1918 and the 1970s, including 
soldier-settlement schemes for returned servicemen from World War I, World War II 
and the Korean and Malayan operations (NWC, 2011f). Overall, there was a ten-fold 
increase in major dam storage capacity in the period between 1940 and 1990 (ABS, 
2010). Such investment was broadly in line with paternalistic and protectionist 
attitudes toward the agricultural sector, which included tariffs on imported products, 
production controls and quotas, price reserve schemes and statutory marketing 
arrangements since the early-1900s (Industry Commission, 1991). From 1915 to the 
1960s the focus of sMDB water demand also shifted from navigation/irrigation uses to 
irrigation-centric uses (River Murray Water Resources Committee, 1993). 
State approaches to water allocation and use differed widely across the sMDB 
regions. In NSW agricultural enterprises were dominated by annual cropping such as 
rice. For example, by 1981/82 64% of irrigation water in southern NSW was used to 
grow rice (Musgrave, 2008). These growers were interested in maximising their yield 
each year rather than leaving water in the dams for the next season. Hence the 
allocation approach adopted in NSW was to use all available water in any given year. 
In Victoria predominant water users were the dairy industry—that depended on 
permanent pastures—and horticulture. These growers’ interest was to maintain a 
secure and stable annual supply. Thus the Victorian allocation approach was more 
conservative, with water managers tending to store enough water for two-successive 
years and basing their seasonal allocations on that premise. Finally, in SA the 
horticultural industry was the predominant agricultural water user. For them annual 
supply security was paramount. Also, the SA interest in river navigation uses, their 
location at the end of the system and Adelaide’s partial reliance on Murray River 
water tended to drive an even more conservative approach to allocations (Crase, 
2008). 
3.4.2. A recognition of over-allocation 
The entitlement systems that developed in each state largely did not therefore provide 
incentives to conserve water—indeed irrigators could use as much water as they liked 
provided it was used on their defined irrigation areas (NWC, 2011f). However, the 
initial uptake of water entitlements offered by the states was relatively slow until the 
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 Tension between NSW and Victoria continued due to storage accounting rules, where the 
two states shared what was left at the end of any given season regardless of how much they 
used. This was clearly to NSW’s advantage as they maximized annual use, while Victoria was 
more conservative in their allocation and issuing of water rights/entitlements. This was not 
resolved until late 1980s when continuous dam accounting was introduced after Victoria 
threatened to build their own dam and divert their unused water into it at the end of each year. 
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drought of 1939-1944. In that period, the demand for issuing new water entitlements 
increased significantly, particularly in Victoria (Babie, 1997). Interestingly, during the 
1940s drought there were stories of short-term unofficial trades between farmers, 
where the water bailiff would be told to ‘send Joe’s water down to me for the next two 
weeks’ (Lewis, 2001, pg. 7). In general though, most water entitlements were issued 
at a time when the sMDB was in a 50-year wet period (compared to the previous 50 
years), which contributed to the over-allocation of access rights (NWC, 2011f). 
In the late 1960s a growing awareness of the potential negative consequences of 
sMDB water resource over-allocation began to emerge. In 1968 the SA government 
recognised of the potential negative impacts of water over-allocation, placing a 
moratorium on the issue of new water entitlements in 1969. This approach was 
followed in 1979 with the introduction of volumetric allocations for each entitlement—
resulting in a general 10% reduction in the total volume of entitlements (Bjornlund and 
O’Callaghan, 2003). The volumetric allocation was set using a combination of the last 
three years actual use and projected future increases based on financial 
commitments already undertaken by the irrigators in the form of new planting and 
irrigation systems. 
NSW also imposed catchment specific embargos on the granting of water 
entitlements in 1977, and a full embargo was subsequently adopted in 1981. In 
Victoria, licences to pump from unregulated streams during summer months were 
ceased after the 1967/68 drought. These embargos essentially capped extraction at 
existing levels of use, rather than at sustainable levels of diversion, and thus did 
nothing to alleviate the prospect of environmental degradation such as algal bloom 
outbreaks, rising soil salinity and the loss of aquatic plant and animal species over 
time (Connell, 2007). However, irrigators acted strategically to avoid the effects of 
these restrictions, by submitting (and approving) entitlement applications before 
embargos were completed, utilising increased groundwater extraction under licence 
and/or constructing on-farm dams, overland flow harvesting or other water 
interception schemes (NWC, 2011f). Therefore, by the end of the 1970s emphasis 
was shifting toward making the best use of available water resources (Lewis, 2001). 
3.4.3. Scarcity impacts on water market development 
The limits to increased entitlement growth meant that informal SA markets for 
seasonal or temporary water arose in the 1960s and 1970s as the state sought 
alternative means to redistribute limited water between consumptive users under their 
discretionary powers to grant and withdraw entitlements (Clark and Moore, 1985). 
One such example included water bailiffs simply accepting the redirection of 
allocations by farmers between farms during periods of drought (Bjornlund, 1999). 
Temporary transfers of water were also allowed in NSW during the 1966/67 drought 
and again in 1972/73 (Alvarez et al., 1989). Trading was also allowed in Victoria, as a 
one-off measure to isolated and temporary water shortages, during the 1966/67 
drought. Trade also occurred in a restricted manner from 1982/83 until the 
introduction of the first formal pilot market in 1986/87 (DWR, 1986) and the 
introduction of water trading in the Water Act, 1989. 
In the 1970s and 1980s government interest in agricultural protection began to wane 
with the appreciation that closer settlement was an inefficient means of redistributing 
wealth and social justice (Musgrave, 2008). In addition, remaining options for further 
development of low-cost water storage infrastructure were exhausted. Finally, 
increasing examples of environmental impacts from over-allocation began to emerge 
through toxic blue-green algal bloom events and irrigation-induced land salinization. 
The RMWA was altered to reflect a need to manage these issues in the 1980s with 
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the River Murray Commission powers being extended to cover the management of 
salinity, among other environmental issues (MDBC, 2007a).4 While supply options 
were decreasing, however, water demand was increasing rapidly. Total water use 
increased by 65% during the period from 1983/84 to 1996/97 (NWC, 2011f). It was 
apparent that no further extraction rights could be offered without compromising the 
rights of existing entitlement holders and the environment (Sturgess and Wright, 
1993), and that water markets should be used to reallocate water between competing 
users in future (Bjornlund and O’Callaghan, 2003). In 1984, the Australian Agricultural 
Economics Society held a joint seminar on water rights in Melbourne. It concluded 
that the primary mechanism for achieving water reallocation should be to ‘expose 
production processes to market forces, with inputs [including water] and outputs 
valued as far as practicable at their economic cost’ (AWRC, 1986). At the time there 
were concerns about using market mechanisms to reallocate water, including 
stranded assets and adverse regional economic impacts, monopolisation of water 
resources by ‘water barons’, and the exacerbation of salinity problems in the sMDB 
(Bjornlund, 1999). However, the drought of 1982/83 overrode these concerns, and the 
process of greater water market implementation and development took shape. 
3.4.4. Emerging water markets and property rights 
Before water trade could occur, complex legislative arrangements and property rights 
were required. Property rights define who is empowered to use a resource, as well as 
the extent of their powers and responsibilities (Griffin, 2006). An assignment of non-
attenuated (i.e. secure) property rights is essential for efficient market exchange to 
occur; as well as to avoid commons dilemmas in natural resources (Smith, 1981). 
Australian water markets have developed beyond simple riparian access 
arrangements toward de jure property rights that are recognised by formal legal 
instruments which, if challenged judicially or administratively, would most likely be 
upheld (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992). Non-attenuated property rights—as well as 
innovation, technological advancement and increased marginal production from the 
resource base (North and Thomas, 1977)—are critical for encouraging investment in 
water use and productive outputs (Bjornlund and O’Callaghan, 2003). Secure 
property rights are also key to the successful market reallocation of natural resources 
(Demsetz, 1964), such as water. 
Based on increasing pressure to deal with over-allocation, SA was the first state to 
offer provisions for the formal transfer of water entitlement and allocations in 1983 
(Bjornlund, 2002). This was initially enabled by discretionary powers by the 
responsible minister under existing legislation. Trade within irrigation districts began 
in 1989 (Curd and Schonfeldt, 1990), but it was not until 1995 that trade between 
private diverters and irrigators within irrigation districts was allowed, following clear 
legislative backing in 1994. In NSW, legislation allowing the transfer of water 
allocations was also passed in 1983, with trading in water entitlements passed into 
law in 1989. However water entitlement trade involving irrigation districts was not 
possible until after 1991 and until individual irrigation districts were privatized (Pigram, 
1999). Similarly, in Victoria water allocation and entitlement trade was formally 
included in the new Water Act in 1989. Trading in water entitlements did not take 
place until required regulations setting out the rules of such trade were passed in 
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 The Commissions’ mandate was expanded from managing water supply to encompassing research 
into environmental and water quality issues under the 1981 amendment of the Murray-Darling Basin 
Agreement. This was further consolidated in the 1987 and 1993 amendments of the Agreement 
(Bjornlund, 1999). 
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September 1991.5 The first Victorian water entitlement transfers were therefore not 
formally registered until January 1992 (Wheeler et al., 2008a). Inter-district water 
trade commenced in 1994 (Lewis, 2001). 
In the MDB water property rights were granted by each of the states and initially 
attached to, and transferred only with, the parcel(s) of land it was used on. However, 
despite some difficulty in defining water property rights due to high supply variability 
and potential impacts from climate and land use changes (van Dijk et al., 2006), the 
gradual separation or ‘unbundling’ of land and water property rights has subsequently 
occurred. This separation has been necessary for water markets to work effectively 
and efficiently (Wilson and Francis, 2010). Consequently, in the MDB well-defined, 
secure and unbundled water property rights have increasingly enabled irrigators to 
transfer water entitlement and allocation assets between one-another in response to 
risk attitudes, seasonal conditions or strategic planning. 
The creation and development of increasingly consistent water trading institutions (i.e. 
arrangements, rules and approval processes) has also helped to strengthen water 
market activity and efficiency by, in part, reducing the transaction costs associated 
with transfers. Water trade institution and transaction cost reform can lead to 
innovative water use, management and transfers between consumptive users, as well 
as the creation of sustainable water use systems in environmental sectors (Martin et 
al., 2008). Generally, irrigators remained wary of water markets though, and trade 
was far from common during this mid-1980s to early 1990s. However, water 
allocation trade was given its first real test during the 1994/95 drought, when water 
availability was much lower than in previous years. Trade activity increased 
dramatically, and irrigators experienced the real benefits of water trade under water 
supply and climatic variability (NWC, 2011f). This period of development provided an 
impetus for the further development of water markets in Australia. 
3.4.5. Water market adoption and broadening 
At the beginning of the 1990s, broadening of water reform and trade began in 
earnest. Numerous reports and enquiries concluded that the states were individually 
unable to manage MDB water resources effectively without coordination and 
investment by the Commonwealth (Connell and Grafton, 2011). Negotiation between 
the MDB governments resulted in a new Murray-Darling Basin Agreement in 1992, 
providing the basis for initiatives to drive management of land, water and 
environmental resources on a basin-wide scale (Papas, 2007) via market-based 
institutional arrangements to reallocate resources (Hatton MacDonald and Young, 
2001). To maintain the momentum of this agreement, its objectives were included in 
subsequent Council of Australian Government (COAG) meeting agendas. 
COAG established a Working Group on Water Resources Policy to examine, among 
other things, barriers to the effective transfer of water between competing uses 
(Working Group on Water Resource Policy, 1994). This led to COAG initiatives for the 
separation of land and water rights, and principles for water trading arrangements 
(ARMCANZ, 1996). Each of the states now worked to unbundle land and water 
assets, establish new water property rights, and develop the means of transferring 
those rights between users (Hamstead et al., 2008). Transfers of water remained 
limited during these early phases. However, in 1995 an audit of river flow regimes in 
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 In Victoria allocation trading was initiated in 1989 through the Act, as it did not require regulation. 
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the MDB concluded that median annual flow-to-sea levels were 27% of pre-
development; and that severe drought-like flow patterns occurred in 60% of years as 
compared to 5% of years in natural conditions (MDBC, 2004). As growth in water 
extraction would exacerbate this problem a cap on further extraction increases across 
the MDB was made effective from July 1 1997, enhancing earlier efforts to address 
over-allocation and environmental water requirements (Bjornlund, 2005). The cap 
restrictions resulted, perversely, in the activation of previously unused (sleeper) or 
under-used (dozer) water entitlements (Crase et al., 2009). Irrigators also sought to 
increase their access to supplementary water and/or take advantage of gaps in 
licence moratorium restrictions—such that between 1984 and 1994 MDB water 
diversions increased by nearly 8% (NWC, 2011f). 
But, in concert with cap barriers to licence expansion, the gradual removal of water 
trade restrictions, increasingly efficient market transaction costs and 1994/95 drought 
effects slowly resulted in increased water allocation trade (Bjornlund, 2006a), while 
water entitlement trade remained subdued (Turral et al., 2005).6 It was expected that 
state-based water management and planning arrangements would address over-
allocation issues via the reallocation of water resources. However, these instruments 
proved unsuccessful at addressing the central over-allocation task and by 2004 it was 
recognised that many of the states had failed to deliver on their commitments to 
provide sustainable levels of water extraction (NWC, 2007, Crase, 2012b). In 
response, an assessment of sustainable MDB water requirements was undertaken; 
concluding that at least 1,500 GL of water was needed for environmental flows to 
maintain a moderate probability of environmental health (Jones et al., 2003). A 
prolonged period of drought that began in 1998/99 also started to impact on water 
resource availability in the sMDB, such that in 2004 dramatic development of water 
reform and markets took place once more. Since the early 1980s initiation of water 
markets in the sMDB, trade in water allocations and entitlements have increased 
considerably (Figure 13 and Figure 14). 
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 Reasons for this include perceptions that interstate water allocation trade was less risky due its 
temporary and reversible nature. Interstate water entitlement trade commenced (under Schedule D of 
the MDB Agreement) with a geographically limited pilot project in 1998, close to the intersection between 
the NSW, SA and Victorian borders that initially involved only private diverters. An extension in May 1999 
subsequently included high security entitlement transfers below Nyah. By 2003 the Murray-Darling Basin 
Ministerial Council had agreed to expand interstate trade to encompass the whole of the sMDB (NWC, 
2011f). Other barriers included restrictions on water entitlement transfers out of irrigation districts or 
states, discussed in depth in Section 4. 
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Figure 13 Water allocation and entitlement trade in the sMDB 
Source: (NWC, 2011b, pg. 13) 
 
 
Figure 14 Net Water allocation trade in sMDB - 1998-99 to 2009-10 
Source: (Wheeler et al., 2012c) 
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There was a significant increase in the volume of trade following the establishment of 
the interim cap in the mid-1990s, which capped the volume of surface water 
extractions. Over the decade, trade volumes have increased in response to climate 
and water supply variability and the implementation of water market reforms. Since 
2007–08, there has been considerable growth in entitlement trade, driven primarily by 
federal government purchasing of water entitlements and severe drought (Wheeler et 
al., 2012c). 
Prices have also fluctuated widely, especially water allocation prices (Figure 15). 
Some major drivers of water trade activity include the availability of water supply in 
each region, the relative differences between commodity prices and water 
entitlement/allocation prices, the capacity of irrigators to adjust to short-term (water 
allocation) and long-term (water entitlement) seasonal change, and the expected 
availability of water in both current and future seasons (Bell et al., 2007). Expected 
future water availability can be impacted, however, by the presence of carry-over 
provisions in the MDB. These are discussed in more detail later. 
 
 
Figure 15 Mean monthly water allocation trade ($/ML) in the sMDB from 
2002/03 – 2010/11 
Source: UniSA data 
3.4.6. Further Water market reform in the 2000s 
Two intergovernmental agreements provided a basis for the move towards 
sustainable water markets—and a larger government intervention in their operation.  
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3.4.6.1. National Water Initiative (NWI) agreement 
The first NWI agreement (NWIA-1) made states responsible for achieving 
environmental sustainable economic and social outcomes by defining water 
entitlements as a calculated share of the consumptive pool with risk-sharing 
conditions in the event of consumptive pool reductions (COAG, 2004a).7 A principal 
component of the NWI agreement was the use market-based mechanisms or 
efficiency investments to recover water for environmental or other public benefit 
outcomes. A subsequent intergovernmental agreement specifically addressing over-
allocation in the MDB (NWIA-2) strengthened NWIA-1 emphasis on water markets 
and efficiency improvements by making them the key policy instruments to achieve 
environmental objectives along the Murray River. This program was known as The 
Living Murray initiative (MDBMC, 2003, MDBMC, 2002, Findlay, 2004). 
3.4.6.2. The Living Murray (TLM) initiative 
The intergovernmental agreement on Addressing Over-allocation in the MDB 
established a targeted sMDB program to purchase water entitlements and invest in 
infrastructure improvement. This program sought to secure 500 GL of water for MDB 
environmental sites (COAG, 2004b). State and federal governments contributed an 
initial $500 million toward TLM programs (Findlay, 2004, MDBC, 2005a, MDBC, 
2006a, MDBC, 2007b, Scanlon, 2006, Grafton and Hussey, 2006), which was 
supplemented with a further $500 million over five years from 2006-07 (COAG, 2006). 
Hence from 2004 to 2008 several state- and federal-based recovery programs 
operated to recover environmental water.8 The most notable of these included the 
Riverbank program targeting water for the Macquarie Marshes, Lowbidgee Wetlands 
and Narran Lakes in NSW and the Streamflow Tender process where irrigators in the 
Olinda, Stringybark, Pauls, Steels and Dixons Creek areas of Victoria could alter their 
license conditions for financial compensation to provide environmental water (Crase 
et al., 2009). However, of all these programs the TLM remained the largest.  
The major TLM focus remained upon infrastructure or efficiency works rather than 
entitlement purchasing (Living Murray Initiative, 2006). It is possible that the 
governments remained uneasy about water market maturity in Australia (Crase et al., 
2009, White and Makin, 2008), and required more robust processes before prioritising 
a strategy of entitlement purchasing. The government’s capacity to avoid market 
intervention was again diminished, however, by drought impacts in 2007. 
The adopted strategy may also not have been suitable for meeting recovery targets. 
An assessment of TLM concluded that water recovery from efficiency investment was 
expected to be minor in volumetric terms and that, since only around 0.7% of all water 
entitlements were traded each year, willing irrigator sellers of water entitlements 
should not be relied upon to secure adequate environmental water, and that 
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 While NSW adopted the NWI risk-sharing framework in full, other states adopted different views that 
affected the security of water entitlements throughout the period. For example, Victoria preferred to 
assign more risk to the government, whereas SA assigned more risk to irrigators (NWC, 2011f). 
However, the presence of government purchasing in the water market meant that, ultimately, the risk of 
water entitlement asset value and security was underwritten by (in some instances higher than) market-
value compensation for any willing reduction to water entitlement rights. 
8
 These included a pilot program through the Murray-Darling Basin Commission and later recovery 
activities by Water for Rivers using NSW, Victorian and Commonwealth funding to return water for the 
Snowy and Murray Rivers. Water for Rivers mainly focused upon infrastructure savings with some water 
purchasing where appropriate (Crase, et al. 2009). 
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governments could also purchase water in allocation markets (Goesch and Heaney, 
2003). 
Goesch and Heaney (2003) thus introduced the concept of government involvement 
in the allocation market to address over-allocation, but did not consider how that 
might be achieved without socio-economic impacts. As such, expanded government 
involvement in water markets remained minor and transfers of water toward 
environmental holdings remained relatively small over this period—it was expected 
that only 240 GL of the 500 GL target would be recovered over the five years to 2009 
at a cost of $179 million (MDBMC, 2005). 
The original 500 GL target also came under scrutiny when it was revealed that that 
risks such as climate change, uninhibited farm dam construction and corporate 
backed plantation forestry projects could decrease future MDB stream flows between 
2,500 and 5,500 GL over the next 20 years (van Dijk et al., 2006). While governments 
struggled to find an appropriate program for water recovery their capacity to avoid 
market intervention was diminished by drought in the MDB over a prolonged period 
and the impacts of water-plan suspensions for both consumptive and environmental 
water users. As such, water markets began to play an increasingly important role in 
the reallocation of water between users, and different uses, in the MDB. 
3.4.6.3. Drought and water entitlement purchasing initiatives 
As outlined above, from 1998/99 onwards irrigators in Victoria and SA experienced 
reduced allocations (Wheeler et al., forthcoming-b). In the period following the 
introduction of the NWI and the TLM program total MDB system inflows were some of 
the lowest on record (DWLBC, 2009). The impact of the MDB drought first came to 
prominence in NSW. In that state, under Sec. 49A of the Water Management Act 
2000 the Minister could suspend part or all of any water sharing plan for an area 
faced with severe water shortages (NSW Parliament, 2000). As the effects of drought 
became widespread in NSW several of their water sharing plans were suspended, the 
first in 2006 (NWC, 2009). 
Irrigation and environmental requirements were sacrificed in an effort to preserve 
water supplies for rural communities. This signalled a formal deferral of the planning 
approach to the provision of environmental water and threatened the collapse of 
NWIA-1 objectives. The drought brought considerable political pressure to bear on 
the federal government, and instigated calls for the national management of water 
resources (Crase and O'Keefe, 2009). Faced with a lengthy drought period (Young 
and McColl, 2008), inaction by the states and possible impacts to longer term system 
inflows from risks such as climate change (van Dijk et al., 2006) the federal 
government acted decisively. 
3.4.6.4. The National Plan for Water Security (NPWS) 
In early 2007 the Howard government released its National Plan for Water Security 
(NPWS) (Howard, 2007). In part, the NPWS plan aimed to: 
 Achieve a 25% increase in water use efficiency, with saved water shared on a 
50/50 basis between irrigators and the environment; 
 Provide annual water savings of 2,500 GL in the MDB (3,000 GL in total), 
comprised of: 
o MDB irrigation delivery system efficiencies at a 90% benchmark, saving 
1,500 GL per annum; and 
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o A $1.5 billion investment in improved MDB farming and irrigation 
methods, yielding a further 1,000 GL of shared water savings. 
In addition, under NPWS the Commonwealth was prepared to invest $3.1 billion to 
purchase water entitlements and assist unviable irrigators to exit the industry. Within 
the NPWS, involvement in the water market was identified as a major means of 
providing water for the environment (ibid, pg. 4); the lesser investment focus was on 
efficiency investment and improvement. Any water savings from efficiency measures 
would be used to achieve environmental outcomes, and could be sold back to 
irrigators when not in conflict with environmental needs (ibid, pg. 11). 
3.4.6.5. Water Act (2007) 
About this time a new Commonwealth Water Act (2007) was also introduced to: i) 
establish and enforce environmentally sustainable limits on water extraction (e.g. the 
Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder [CEWH] and a Basin-wide 
environmental watering plan); ii) protect, restore and provide for ecological outcomes; 
iii) optimise economic, social and environmental outcomes (objective 3c, purpose 
20(d)); iv) maximise net economic return to the Australian community (objective 3d(iii)); 
and v) achieve efficient and cost effective water management and administrative 
arrangements (objective 3g) (Australian Parliament, 2007). A new administrative body 
in the form of the independent Murray-Darling Basin Authority (MDBA) was also 
created (replacing the Murray-Darling Basin Commission) to address over-allocation 
and increase environmental flows (Waye and Son, 2010). The Authority Board is 
made up of 5 independent members and the Authority CEO. 
The Water Act 2007 thus gathered disparate state water planning and trade 
mechanisms into a single over-arching framework requiring Commonwealth approval 
and deferral where conflict arose (Waye and Son, 2010). Purchasing water 
entitlements to meet environmental needs in the MDB using public tender rounds 
became prominent from 2008. 
The Water Act 2007 also provided for the creation of a Basin Plan to recommend and 
account for required reductions in the consumptive pool to achieve sustainable water 
use outcomes (MDBA, 2012c). Proposed sustainable diversion targets have been set 
at 2,750 GL (MDBA, 2012b). To complement this, the federal government has made 
further provisions to obtain 450 GL via on- and off-farm efficiency measures and 
works that address delivery constraints (Burke, 2012). Setting a recovery target via 
the proposed Basin Plan will assist the water market recovery effort to progress, and 
for that progress to be assessed in terms of usefulness for delivering environmental 
water outcomes. However, ultimately additional water market development may also 
be required to achieve efficient reallocation results (Whitford and Clark, 2007). 
3.4.6.6. The Water for the Future (WFF) initiative 
In March 2008 the Rudd government created a further intergovernmental MDB 
agreement. It determined that, while the NWI arrangements had positively contributed 
to water reform and management, its’ objectives would not be met without significant 
federal government intervention (DEWHA, 2008). The new agreement built on the 
NPWS focus on sustainable diversion limits, long-term MDB health and safeguarding 
community water needs (COAG, 2008). The major points of the new agreement were 
enshrined as Water for the Future (WFF) and publically released in April 2008 (Wong, 
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2008).9 WFF encompassed a $12.9 billion investment over 10 years to 2018/19 
(DSEWPC, 2011b) (overall summary shown in Table 7 below). In contrast with 
NPWS, however, WFF placed a significant emphasis on the role of water markets to 
recover water for the environment. A revised recovery target of 1,500 GL was set in 
line with the recommendations made by Jones et al. (2003). 
Beginning in 2007/08, the federal government directly intervened in water entitlement 
markets to secure environmental water under its $3.1 billion Restoring the Balance 
(RtB) program (Wong, 2008, DEWHA, 2008, Crase and O'Keefe, 2009). Broadly 
speaking there has been limited coordination between the range of recovery 
programs and, while there are recent examples of program outcomes from Riverbank 
in NSW (Walpole et al., 2010), the federal government has been somewhat selective 
in its release of detailed recovery information. As at 30 September 2012, WFF had 
recovered a total of 1,094 GL of long-term average annual yield (LTAAY) water from 
purchases of water entitlements and infrastructure efficiency transfers (e.g. NVIRP 
project savings in northern Victoria) across the MDB (DSEWPC, 2013). 
Table 7 Water recovery policy summary—NPWS and WFF†  
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NPWS $3.0b $600m $480m    $3.13b off-farm 
$1.64b on-farm 
$620m metering 
$500m operations 
NPWS Total: $10.05b 
WFF $3.1b $1.5b $450 m $57.1m
‡
 $250m $250m $5.8b across areas 
similar to above 
WFF Total: $12.9b 
† Figures do not add exactly due to incomplete funding information, and do not include additional 
funding in 2010/11 of up to $310 million per annum from 2014/15 to bridge any remaining gap 
between WFF and the final MDB Plan. 
‡ In 2009, exit package funding increased to $107.1 million, with funds reallocated from SRWU. 
Source: Loch et al. (under review - b) 
As discussed later in Section 4, economic studies have indicated that reductions in 
current diversion limits will have only small scale long-run average impact on the 
gross value of irrigated production and employment within the MDB (Grafton, 2011). 
Nevertheless, the impacts are projected to be uneven and community resistance has 
prompted further socio-economic analysis of regional impacts. It is likely that water 
                                               
 
9
 The major components of the WFF plan include Sustainable Rural Water Use and Infrastructure 
($5.8b); Restoring the Balance in the Basin ($3.1 billion); National Urban Water and Desalination Plan 
($1 billion); Water Smart Australia ($937 million); Driving Reform in the Basin (DEWHA and ACCC) 
($646 million); Improving Water Information (BOM) ($447 million); National Water Security Plan for Cities 
and Towns ($256 million); National Rainwater and Greywater Initiatives ($250 million); Raising National 
Water Standards (NWC) ($214 million); and finalising The Living Murray initiative ($185 million) (Wong 
2008). 
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markets will remain a key mechanism in the water recovery process because they are 
associated with voluntary transactions between buyers and sellers. However, critics 
of WFF argue that there may be strong irrigator reluctance to part with water 
entitlements in the future (e.g. Waterfind, 2012). Irrigator concerns voiced in response 
to the Guide to the MDB Plan also resulted in strategic RtB program shifts in late 
2011 (MDBA, 2010a). 
Broad negative reaction to the Guide’s proposed 3,000 to 4,000 GL recovery target to 
sustain key ecological sites (Quiggin, 2011) fuelled criticism of WFF’s budget 
emphasis on water entitlement purchases. In response, a federal parliamentary 
inquiry was established to consider the Guide’s impact and recommend future 
program arrangements (Australian Parliament, 2011). In 2011-12 the Department of 
Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities (DSEWPC) 
undertook a review of Restoring the Balance water entitlement purchasing to date in 
2012, as discussed later in Section 4, partly to investigate claims against the 
program. 
3.4.6.7. The Murray-Darling Basin Plan (2011) 
In November 2012, federal Parliament passed the Murray-Darling Basin Plan into law, 
and several attempts to have the plan disallowed have since been rejected (as at 18 
March 2013). The new target for SDL reductions was confirmed at 2,750 GL; an 
outcome to be achieved by 2019 with a performance (and target) review process 
scheduled for 2015 (MDBA, 2011e). At the time of passing the Basin Plan, the MDBA 
confirmed that (using 2009 as the base year) 1,315 GL had been recovered for the 
environment, leaving 1,435 GL to be recovered (DSEWPC, 2013). 
Importantly, the Basin Plan provides significant opportunity for improving water trade 
rules, operations and integration in the southern MDB. Specifically, new requirements 
on water trading rules contained in Chapter 12 of the plan seek to enhance trade in 
groundwater entitlements, trade in delivery rights, clearer definitions of water 
user/service provider rights, delivery and reporting obligations, and allocation 
announcements. Completion of water trade reform is important to complete 
implementation of Australia’s progress toward addressing environmental, social and 
economic issues (Horne, 2012b). 
The emphasis in part on water trade as an instrument to reduce risks identified in the 
Basin Plan suggests the possibility of an increasing role for water trade in future. This 
conclusion is supported by CEWH interest in using allocation water trade to recover 
water for the environment (CEWH, 2011a), and enhanced water trade rules that have 
been developed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of water markets for 
reallocation purposes (ACCC, 2009, ACCC, 2010, ACCC, 2011b). However, there 
has been an increasing emphasis on investment in infrastructure upgrades and water 
saving projects. 
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3.4.6.8. RtB strategic shift toward infrastructure investment over buy-back 
Cessation of non-strategic water entitlement purchasing conformed to a 
recommendation from the Parliamentary Inquiry into the impact of the Guide 
(Australian Parliament, 2011). Specifically, the inquiry called for strategic water 
entitlement purchasing that prioritised low community impacts (i.e. where 
consequences for communities had been identified prior to purchase) and dealings 
with proactive sellers. The inquiry also recommended (amongst other things) that: i) 
the identification and implementation of viable efficiency works for the environment 
should be done immediately; ii) tax impediments to efficiency investment should be 
addressed; iii) tax-based incentives for irrigation efficiency uptakes should be 
introduced; iv) there should be immediate investment in R&D for efficiency uptakes; 
and v) a national water fund should be established to achieve these outcomes. 
In February 2011 the federal government announced that, in response to irrigator 
concerns about the rural effects of water purchasing in sMDB districts, it would shift 
its program emphasis to smaller and rolling tender rounds to provide a measured and 
steady pace of water recovery (NWC, 2011b). Water purchases had to align with new 
criteria including: closer matches of purchasing locations to areas with scientifically 
proven environmental water needs; a demonstrated capacity to meet environmental 
needs; and cost effectiveness of the purchases relative to current market prices. In 
response, federal purchases in the sMDB fell from 488 GL in 2009/10 to 221 GL in 
2010/11 and largely emphasized high reliability water entitlements over other 
reliability types (NWC, 2011b). The market price for sMDB water entitlements also fell 
by around 15% in 2010/11 (Waterfind, 2012). This price fall was largely consistent 
with modelling by Hone et al. (2010) that estimated federal government intervention in 
the water entitlement market had increased prices between 13% (northern MDB) and 
18% (southern MDB) overall. 
An emphasis on infrastructure investment has provided the basis for an additional 
$1.7 billion investment into water recovery via on-farm efficiencies such as channel-
lining and farm evaporation reduction technology, as well as larger barrier reduction 
projects to improve environmental watering (Wroe, 2012). As a consequence, the 
total RtB water recovery target increased to 3,200 GL by 2024; or an additional 450 
GL on current Basin Plan arrangements (MDBA, 2012c). On-farm benefits from 
infrastructure investment include greater farm flexibility and viability, reduced labour 
inputs and nutrient runoff and production stability from efficient supply (Burke, 2012). 
Community advantages can also accrue from short-term and long-term labour and 
capital injections, improved property values, and enhanced secondary/tertiary sector 
viability and adjustment periods to water reform requirements (MDBA, 2012d). 10 
Where irrigation losses contribute minimal return-flows, infrastructure investments can 
also be cost-effective (Qureshi et al., 2010). 
However, the savings from such projects are often called into question (Ward et al., 
2007) and irrigators can be burdened with higher variable farm operating costs, as 
well as enduring water structure operation, maintenance and refurbishment costs 
(Crase, 2012a). Viable projects can also be difficult to identify, as many fail benefit-
cost tests or contradict NWI requirements from state investments in water 
infrastructure (Crase and O'Keefe, 2009). Finally, total water recovery from 
                                               
 
10
 Although for an opposing argument to public social welfare benefits from infrastructure investment in 
private irrigation works see Crase (2012b). 
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infrastructure investment may not exceed 600 GL due to improvement limits or 
questionable reductions in seepage/evaporation losses (Quiggin, 2006b). 
In response to the parliamentary inquiry recommendations, the federal government 
announced a range of further reforms in the sMDB. Specifically, in April 2012 the 
government announced that it would suspend all non-strategic water purchases in the 
MDB and shift its RtB spending emphasis toward infrastructure investment (ABC 
News, 2012b). By way of tangible support for this approach, in early November 2012 
the federal government announced that it would seek to return a further 450 GL of 
water to the environment via an additional $1.77 billion funding package (i.e. on top of 
the existing SRWU program funds) toward infrastructure investments within the 
sMDB. The target date for returning water to the system was also extended out 
beyond 2019 to 2024. 
Further research by Loch et al. (under review-b) suggests that there is not the 
increased demand for greater water infrastructure investment as commonly 
perceived. They found that irrigators marginally prefer infrastructure expenditure 
above the sum of a set of market-based options (namely water entitlement 
purchasing, temporary water market products and exit- based packages). However, 
their infrastructure preference weighting is less than current budget expenditure, and 
the use of market-based options has higher support from irrigators than current policy 
recognises. 
3.5. Key points 
The major points from this section include: 
 Australia’s progress toward water markets has been long and costly. However, 
it is clearly apparent that during this time water trade has become entrenched 
as a tool to manage water scarcity, particularly during severe shortages 
associated with drought (e.g. the Millennium drought). However, active water 
markets are still mainly limited to the sMDB. 
 A major element from this section is that periods of extreme dry (and wet) 
have seen water markets expand and develop as a tool for the effective and 
efficient reallocation of water resources between competing uses and users. 
This has primarily provided a basis for assisting sectoral, structural and 
community adjustment particularly in rural areas. As future climate change is 
set to exacerbate the twin issues of water scarcity and variability to a 
potentially greater degree than ever before, the usefulness of water markets 
and an adaptation tool for water users is clearly evident. 
 The following section thus details the expected effects of climate change for 
water supply and agriculture in Australia and the sMDB in particular as a basis 
for examining how water markets might assist adaptation in that context. 
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4. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF WATER MARKETS 
As noted in Sections 2 and 3, the effects of climate change in Australia and the MDB 
will potentially be quite severe. Changes such as reduced rainfall and surface runoff, 
together with increased temperatures and seasonal variability, will result in decreased 
water supply and/or water resource availability. As water resources comprise a key 
input for agricultural production, industrial manufacture and rural town supply 
requirements (e.g. critical human needs) any decrease in its supply will have 
economic flow-on effects for these sectors. This chapter outlines and discusses those 
economic flow-on effects and their mitigation by water markets. 
Water markets enable water users to deal with allocation problems specific to their 
demands and their local environmental constraints (Anderson and Leal, 1992). Using 
an earlier approach adopted by Crase et al. (2004), the objective of this chapter is to 
provide insight into three questions. These include: (1) what advantages do current 
water market arrangements offer for the economic reallocation of scarce water 
resources; (2) do existing water market structures and arrangements provide 
economic capacity to mitigate likely future climate change impacts; and (3) where 
changes to existing water markets are required to improve/increase the capacity for 
economic adjustment, what changes would be needed? This chapter sets out to 
address these questions. 
4.1. The perception of water markets – an overview 
Fears about the community impacts of water trading have been widespread and 
vehemently expressed since markets were first introduced (Bjornlund and McKay, 
1999, Bjornlund, 2002, Fenton, 2006, Edwards et al., 2008a, Edwards et al., 2008b, 
Edwards et al., 2009, Productivity Commission, 2010). However, it is clear that 
irrigator views towards trading have become more accepting over time. Table 8 
andTable 9 illustrate attitudes by irrigators towards various aspects of the water 
market, in 1998-99 and 2010-11 respectively. It is also clear that there has been more 
concern about entitlement trading than allocation trading, and trading out of districts 
than within districts. Users of the water market are more likely to agree that water 
markets are a good idea, while sellers are more likely to think that than buyers 
(Bjornlund et al., 2011). 
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Table 8 Water Trade Attitudes by GMID and NSW Murray in 1998-99 (%) 
 
GMID (allocation 
buyers/sellers and non-
traders) 
NSW Murray 
(allocation/entitlement 
buyers and sellers) 
 
SA* A N D SD SA A N D SD 
Water trade is a very good idea 46 27 13 5 10 48 24 10 7 11 
I only agree with temporary transfers since the 
water stays on the property 
35 27 12 13 13 31 20 12 18 19 
It has to be possible to transfer water 
permanently otherwise it is not possible to make 
long term commitments 
27 28 19 13 13 37 27 16 11 9 
Water trade should not be allowed because it 
activates otherwise unused water and reduces 
annual sales water 
9 15 15 28 32 12 13 15 27 33 
Water trade is a good way for some farmers to 
get out of irrigation 
25 39 11 11 14 27 34 15 19 9 
It is essential to make allocations to the 
environment otherwise irrigation will not be long 
term viable 
27 33 21 10 8 17 38 19 15 11 
I am willing to reduce annual sales water 
allocations in order to ensure sufficient 
allocations for the environment 
7 20 20 22 31 4 15 17 20 44 
* SA = Strongly agree, A = agree, N = neutral, D = disagree and SD = strongly disagree. 
 N=300 (GMID) N= 311 (Murray) 
Source: (Bjornlund et al., 2011) 
 
Table 9 Water Trade Attitudes in NSW, VIC and SA 2010/11 (%) 
 
NSW VIC - GMID SA 
 
S
A A N D 
S
D 
S
A A N D 
S
D 
S
A A N D 
S
D 
I believe water trading has 
been good for farming  
7 38 12 23 17 8 32 15 26 18 7 49 14 21 7 
Trading water helps me cope 
with seasonal uncertainty 
14 58 8 13 5 16 57 8 13 4 11 58 17 9 1 
We would willingly reduce 
our seasonal allocations to 
ensure environmental water  
1 5 9 42 41 0 9 7 41 41 0 17 10 42 28 
Most irrigators think 
increasing environmental 
water flows is a good thing 
1 21 10 48 19 1 20 11 47 16 5 64 11 17 3 
Environmental allocations 
are essential otherwise 
irrigation will not be long-
term sustainable 
6 38 12 28 12 4 39 14 32 8 8 71 7 10 1 
I am well informed about the 
trading rules in my district 16 68 6 6 2 15 68 6 9 2 8 78 4 7 1 
N= 274 (SA), N= 358 (VIC), N= 313 (NSW) 
Source: (Bjornlund et al., 2011) 
Despite these concerns irrigators have widely adopted water trading over time, in 
particular the trading of allocations (Wheeler et al., 2009) while the adoption of 
entitlement trade has been much slower and only started to accelerate in the past few 
years (Bjornlund et al., 2012). Water trading is thus having an increasing influence on 
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both who uses and who owns water. There is clear evidence to suggest that irrigators 
have used water markets to manage the adjustment process; and to manage water 
scarcity and production risk with respect to water supply (Bjornlund, 2002, Bjornlund, 
2004, Bjornlund, 2006b). Despite the early reluctant acceptance of water trading, 
there is now a clear understanding within the irrigation community that without water 
trading the socio-economic impact of the current drought would have been much 
harsher. 
4.1.1. Water trade background in the 2000s 
In general, the sMDB market for water allocations was more volatile during the recent 
Millennium drought than the market for water entitlements. The total volume of water 
allocation trade roughly trebled from 8% to 30% of available water in the period from 
2001/02 to 2007/08, as seasonal allocations began to diminish (NWC, 2011b). While 
relatively little water allocation was traded between the sMDB states from 2003/04 
through to 2007/08, from 2007/08 to 2010/11 interstate trade grew from 19% to 65% 
of transactions to cope with differing state demands for water resources (Table 10). 
From 2006/07 the NSW Murrumbidgee became a net exporter of water allocations as 
rice and other annual crop growers elected not to produce, and sold their water 
allocation instead.11 SA on the other hand became a net importer of water from 
2007/08 to 2010/11 to meet demand from horticulture crops and demand for carry-
over. In total, over 60% of NSW’s water allocation exports went to SA, with the most 
substantial volume occurring in 2008/09 following particularly difficult allocation 
conditions in 2007/08. 
Consequently, the 2007/08 period experienced high prices of water allocations, as 
irrigators unfamiliar with low allocation announcements engaged in ‘panic’ trade to 
secure adequate water supply (Loch et al., 2012). The rumours in 2007/08 about the 
extent to which the government was going to intervene in the water market also drove 
up prices. Water allocation prices returned to lower levels in 2008/09, and fell 
dramatically at the end of the Millennium drought in mid-2010/11. 
  
                                               
 
11
 In November 2006 both the Murrumbidgee and the NSW Lower Murray-Darling Regulated Rivers 
water sharing plans were suspended to give general and high security water users greater flexibility in 
managing their water needs. This removed previous 100 GL total limits on interstate water allocation 
trade, and saw total transfers-out rise to around 400 GL in 2008/09. In response, an embargo was 
placed on out-of-district trade in the Murrumbidgee River in 2009/10 (Loch et al., 2012), which saw SA 
irrigators source water allocations from other regions such as the Lower Darling (NWC, 2011b). The 
trade embargo ballot-trigger point was not reached in 2009/10, so possible trade restrictions did not 
eventuate. In July 2011 the water-sharing plans were reinstated, along with the original 100 GL interstate 
trade limits. 
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Table 10 Intrastate versus interstate sMDB water allocation trade as a % of 
state trade—2007-2011 
 NSW Vic. SA Total 
Year 
Internal 
trade 
Inter-
state 
trade 
Internal 
trade 
Inter-
state 
trade 
Internal 
trade 
Inter-
state 
trade 
Internal 
trade 
Inter-
state 
trade 
2010-11 83% 17% 77% 23% 35% 65% 73% 27% 
2009-10 75% 25% 81% 19% 81% 19% 77% 23% 
2008-09 58% 42% 94% 6% 96% 4% 67% 33% 
2007-08 74% 26% 87% 13% 99% 1% 83% 17% 
Note: To avoid double counting, interstate trade comprises only trades out of each state. For example, 
the substantial volume of trade that took place in 2008-09 from New South Wales into South Australia is 
included as New South Wales, rather than South Australian, interstate trade. 
Source: (NWC, 2011b) 
The National Water Commission (NWC) notes that the price of water allocations is 
usually unstable at the beginning of a water year but tends to stabilise as the water 
year progresses. As the prices of water allocations fall, smaller trades become 
unprofitable as the transaction costs associated with the transfer outweigh the 
revenue from the sale. This provides sellers with an incentive to carry-over water into 
the following season, and buyers the incentive to purchase higher than planned 
volumes to make transactions cost-effective, and then carry-over that water as well 
(NWC, 2011b). 
It therefore appears as if the water entitlement and allocation markets have worked 
well in reallocating water within the sMDB in response to the Millennium drought by 
facilitating significant inter- and intra-state volumetric transfers. In the next section we 
examine the economic drivers for this reallocation in greater depth to develop lessons 
for future climate change impact mitigation from water markets. 
4.2. Economic studies of water trade and reallocation 
The ability to trade water provides flexibility for irrigators in water use, production and 
farm management strategies. As Qureshi et al. (2009) argued, trading in water 
markets is likely to increase and improve economic efficiency because market prices 
make the opportunity cost of water explicit; they provide incentives to adopt water-
saving technologies and reduce inefficient uses of water. Peterson et al. (2004) 
estimated the gains from trade in a dry year at $495 million, the NWC (2010a) 
suggested that water trading in the sMDB increased Australia’s gross domestic 
product by $220 million in 2008–09, and Qureshi et al. (2009) found that a reduction 
in water market barriers in the sMDB would increase annual net returns significantly. 
Jiang and Grafton (2012) use a hydro-economic model to examine the role that water 
trading plays under climate change and reduced surface water availability in the 
MDB. Results show that with inter-regional water trade, the on-farm impacts of 
climate change in periods of much reduced water availability is mitigated compared to 
without inter-regional water trade, emphasising the critical importance that water trade 
plays. 
The above concerns associated with water reallocation in the Basin have prompted a 
range of socio-economic analysis of regional impacts (Connor et al., 2011a, DAFF, 
2011, Goesch et al., 2011, Dixon et al., 2011, ABARE-BRS, 2010a, ABARE-BRS, 
2010b). In general, these studies find GDP would decline between 0.2% (Wittwer and 
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Griffith, 2011) and 0.7% (DAFF, 2011) under 3000GL/y recovery; but trade and dry-
land farming would mitigate most losses. Heavily irrigation-dependent areas may 
experience larger impacts, but most regions could expect short-term negative impacts 
where: 1) adjustment was enhanced by unrestricted intra-regional trade; 2) cap 
barriers to water entitlement selling were removed; and 3) targeted buyback within 
strategic irrigation districts was undertaken. Broadly speaking, current water trading 
arrangements produce significant economic benefits for sMDB, and the states within 
it (NWC, 2012a). 
One way in which the economic benefits of water trade could be measured is by 
calculating the gross value of irrigated agricultural production (GVIAP) and mapping it 
across years. Figure 16 summarises available ABS data for GVIAP in the MDB from 
2005/06 to 2008/09 (NWC, 2012b). The data suggests that while water availability 
over the entire MDB dropped by 53%, GVIAP for the period fell by only 27%. 
 
 
Figure 16 Gross value of MDB irrigated production, 2005/06 to 2008/09 
Source: (NWC, 2012a). 
However, the ABS (2012b) caution that GVIAP does not provide an accurate 
quantitative measure of irrigation water value-adding or the benefits of water trade, 
which are typically overstated in its reporting. To account for this issue, the NWC 
employ economic modelling techniques to estimate the relationships between water 
availability, water use, irrigated agricultural production and overall economic activity. 
Specifically the NWC, among others, use computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
models to examine aggregate economic effects of water trade on irrigator water 
adjustment within and across irrigation regions up to 2010/11 (NWC, 2012a). 
Economic impacts modelled include the impact on industries, production, 
employment, regional economies and local spending in response to given water 
availability scenarios. Dry-land productivity shocks as a result of drought or reduced 
water availability are also captured. 
The findings suggest that, without access to water trade, the economic impact of 
water scarcity in the sMDB would have totalled between $2-3 billion each year in 
2007/08 and 2008/09. However, when interregional and intraregional water trade is 
permitted in those same years, production gains of $1.05 billion and $1.2 billion 
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respectively were realised. In total between 2006/07 and 2010/11 sMDB production 
was estimated to be $4.3 billion higher in the presence of water trade than it would 
have been if opportunities for inter- and intraregional water trade and on-farm 
reallocation of water were not available. Further, access to water trade mitigated flow-
on declines in investment and avoided the loss of more than 1000 jobs. Finally, at the 
regional level water trade increased the net value of irrigated production of $136 
million in NSW between 2006/07 and 2010/11. Further, in Victoria and SA the impact 
of water trade increased irrigated production by $885 million and $103 million 
respectively over the same period. Water trade thus helped to avoid state gross 
production reductions in NSW (-$760 million), Victoria (-$2,256 million) and SA (-$419 
million) respectively (NWC, 2012a). 
In addition, expanded intra- and inter-regional trade as a consequence of NWI 
institutional reforms were estimated to have reduced the impact of drought within the 
sMDB from $11.7 billion to $7 billion over the 2006/07 to 2010/11 period—with higher 
magnitude benefits being incurred during exceptionally dry years when the need to 
reallocate water was highest (NWC, 2012a). While significant water trade institutional 
and transaction cost reductions have been achieved, there is still considerable room 
for improvement (Hamstead et al., 2008). However, efforts to reduce water trade 
barriers have resulted in beneficial transfer outcomes that would likely be repeated in 
future under predicted climate change impacts. 
These results generally conclude that the ability to trade water plays a critical role in 
maintaining irrigation sector incomes during drought, with likely adaptation 
advantages under mild to moderate future climate change scenarios. However, where 
severe climate change impacts are expected, irrigation sector adaptation costs may 
increase with the move from perennial to annual crops to suit more variable and 
reduced water supply arrangements. Further, irrigation-dependent areas may 
experience larger impacts, which could be minimised if: i) adjustment was enhanced 
by unrestricted intra-regional trade; ii) cap barriers to water entitlement selling were 
removed; and iii) targeted buyback within strategic irrigation districts was undertaken 
(NWC, 2012a). 
Wheeler et al. (2012c) investigated the impact of water ownership and trade 
strategies on irrigated farm profitability in the MDB. They found that higher net farm 
income was associated with lower debt, lower labour expenses and higher farm 
capital and production receipts. It was also sometimes positively associated with 
owning larger high security water entitlement, allocations received, and selling a 
higher volume of water allocations. However, larger ownership of low and general 
security water entitlements is often negatively associated with net farm income. 
4.2.1. Restoring the Balance water recovery program 
As described earlier, Restoring the Balance (RtB) is the largest market-based water 
recovery program in the world—and occurred largely during a period of extreme 
drought in the MDB. From 2007/08 to late 2011 the federal government purchased 
990 GL of long-term average annual yield (LTAAY) water at a cost of approximately 
$2.1 billion through market tenders. Of the more than 15,500 water entitlement sales 
in that period, around 25% were to the Commonwealth. In total 3,150 MDB irrigators 
sold water entitlements, or around 13-17% of the irrigator population, depending on 
the population estimate used (Cheesman and Wheeler, 2012). 
The assessment of RtB sellers was based on a survey of 589 irrigators who had 
agreed to be contacted for such purposes as part of their tender process. This 
participation request did not form part of the original tender round, and so those initial 
irrigator’s views were not able to be included. Of the 520 irrigators surveyed who had 
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sold water, 60% had sold part of their water and were still farming, 10% had sold all of 
their water but were still farming and 30% had sold all of their water and exited 
farming altogether. Selling water entitlements to the Commonwealth had been a 
positive experience for the majority of irrigators (80%), because it allowed them to 
better manage their farm situation and achieve other personal objectives. Half of the 
irrigators who sold part of their entitlement did not experience any reduction in their 
farm production. Further, of those irrigators that had sold all of their entitlements and 
left farming, 70% reported that their farm was still being used for agricultural 
production and 25% reported that the farm was now fallow. Exiting irrigators were 
now either working in other jobs within the region (51%), had retired within the region 
(35%) or were unemployed (3%). It was estimated that a maximum of 10% had left 
the region, although this figure may be over-stated (Cheesman and Wheeler, 2012). 
Interestingly, while about 50% of surveyed irrigators generally disagreed with the 
Commonwealth’s environmental water recovery objectives a similar proportion 
believed that using water markets to recover water was appropriate—predominantly 
stating they believed that the approach had resulted in higher than normal market 
prices.12 Water entitlement selling had allowed irrigators to generate cash flow during 
a difficult time that they then used to reduce farm debt, invested on-farm or in the 
region, or spent outside their region. Consequently, 50% of irrigators wanted to sell 
more water to the Commonwealth when asked in early 2012 and many wanted more 
frequent and shorter tender rounds (i.e. reduced transaction times). Of the 40% who 
would not sell water entitlements in future, most would be in the position of not having 
any further surplus water to sell (Cheesman and Wheeler, 2012). 
A number of irrigators in the RtB survey had been initially prevented from completing 
their transaction by cap restrictions on out-of-district trade such as the Victorian 4% 
limit, which delayed and then ultimately resulted in their tenders being withdrawn. We 
consider cap restriction impacts on the water market in the next section. 
4.2.2. Water market influences 
A wide literature has studied the quantitative influences on water market prices and 
volumes (e.g. Wheeler et al., 2008b, Wheeler et al., 2010a, Brennan, 2006, NWC, 
2011b, Bjornlund, 2003, Bjornlund and Rossini, 2004, Bjornlund and Rossini, 2005, 
Bjornlund and Rossini, 2006, Bjornlund and Rossini, 2007). Some important 
influences on water markets include: 
 Institutional change: e.g.: development of property rights for irrigators under 
state water-sharing plans by the early 2000s and wider improvements to trade 
institutions, rules and approvals. 
 Policy change: The NWI, TLM, WFF all impacted on water demand, trade 
suspensions, caps (see Box 4.1), and water allocation trade ballots. 
 Rainfall and temperature: Higher temperatures and lower rainfall drive 
increased demand for water allocations; 
 Timing: time of season impacts on water demand; 
                                               
 
12
 The states held different attitudes to the Commonwealth’s environmental water recovery objectives, 
with 50% of SA farmers broadly agreeing with the program as against 35% of Victorian and NSW 
farmers. 
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 Seasonal allocations: The percentage of water received from an entitlement 
seasonally is a very important influence on water demand. The differences in 
seasonal announcements (for example, starting with a 0% in the start of the 
water season) can critically impact the timing of water demand; 
 Differences in agricultural commodities, market and farm conditions across 
states, as well as changes in water pricing. 
 Differences in carry-over access and conditions between states, with 
somewhat more favourable carry-over conditions available in Victoria (see Box 
4.2). 
 Differences in water charges. 
Many of these factors have been discussed in the report elsewhere, with the 
exception of water charges. Table 11 highlights the differences in costs charged 
across the MDB by IIOs, as estimated by ACCC (2012) from reported IIO data. 
 
 Water markets in climate change adaptation 63 
Table 11 Total hypothetical irrigator bills for 2010−11 year, 50 ML, 250 ML 
and 1000 ML of entitlement with delivery of 100 and 50% allocation 
  
Total Annual Bills ($) 
  
100 per cent allocation 50 per cent allocation 
Operator Hypothetical irrigator 50 ML 250 ML 1000 ML 50 ML 250 ML 1000 ML 
Buddah Lake  1577 7883 31530 952 4758 19030 
CIT High pressure 3418 17089 68356 2329 11644 46578 
Medium pressure 2870 14349 57396 2055 10274 41098 
Low pressure 2369 11844 47376 1804 9022 36088 
Coleambally General Security 3458 7812 24139 3361 7327 22199 
Eagle Creek General Security 888 4438 17750 646 3231 12925 
GMW Tresco 3113 15035 59741 2863 13785 54741 
Nyah 3209 15213 60228 2737 12854 50793 
Woorinen 3438 16536 65652 2926 13975 55407 
Torrumbarry 2269 11045 43954 2091 10156 40399 
Murray Valley 2353 10663 41826 2216 9978 39086 
Pyramid-Boort 2250 10149 39771 2084 9319 36451 
Rochester 2223 10014 39231 2072 9261 36221 
Central Goulburn 2924 12384 47857 2668 11103 42732 
Shepparton 3618 16253 63635 3228 14307 55850 
Hay 
 
2367 10207 39607 1992 8332 32107 
Jemalong 
 
2006 10028 40110 1329 6645 26580 
LMW Robinvale 8955 44373 177192 7504 37122 148187 
Red Cliffs 5832 28762 114749 4726 23228 92614 
Merbein 5010 24648 98293 3943 19317 76968 
Mildura 5721 27353 108473 4671 22103 87473 
Marthaguy General Security 2001 10003 40010 1397 6985 27940 
MI SAS—General Security 2812 8540 26720 2505 7006 20585 
SAS—High Security 3326 10576 32791 3019 9042 26656 
LAW—General Security 3202 7802 22914 2920 6392 17274 
LAS—General Security 3252 8466 25364 2945 6932 19229 
LAS—High Security 3821 10299 30579 3514 8765 24444 
IHS—High Security 6287 26065 95538 4387 16563 57528 
MIL B1 Class C 4095 10429 32306 3404 8446 26416 
Moira 
 
1638 8188 32750 1175 5875 23500 
Narromine 
 
2278 10590 41760 1553 6965 27260 
Renmark 
 
3627 18135 72539 2639 13197 52789 
SunWater St George 2662 13310 53240 2366 11828 47310 
Tenandra 
 
1721 8603 34410 1096 5478 21910 
Trangie 
 
2536 12678 50710 1661 8303 33210 
West Corurgan 1615 8075 32300 1208 6038 24150 
WMI Curlwaa 3136 15678 62710 2111 10554 42215 
Coomealla 4052 20260 81040 2598 12990 51960 
Buronga 6244 31220 124880 4183 20915 83660 
Notes: HP, MP and LP mean high pressure, medium pressure and low pressure, respectively. SAS, LAW, LAS 
and IHS represent different types of farms serviced by MI (see www.mirrigation.com.au/Customers/charges.htm ). 
Source: (ACCC, 2012) 
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Box 4.1: Cap impacts on sMDB water demand and trade 
Cap restrictions on water entitlement trade limit the volume of water that can be transferred 
away from a district or region to a specific amount in a period (Frontier Economics, 2009). 
Supporters of entitlement trade restrictions argue that they are necessary to reduce the pace 
of rural adjustment under water reform and lessen problems associated with stranded 
irrigation assets. To provide such benefits to remaining users, Victoria places a 4% limit on the 
volume of water that can be trade out of an irrigation district in any given year; and a 10% limit 
on the volume of irrigation water entitlements that can be held by non-users in a given water 
system. NSW also imposed a 4% annual limit on the volume of water entitlements that can be 
transferred out of an irrigation district, together with a general embargo on water entitlement 
sales to the Commonwealth until September 2009. This restriction was lifted under an 
agreement between the federal and NSW governments to limit total annual water purchases in 
that state to 890 GL of general security water entitlements over five years from 2008/09 
(Productivity Commission, 2010). In SA a 12% cap on the volume of water entitlements that 
may be traded out of an irrigation district over a two-year period has generally never been 
reached, and this limit was lifted in 2009/10 (Frontier Economics, 2009). Queensland and the 
ACT do not have any volumetric restrictions on water entitlement trade and, notably, similar 
cap restrictions on water allocation trade do not exist in any of the MDB states. 
There are a number of clear economic inefficiencies that can be associated with cap 
restrictions on trade. These include allocative and productive inefficiency outcomes from 
foregone high-value crop production opportunities, dynamic inefficiency from distorted long-
run decision-making, economic inefficiency from poor or avoided investment (divestment) 
decisions in irrigation areas, cash-flow management constraints, delays in adjustment to dry-
land or less-intensively irrigated agricultural production and declines in local/regional economic 
activity (Frontier Economics, 2009). By way of example, it is estimated that in Victoria 94.5% 
of high reliability water shares (entitlements) in irrigation districts had reached the 4% cap by 
early 2008/09, preventing water transfers for a significant period of time. Further, the Victorian 
10% rule prevented the processing of 50 GL of environmental water in 2009/10—with an 
estimated welfare loss of $6.8 million (Frontier Economics, 2009). The federal government 
estimated that as much as $80 million worth of environmental purchases had been prevented 
by 4% cap restrictions in 2009/10 (DEWHA, 2010), while in 2010/11 reaching the 80 GL 
annual cap in NSW for selling general water entitlement holdings to the Commonwealth 
excluded irrigators in that state from the $60 million third MDB tender round for that period 
(DEWHA, 2010). A further result of cap restrictions on water entitlement transfers is that prices 
can become higher than they would otherwise be (Productivity Commission, 2010). Markets 
can only provide effective and efficient means to price and transfer water between competing 
uses if the real values of all competing uses, including externality effects, are included. Such 
conditions, however, constitute perfect market contexts that are rare in reality and as such 
prospects for market failure are high (Challen, 2000). Specifically for water reform, a reduction 
in water supply availability for other users from cap restrictions (or as a consequence of 
climate change) is often foremost among the list of externalities considered (Colby, 1990). 
 
 
Water market trade rules can change rapidly, making it difficult for users. For 
example, in April 2011 Victoria took the unprecedented step of suspending water 
allocation trades from NSW into Victoria for the remainder of the 2010/11 water 
season. This decision was based on high MDB storage levels at the close of the 
water season, which resulted in large volumes of unused water allocation, and 
threatened to impact on the 2011/12 announced allocations as a result of Victoria’s 
carry-over rules (NWC, 2011e). Overall, 2000 GL of unused water allocation in the 
Murray and Goulburn systems toward the close on 2010/11—if stored in the Hume 
Dam—would dilute the rights of those already holding water in that storage. 
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Box 4.2: An introduction to carry-over 
Carry-over is an arrangement whereby water allocation account holders can retain unused 
portions of their water allocation from one year to the next (Barma Water Resources Pty. Ltd 
et al., 2011). As such, carry-over redistributes water between seasons allowing individuals 
additional strategies for managing their water supply risk and societal welfare benefits from 
more flexible water use. To work properly, carry-over provisions must: i) not adversely impact 
third-parties; ii) have explicit cost and risk signals; and iii) have simple and consistent rules 
across connected water trading arrangements (DSE, 2010). Carry-over has been available in 
Queensland and NSW for some time, and provisions have been more recently established in 
Victoria and SA. In the NSW Murrumbidgee irrigation district, for example, carry-over limits of 
15% of seasonal allocations applied between 2001/02 and 2007/08. In 2008/09 these limits 
were relaxed to 30% in response to drought and expected benefits from improved inter-
temporal water management under scarce supply conditions. In the 2010/11 return to wet 
conditions, Murrumbidgee carry-over and seasonal allocations were capped at 100% of water 
entitlement, with surplus allocation above this cap immediately subject to forfeit (NSW Office 
of Water, 2010). In SA, where the need for carry-over had not been envisaged before, 
temporary access provisions were put in place in 2007/08 under agreement with the upstream 
states where storage space would be provided.
1
 In 2008/09 SA irrigators were able to access 
50% of approved carry-over, while in 2009/10 this level of access increased to 60% and then 
100% by the close of the season. 
In 2010/11 SA irrigators started the season with no carry-over access provisions under the 
cancelation of interim storage sharing agreements with the upstream states. However, in 
September 2011 the SA government renegotiated a long-term agreement that incorporated 
carry-over rights (SA Department of Water, 2011b).SA’s reliance on upstream states offers an 
example of attenuated carry-over access rights that may weaken their effectiveness. When 
storage rights are not explicitly defined, or where carry-over access is heavily restricted to 
minimise externalities for other water users, these arrangements can further weaken their 
effectiveness (Hughes and Goesch, 2009). The Victorian system of carry-over introduced in 
2010/11, however, represents an attempt to overcome these issues. Victorian carry-over was 
first introduced as an emergency drought measure in 2007, and then made permanent. To 
minimise third-party externality impacts and address water storage property and access right 
definition requirements (NWC, 2011d) 
Victoria introduced spillable water accounts (SWAs). SWAs allowed water entitlement holders 
to carry-over unused portions of their allocation above 100%, as long as water storage 
capacity existed. SWA allocations could then be used or traded as usual. However, if a 
probability of a spill-risk is high (i.e. likelihood that the maximum storage level or spill-way will 
be breached), all SWA water is immediately quarantined from use and/or trade. In the event of 
a spill-event, all SWA water is immediately forfeit (DSE, 2010). Consistent carry-over rules and 
access provisions across the MDB should result in less intra-seasonal volatility and greater 
end of season stabilisation in the price of water allocations. This would particularly be the case 
following seasonal allocation announcements, as they involve slightly longer-term outlooks 
(NWC, 2011b). Carry-over may also create less inter-seasonal water allocation price volatility, 
since it allows regulators to reduce the urgency for early-season water allocation trade by 
enabling larger water allocation accounts to be developed in prior seasons. In support of this, 
simple analysis of end-of-season water allocation prices and volatility between 2007/08 and 
2009/10 suggest that reductions in the total volume of water allocation trade under access to 
carry-over results in lower early season water allocation price volatility and increased water 
allocation prices towards the end of a season (Waterfind, 2009, Wheeler et al., 2010b). 
 
An issue arose from the fact that, although water allocations could not be transferred 
from NSW into Victoria under the suspension, there was no initial restriction on trade 
from NSW to SA, and then back into Victoria (NWC, 2011b). Consequently, record 
water allocation trade occurred in April, May and June 2011 in response to both the 
trade suspension and state differentials in carry-over rules. In 2011/12, another round 
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of water allocation trade suspensions were announced by Victoria (Walsh, 2012), 
NSW (NSW Office of Water, 2012) and finally SA (SA Department for Water, 2012) to 
halt interstate transfers until the next water season. These largely unanticipated 
decisions highlight shortcomings in the current water storage property right 
arrangements that ultimately led to confusion and reduced confidence in the water 
trade system since participants were given limited notice, had limited information and 
could not predict when restrictions would be imposed (NWC, 2011d). 
The Water Market Rules and Water Charge (Termination Fees) Rules address 
barriers imposed by irrigation infrastructure operators (IIOs) that prevent irrigators 
from participating in water markets. Both sets of rules came into effect in 2009−10 
(ACCC 2012). 
The challenge for agriculture and the farms that comprise them is building productivity 
and profitability without depleting the resources on which they depend (MDBA, 
2010b). A further challenge is to increase (or at least maintain) productivity and 
profitability in the face of a decreasing (e.g. water) resource-base. To that end, 
agriculture has often invested in new technologies to improve productivity through 
planning and practice changes (EBC et al., 2011). Water trade and infrastructure 
upgrades represent a natural extension of this previous farming approach to 
productivity management. The final section in this chapter considers shortcomings in 
sMDB water markets and considers other market failures or deficiencies that may 
reduce the effectiveness of water markets as an adaptive tool for mitigating future 
climate change impacts. 
4.3. Improving water markets 
4.3.1. Basic elements for effective and efficient water markets 
From our previous discussion, we can outline the basic elements required for 
effective and efficient water markets. These include (NWC, 2011f): 
 Secure water access property rights; 
 Well-informed market participants; 
 Incorporating third-party externality impacts into water trade decisions; 
 Low market entry barriers and/or impediments to trade; 
 Low transaction costs; 
 A balance between consumptive and environmental water uses, and 
 Institutional arrangements that account for market regulation, trade platforms, 
registration of trades, compliance monitoring and enforcement. 
The discussion above also highlights that sMDB water markets are continuing to 
deepen and broaden, and play an increasingly important role in allocating water 
within and between rural, urban and environmental water users (NWC, 2011f). 
Adapting to and mitigating likely future drought [or climate change] effects will involve 
significant institutional development that: i) increases opportunities to allocate water 
more efficiently through water markets and water banks; and ii) promotes cooperation  
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between and across water catchments and diverse water interests (Schwabe and 
Connor, 2012).13 However, there is scope for market failures to emerge in the water 
reform and resource management process, and as such a cautious approach to water 
market design and implementation is advisable (Crase et al., 2004). Adaptive 
management is often recommended, where possible, to address market failure 
outcomes (e.g. Garrido and Dinar, 2009, Huitema et al., 2009). But adaptive 
management can be constrained by issues such as path dependencies (Challen, 
2000) and information asymmetries (Tisdell et al., 2004). 
All water markets offer degrees of adaptive management to facilitate drought or 
supply-shock responses, but the challenge is providing response flexibility to 
accommodate desired public good benefits of water use (Grafton et al., 2011b). 
To that end, an essential water market development involves establishing sustainable 
diversion limits (SDL) (CSIRO, 2008a) or baseline diversion limits (BDL) (DSEWPC, 
2011a) to secure public benefit water use. In the context of the MDB these are 
defined in the MDB Plan. Recent modelling outside the MDB planning process 
suggested that the recovery target should be 3,200 GL (EnviroInfo, 2012). This 
change indicates recovery program uncertainty and policy-on-the-run tendencies, and 
reduces market confidence. However, the current MDB Plan (MDBA, 2012c) seeks to 
provide flexible water reforms to meet public good benefits from water use, as well as 
better scientific data, sustainable environmental flows, water quality considerations, 
and complementary basin and catchment-level water planning arrangements (Crase, 
2012b). Therefore, strong connections between water reforms and water markets will 
likely be necessary to maintain and deliver desired public benefit outcomes (Grafton 
et al., 2011b). 
4.3.2. The influences of caps on water markets 
Supply limit instruments like trade caps result in quota effects on the market and can 
result in significant welfare (real income or deadweight) and production losses. 
Further, cap limits can break the connection between demand and supply, potentially 
favouring sellers over buyers in water markets as demand increases result in 
shortages where substitutes are not available; e.g. where riverine supplies of water 
cannot be easily or realistically substituted for desalinised or recycled water supply 
(Jackson et al., 2012). 
Where cap restrictions are present there are likely to be uncertain substitution effects 
between water allocation and entitlement products. For instance, cap restrictions may 
motivate irrigators to increase the volume of water allocation sold in the markets, 
especially where they are uninterested in utilising that water for production purposes 
but remain constrained from selling part or all of their holding. Conversely, removing 
cap restrictions may reduce the volume of water allocation trade, as those previously 
unable to sell their entitlements are now allowed to trade freely. Loch et al. (2012) 
examined broad influences on water allocation selling and buying behaviour, 
concluding that cap restrictions on trade drive early season selling of water 
allocations in the sMDB. However, these effects of cap restrictions on water allocation 
trade require further investigation. 
                                               
 
13
 The ability to bank water across seasons has been recently introduced in the sMDB, with estimated 
agricultural productivity gains of around 12% in one case study example (Hughes and Goesch, 2009). 
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Loch (2012) investigated the importance of cap restrictions on water allocation trade 
via a survey of sMDB irrigators (n=946) in 2010/11. When asked if a cap had ever 
precluded them from trading a water entitlement, 18% indicated that it had, with 
varying responses according to state. In general, cap restrictions on water entitlement 
trade make water allocation buying less likely (P=0.01), suggesting that irrigators 
prevented from selling have progressed industry exit plans to the point where farming 
no longer features in their decision-making. Hence, there is no need to buy water 
allocations. No statistically significant influence on the decision to participate in water 
allocation selling was found. 
However, in relation to the timing of water allocation trade Loch (2012) found that cap 
restrictions were significantly and positively associated with the likelihood of irrigators’ 
decisions to sell water allocation early in the season (P=0.00), but reduced the 
probability of buying water early (P=0.02) or late in a season (P=0.01). Therefore, cap 
effects on water allocation trade tended to influence the timing of both buying and 
selling decisions, particularly early in a season. This would be consistent with 
irrigators resigned to industry exit but unable to divest their water asset, resulting in 
reduced plans to use existing water (or alternative sources of allocation water) for 
productive uses in 2009/10. 
The study concluded that caps on water entitlement trade that avoid large volumes of 
entitlements being transferred away from an irrigation district run contrary to US 
National Research Council (1992, pg. 50) recommendations that ‘while water 
transfers may bring negative effects, it must be recognised that a dynamic growing 
economy depends on processes that allow declining industries and firms to be 
displaced by growing firms and industries’. Therefore, while applying district 
restrictions on water entitlement transfers (e.g. the 4% limit rule in Victoria) may 
restrict transfers at that level of the market, they may effectively promote sales of 
water in the allocation market. For instance, potentially inefficient farmers that would 
have exited willingly but for the cap restrictions remain in the district contrary to 
reform objectives. However, by remaining and selling their allocation water these 
same irrigators provide important seasonal adjustment supply spill-over benefits. 
Thus, caps on water entitlement trade can have negative structural adjustment and 
positive seasonal adjustment outcomes. If an ancillary objective of cap intervention is 
to reduce the level of inefficiencies generated by water use in the southern MDB until 
farmers can successfully exit agriculture, then it appears the allocation market is 
helping to drive that agenda. The policy may also help rural communities affected by 
the program to adjust gradually by retaining population and income in the area to 
support local businesses and services (see Section 5 below). However, in the face of 
potential future climate change impacts in the sMDB, recent experience in the 
Millennium drought period would suggest that the gradual reduction and eventual 
removal of state and irrigation district cap restrictions on water entitlement trade 
remains a positive policy outcome. 
4.3.3. Water market Improvements needed 
Finally, a NWC report on developments required to strengthen Australia’s water 
markets identifies seven key priorities for market improvements (NWC, 2011c). These 
arise from the fact that many existing water market elements were established 
progressively in response to trade demand, and/or were add-ons to existing 
administrative structures. Different governance, institutional and administrative 
processes across states and jurisdictions—including water entitlement specification, 
trade rules and transfer processing arrangements—also creates inconsistencies in 
sMDB water markets. Overall, the report found that ‘institutional fundamentals for 
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efficient water markets coincide with the requirements for effective water resource 
management’ (NWC, 2011c, pg. ix). Therefore, several recommendations were made 
to further improve Australian water markets: 
 Groundwater entitlements and planning processes: As the demand for 
groundwater rises among existing and new users (e.g. Sutton, 2011) it will be 
important to identify and regulate the sustainable level of aquifer use. 
Complex and restrictive trading rules that arise from the interaction between 
surface and groundwater resources (Evans, 2011) may lead to restrictive 
trade rules and zones that impede efficient use of water resources. Indeed, 
there are a great many hydrological (Skurray et al., 2012) and institutional 
(Skurray et al., forthcoming) challenges to groundwater trade, but these could 
be managed with better price, property right and resource impact information 
to improve efficient resource use. Existing entitlement and planning 
arrangements therefore currently impede market development in otherwise 
conducive aquifers (NWC, 2011c). 
 Trade approval processes: Different terminology for statutory instruments, 
water products and transfer conditions across jurisdictions adds unnecessary 
complexity to the water market. Trade approvals can also be delayed by a lack 
of readily available information on processing, assessment factors and critical 
requirements for different approval authorities. This situation adds to 
transaction costs and weakens trader confidence in the market and the 
transparency of its approvals process. To combat this, the NWC recommends 
greater disclosure of trade approval frameworks including: relevant rules and 
policies; steps involved in assessing complex trades; and trade terminology 
(NWC, 2011c). Water transfers would also be strengthened by an effective 
complaint handling process (possibly at the federal level) and trade 
processing standards covering a broader range of performance information. 
 Conflicts of interest: Agencies involved in water reform can often assume 
multiple roles, such as commercial, regulatory and operational functions. A 
good example of this until recently was Goulburn-Murray Water that provided 
market platforms for water trade, declared seasonal carry-over rules and 
made regular seasonal allocation announcements. Where potential or 
perceived conflicts of interest arise in such agencies market damage can 
occur due to a loss of institutional trust (NWC, 2011c). Considerable concern 
has also been raised about federal agency conflicts of interest from CEWH 
involvement in water markets. While CEWH involvement in environmental 
watering takes shape (CEWH, 2011b), the agency has also flagged potential 
water allocation and entitlement trade ambitions (CEWH, 2011a). This 
ambition, if implemented properly, could be beneficial for the environment and 
irrigators alike (Wheeler et al., 2013, Connor et al., 2011b). However, the 
water market would benefit from greater clarity around future water trade 
activity and its likely impact. 
 Market price information improvements: Water price information is key to 
any economic assessment of trade activity (Bjornlund and McKay, 1998). The 
move from centrally determined prices to market-based pricing has been an 
important step forward in the reform process (Harris et al., 2009). However, a 
significant hurdle to water market analysis remains a lack in the quality and 
quantity of water price information. Fragmented and inconsistent price data 
availability decreases traders’ ability to accurately appraise water values under 
different conditions and detect market aberrations (NWC, 2011c). Lack of 
price information stems from misreporting by traders, a lack of mandatory 
reporting requirements and/or instances where no consideration is involved 
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(e.g. transfers between related business holdings). It can also take 
considerable time for water entitlement price information to be made publically 
available. To address these issues, price disclosure should be mandatory for 
all water trades across a wider scope of market activity, together with a 
moderate level of price monitoring and verification (NWC, 2011c). By way of 
example, general information sharing can significantly improve multiparty 
adaptation to drought and climate change effects. Spain has information 
sharing systems and negotiation processes that facilitate water shortage 
mitigation via integrated river basin modelling, mitigation strategies and 
stakeholder committees involving key economic and environmental interests 
(Schwabe and Connor, 2012). Such approaches may provide insight for water 
market managers interested in improving information collection and sharing. 
 Allocation announcement processes: The determinations of allocation 
announcements are not transparent, which can prevent some users from 
accurately assessing the reliability of their water entitlements. In the extreme, 
this may dissuade financial institutions from lending against or toward water 
entitlement investments, and higher than necessary transaction costs in the 
market as parties are forced to search for relevant information (NWC, 2011c, 
Martin et al., 2008). The system of allocation announcements therefore 
requires both substantial up-front and periodic review to improve these issues 
for market and economic efficiency benefits. 
 Market intermediary confidence: Some water market analysts believe that 
there is significant potential for water brokers and agents to experience 
misconduct or poor competency issues where mechanisms such as trust 
accounts, professional indemnity insurance, conflicts of interest disclosure and 
competency standards are not mandatorily required. While licensing is touted 
as an option, the costs of adopting such measures may outweigh the benefits 
(NWC, 2011c). Largely, this issue remains one of potential concern; therefore 
the NWC recommends continuing with current monitoring and code of practice 
adoption in the short-term. 
Aside from these recommendations, several other water market development 
directions are also gaining attention. These include the introduction of expanded 
water trade products such as water allocation trade for environmental benefits 
(Wheeler et al., 2013), counter-cyclical trade between irrigation and environmental 
water holders (Kirby et al., 2006), and option contracts in rural (Heaney et al., 2004, 
Byrnes et al., 2010) and urban markets (Leroux and Crase, 2010). 
As Cummins and Thompson (2002, pg. 5) argue: 
“Options make intuitive sense for the water market. Those with most at stake in 
the event of water shortages, those with high cost/income ratios, could buy call 
options. These options could give them the right, but not the obligation, to call 
on the other side to provide them with water at a prearranged price. Those with 
lower cost/income ratios could buy put options that gave them the right to put, 
or sell, water at a prearranged price. The buyers of call options would effectively 
be insuring their crop production and insuring against the price of water rising. 
The buyers of put options might be prearranging a return from water that is 
greater than they can achieve by irrigating a crop. Or, they may be insuring 
against the price of water falling. Call options would presumably be more 
attractive to those irrigators with contracts to supply produce to food processors 
or wineries. Such contracts are becoming a common feature of Australia's 
irrigated agriculture.” 
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To successfully implement options and derivatives in Australian water markets, a 
wide range of information would be needed. Information on trading industries, valleys, 
seasonal and monthly water use, entitlement and security information, current and 
predicted information on prices, volumes and climate. And, it also requires irrigators 
to take risks and with the probability of incurring losses in the short-run, with the 
expectation they will benefit in the long-run (Cummins and Thompson, 2002). 
Further, the transaction costs associated with water market trade are attracting 
attention as their importance toward market failure (McCann and Easter, 2004) and 
institutional performance (Garrick and Aylward, 2012) is recognised. A past constraint 
in this area has been data collection and analysis (e.g. Allen Consulting Group, 
2006), but this is being gradually overcome with new approaches and metrics 
(Garrick, 2012). Finally, investigation of strategic behaviour by traders, the unbundling 
of water storage rights and state requirements for shared storage capacity, carry-over 
rule inconsistency, and parochialism by state and federal governments from time to 
time all need attention in future water market development discussions. 
So what are the key lessons from an economic examination of sMDB water markets?  
1. Where water supply is scarce and in demand from a variety of different users, 
well-designed water markets with strong property right characteristics can 
deliver significant economic benefits by signalling the value of water. 
2. Water markets can improve the efficient use of water in the context of 
connected systems that experience seasonal water supply and demand 
variability, and where users have different elasticities of demand and/or 
capacity to adjust to water supply shortages. 
3. Where there is pressure for adjustment in the existing structure of water users, 
for example under climate change impacts similar to previously experienced 
sMDB drought effects, water markets can be an effective means of reducing 
total economic impacts and production losses. 
4. Water users tend to learn and adapt quickly to change where the institutions, 
arrangements and rules provide opportunities to adjust. As such, incremental 
approaches to water market design may be appropriate, but result in perverse 
outcomes if sub-optimal arrangement are left in place too long (NWC, 2011f). 
5. Finally, while there are many economic benefits from the trade and 
reallocation of water resources among competing uses and users (Frontier 
Economics, 2011), trade activity will also have important impacts on social and 
environmental issues, requiring a careful balance between the governance, 
institutional and equity arrangements put in place (NWC, 2011f). These are 
discussed in the next two sections of this report. 
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4.4. Key points 
The major points from this section include: 
 The use of instruments such as secure property right arrangements, clear 
price and allocation signals, different supply and demand schedules and an 
emphasis on allocative, dynamic and productive efficiency objectives have all 
resulted in reasonable reallocation of scarce water resources during the last 
few decades, particularly in the sMDB. Further, an expansion of trade through 
direct market intervention by governments from 2004 onwards has bought 
renewed public focus on the progress, outcomes and future development of 
water markets as a means of delivering significant economic, social and 
environmental welfare changes in Australia. 
 To that end, water markets have performed relatively well in a role of drought 
impact mitigation, resource reallocation and economic production facilitation. 
However, there is scope for water market improvement in the areas of trade 
rules (particularly among interstate trades following the implementation of the 
Basin Plan), trade product expansion into derivatives (Shorten, 2012), 
improvements in the depth and access of market information, and reductions 
in transaction costs associated with water trade activity. In addition, a better 
understanding of trade behaviour, especially strategic trade issues that can 
lead to market failures, is required in future (Loch et al., 2012). 
 However, any economic benefits associated with water markets must be 
balanced against social and environmental impacts from that activity. 
Therefore, the following two sections of this report consider the social and 
environmental impacts of water trade and how these might best be addressed. 
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5. SOCIAL IMPACTS OF WATER MARKETS 
In many sMDB rural communities, the fear of water trade and its’ potential impacts far 
outweighs the fear of climate change. Despite some recognition that climate change 
will likely result in further water supply pressure and a need for dramatic policy shifts 
to address its impacts (Mercer et al., 2007), it has been suggested that most people 
have not given the issue of climate change much serious thought, nor believe in the 
need to do so (Kempton, 1997). This has led to skewed perceptions about its 
probability, impacts and a need for adaptation in response. On the other hand, the 
impact of prospective or actual transfers of scarce water resources away from rural 
communities is both clearly conceivable and assessable for most people, leading to 
fears about such outcomes. 
Government's response to irrigation communities’ fury over the Murray Darling Basin 
Plan (Quiggin, 2011) suggests that the needs of the environment will compete with 
those of agriculture and rural communities. Climate change is likely to add to issues 
of adjudicating competing claims for water if water is increasingly scarce and 
agriculture is profoundly affected. Yet while water markets may play an increasingly 
important role in assisting farmers, the environment and rural communities to adjust 
to changes in water supply variability inherent fears about the impacts of water 
markets have long threatened to override the rational design, implementation and 
development of water market rules, institutions and transactions. This section 
therefore examines the: i) likely issues that rural communities will face in future years; 
ii) specific fears related to water markets and their impact on farmer, community and 
government decision-making; and iii) state of rural community adaptive capacity and 
ability to cope with future risks. 
5.1. Issues facing rural communities 
Rural communities have faced a range of challenges in the past 40 years. Declining 
terms of trade for farmers have had negative implications for many local communities 
and this has been compounded by population loss, business closures and the 
withdrawal or corporatisation of services (Edwards et al., 2008a). For many rural 
communities this has meant shrinking local economies, fraying of the social fabric and 
fears about their long-term viability. 
Many of these changes predate the introduction of water markets and implicate 
historical, social, demographic and economic forces. Farmers and farming 
communities have faced a series of long-term structural change pressures, many of 
which are exacerbated by drought conditions and, as such, may become important 
issues under future climate change scenarios. These issues include: 
 Declining terms of trade (i.e. the ratio of input to output prices), driving 
constant pressure to find economies of scale. 
 Continuing decline in agriculture's importance and employment despite 
continued growth in productivity. 
 General movement of people and services from smaller centres to larger 
regional centres. The loss of young people and competition for agriculture 
from the mining sector are particular current issues. 
 Gradual aggregation of family farms into larger units, and fragmentation of 
smaller farms into lifestyle holdings—or the acquisition of agricultural land for 
non-agricultural purposes. 
 Ageing farming workforce (EBC et al., 2011). 
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On the basis of these historic issues, Kiem and Austin (2012) identify the following 
stressors likely to impact on rural communities in the future: 
 Climate variability, including increasing water shortages and supply changes 
(as discussed in Section 2). 
 Inconsistent projected impacts of climate change and increased uncertainty 
about climate change will impact on existing variability. 
 Significant rural demographic shifts and financial/economic pressures on the 
traditional family farm operation. 
 Increased psycho-social stresses for all community sectors from change 
across many dimensions. 
 Increased economic uncertainty in terms of global market effects, mutable 
commodity prices and ongoing global financial crisis issues (e.g. world effects 
from uncertainty in Greece and/or Europe as a whole). 
 Inadequate, failed or misplaced government support. 
Expanding on their last point, Kiem and Austin (2012) suggest that recent reviews of 
government policy in relation to drought have moved from seeing them as exceptional 
events toward regarding them as normal parts of the climatic cycle.14 In future 
therefore, exceptional circumstance assistance once thought of as a fixture in the 
agricultural landscape may no longer be available. In that context, water markets may 
have an even more significant role to play in assisting users to adapt to change 
experienced under climate change, as governments adopt a long-term focus on 
adaptation rather than polices aimed at short-term crisis management. 
These views are supported by Williams et al.(2009). They argue that rural 
communities will only be able to cope with the increasing demands of social and 
economic adjustment if targeted and appropriate government assistance is provided. 
However, where there is a contention that MDB water planning processes are not 
taking climate change impacts and outcomes into account (NWC, 2012b), it may be 
possible to make similar claims about agricultural, water and rural community policy in 
the Basin. The following sections outline some of these commonly discussed fears. 
5.2. General social fears related to water trade 
Fears about the community impacts of water trading have been widespread and 
vehemently expressed since markets were first introduced (Bjornlund and McKay, 
1999, Bjornlund, 2002, Fenton, 2006, Edwards et al., 2008a, Edwards et al., 2008b, 
Edwards et al., 2009, Productivity Commission, 2010). The stubborn persistence of 
the unease about the community impacts of trading can be gleaned from the fact that 
while irrigators overwhelmingly acknowledge the beneficial consequences of trading 
for their individual businesses, ‘they are less positive in their assessment of its 
consequences for their local community’ (NWC, 2012a, pg. 58). Similar results were 
found by Cheesman and Wheeler (2012) in their survey of water sellers to the RtB. 
                                               
 
14
 Prior to 1989 Australia provided subsidies to the agricultural sector during drought events, which were 
treated as a natural disaster. This approach was counterproductive, as the policy did not enhance the 
sustainability of the agricultural and livestock sectors. Following 1990, new policy measures were 
adopted that removed coverage of drought under Natural Disaster Relief arrangements and implemented 
various relief schemes that encouraged on-farm sustainability and conservation practices. As such, aid 
was distributed to farms that demonstrated a long-term productive future in agriculture under the Farm 
Household Support Act (2003). 
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However, when gauging the real impacts of water markets on rural communities it is 
harder to disentangle these from the impact of the wider historical and structural 
forces that have constantly impacted on agricultural communities. For example 
Watson et al. (2007) and the NWC (2010b) suggest that the regional impacts of trade 
have been minimal. In more recent examinations of social impacts from water trade, 
the NWC (2012a) again concluded that inter and intra-regional water trading has had 
little to no impact on rural communities. Overall, these reports found that rural 
community socioeconomic trends continued in much the same direction, regardless of 
water trading patterns. Further, changes in welfare patterns were the same in both 
irrigation and dry-land rural communities. While it was suggested that water trading 
did have an adverse impact on some businesses that supply irrigation equipment or 
where there was large localized out-trading of water, the movement of water also 
provided for balancing positive development projects at other sites. Thus, these 
investigations tended to suggest that water markets were essential in helping 
irrigators and the communities that they lived in adapt to issues such as water 
scarcity, adjustment requirements and climate change. 
As noted in Sections 1 and 4 drought, rather than water trading, has been a primary 
driver of reduced water use (NWC, 2012a). Since major water trade activity tends to 
occur during periods of prolonged drought, the prospect of disentangling the effects of 
one driver from the other becomes practically impossible (NWC, 2011f). Drought 
effects, however, offer something of a template for attempting to understand the likely 
ongoing impact of water trading and climate change. This is because such events 
provide insight into rural community effects of dwindling and/or uncertain water 
supply. Such effects can include: 
 Reduced local economic expenditure; 
 Reduced farm and community income levels; 
 Falling house and land prices—and conversely rising water prices; 
 Closure of some rural businesses; 
 Reduced investment and general lack of confidence in the future; 
 Reduced employment, both on farms and in local communities; 
 Reduced provision of community and private services; 
 Increased demand on human service providers in response to various 
stressors (e.g. suicide concerns, counselling requests); and 
 Difficulty in finding volunteers for community events. 
Typically, 75-80% of farm operating expenditure is spent within 50 km of the farm 
gate (i.e. locally). Across all farm sectors and regions in the MDB (except for the 
Gwydir) 55% of all expenditure was sourced from the nearest local town; with a 
further 20% being sourced from a major regional centre (EBC et al., 2011). The 
changed irrigation environment will also have important implications for local 
businesses. Local and regional economies may be further affected indirectly through 
changes in purchases of inputs or sales of outputs to associated industries and flow-
on expenditure on other goods and services. As businesses that supply irrigation 
begin to diminish in numbers, the cost of using that business or service increases, 
and consumers are likely to go to businesses in larger centres (EBC et al., 2011). 
Downstream industries will be affected by the variability of irrigation production and 
the implications of ‘opportunistic’ farming with farmers shifting between crops in 
response to water availability. This will have implications for both capital and labour 
(see Section 4 above). While the receipts from sales of water entitlements or 
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allocations can have beneficial impacts on local and regional economies where 
individual irrigators remain in the community and use the proceeds of sales in local 
businesses, changes to the base farming activity can result in significant structural 
adjustment requirements in secondary and tertiary support sectors. For example, 
when agricultural activities in certain regions move up the value chain, with a 
concentration on horticulture, gourmet foods and farm tourism (Hamblin, 2009) this 
can have a significant positive and negative impact in rural economies. 
Changes in regional economic activity can therefore have social implications. 
Through its direct and indirect economic impacts (positive and negative), water 
trading could have (positive and negative) social impacts on regional communities. 
For example, reduced employment in agriculture may lead to rising unemployment in 
the region generally and put pressures on existing social services (NWC 2012). The 
Millennium drought between 1998/99 and 2009/10 provided plenty of incentive and 
opportunity to trade water, as well as evidence of expenditure and income impacts 
(Edwards et al., 2008b, Kuehne et al., 2010). 
Many of these impacts created flow-on effects for rural council revenue. More 
specifically, they meant that councils needed to change their rating structures in order 
to recover their costs. However, that impact was not due to water trading per se; it 
simply reflected a more accurate and unbundled indication of the relative value of 
water and land (NWC, 2012a). Local councils also faced significant challenges 
learning to accommodate competing demands. The housing market adjusted, with 
some people leaving the area in search of jobs and others on transfer incomes 
entered the market due to lower property prices (Edwards et al., 2008b). This reduced 
the confidence in the housing market, resulting in falling house prices. Transient 
employees were more likely to rent than buy and this creates a risk of asset fixity 
(EBC et al., 2011). Therefore, councils looking to maintain and expand the rate 
paying base are likely to continue welcoming ‘tree changers’, as in rural communities 
like Kerang in northern Victoria. However, this brings with it an increased sense of 
displacement, and community anger related to perceptions of opportunism (Edwards 
et al., 2007). It is not clear if this phenomenon will affect the availability of irrigated 
land. Yet there is the potential for farms in affected areas to become smaller as land 
prices increase. 
However, the intervention of governments into water markets to secure large parcels 
of water for the environment, particularly after 2008, provided renewed emphasis from 
rural communities on the ‘evils’ of water entitlement trade—or buyback. These 
concerns are outlined below. 
5.2.1. Community concerns about water buyback 
As discussed previously, government intervention into water markets began in 
earnest in 2003/04 with the introduction of The Living Murray (TLM) program (see 
previous section). As water entitlement purchasing in this program constituted a 
smaller focus it is possible that the effects of government water market intervention 
were largely overlooked. However, with the announcement of large-scale water 
entitlement purchasing via the 2007 NPWS and 2008 WFF Restoring the Balance 
programs community concerns about the impacts of water selling and transfers 
appeared to take on greater significance. 
These concerns for the most part mirror those associated with trading in general and 
can be summarised into the following broad categories: 
 Community vulnerability and effects from water sales. 
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 Impacts on community spending and reinvestment. 
 Population losses as farmers elected to move out of regional areas once water 
sales had been finalised. 
 Impacts on current and future local employment prospects, especially for 
younger people. 
 Changes to the nature of production in regional areas (e.g. shifts to dry-land 
agricultural practices). 
 Legacy issues for remaining farmers such as higher variable farm operating 
costs (e.g. electricity inputs), stranded asset problems, increased emphasis on 
the rationalisation of remaining ‘outer’ arm units etc.). 
Each of these issues is discussed in turn below. 
5.2.1.1. Conceptualising Vulnerability 
Pearson et al. (2008) suggest there are two ways of conceptualising vulnerability. 
First, 'outcome vulnerability', is defined by the IPCC as the extent to which a system is 
susceptible to or unable to cope with climate variability and change. Second, 
‘contextual variability’ focuses on the susceptibility of systems to disturbances, 
including exposure and sensitivity to 'perturbations' and its capacity to adapt. 
Outcome vulnerability is a more effective tool in linear and bounded systems, such as 
estimates of biophysical productivity changes. By contrast, contextual viability is more 
helpful in analysing open systems, particularly social systems, and is more sensitive 
to contextual and regional variation. Contextual vulnerability is therefore frequently 
included in qualitative analyses (Pearson et al., 2008). However, combined qualitative 
and quantitative analyses of vulnerability can facilitate an integrated assessment of 
multiple hazards that are faced simultaneously. 
5.2.1.2. Vulnerable community profiles 
Much work has identified rural communities that are at risk of significant impacts from 
water reform, water transfers and reduced water availability as a consequence of 
climate change (ABARE-BRS, 2010b, Edwards et al., 2008b, NWC, 2012a, EBC et 
al., 2011). Rural communities most at risk of drought and water scarcity impacts 
generally have the following characteristics (EBC et al., 2011): 
 Size: A population of greater than 10,000 was considered as the threshold for 
resilience, while a population under 2,000 is a significant risk factor. 
 Diversity: More diversity in industry, economic arrangements, agricultural 
product and social strata equals greater resilience. 
 Dependence. Where 15% of the population is working in irrigated agriculture, 
or a closely related industry, the risk level is much higher. 
 Location: Communities on the eastern edge of the MDB are better positioned 
than those in western regions, which face higher risks. In part, this is related to 
proximity to larger population centres. 
Confirming earlier work by ABARES-BRS (2010b), size and dependency are the 
cardinal criteria. But the amount spent on irrigation per capita is also an important 
factor. The communities most at risk have issues related to their size, their 
dependence on irrigated agriculture, and the proportion of spend per capita that is 
related to irrigation. 
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Given this, it may be that water trading will have only limited capacity to redress long 
term reduction in water use. However, water trading did allow some rice production in 
NSW that would not have occurred otherwise.15 While it is clear that low water 
allocations were the primary influence, the impact on NSW rice processors and their 
employees was substantial, with significant job losses and lack of investment in 
infrastructure. Over time, processing ceased entirely in some locations (NWC, 2012a) 
and it appears that in some of the smaller communities there was permanent 
population loss. 
In the dairying region of northern Victoria herd sizes also decreased as water 
availability declined. At the height of the drought vine growers and horticulturalists 
aggressively entered the allocation market to protect their crops—pressing allocation 
water prices to levels prohibitive for dairy production. While initially some banks lent 
money to dairy farmers so that they could buy water and maintain stock numbers, as 
the drought continued this practice was unsustainable and ceased. 
These examples suggests that while trading helps farmers adjust, in some situations 
it is not in the direction of economies of scale that predict greater productivity and 
profit margins (NWC, 2012a). While the productivity of the region declined sharply this 
was largely due to exchange rate and international commodity market influences, as 
much as water availability. Thus, the outward trading of water may have had a minor 
impact on declining productivity during the assessment period but it was small in 
comparison to the influence of the drought (NWC, 2012a). 
EBC et al. (2011) identify four categories of community on a scale from 1 to 4 that 
may be influenced by the water reform and climate change according to their size and 
dependence on irrigation: 
 Category One—Small, dependent communities (e.g. Warren and 
Collarenebri): In general, these are typically regional areas highly dependent 
on irrigation, and often geographically isolated. Wider social and economic 
trends are driving reduced populations and contracting economies. The loss 
or reduction of irrigation water from water entitlement sales will likely 
exacerbate this trend. In the decade to 2001, there was some growth, 
especially in the cotton growing valleys. However, the early drought years 
(2001-2006) saw a general population decline in these smaller towns and rural 
areas. The loss was particularly notable for young people (aged 20-44), as 
well as significant reductions in people aged under 20 years. The loss of these 
population segments tends to also reduce the number of taxable incomes in 
the region as well as the number of businesses that rely on discretionary 
income (e.g. cafes and retail outlets). This appears to be part of a longer, 
wider trend (EBC et al., 2011). Category One communities are likely to face 
ongoing challenges, such as difficulty attracting health and related services 
even with full post-drought restoration. Overall, these trends will be 
exacerbated by water entitlement buyback. 
                                               
 
15
 Admittedly because a significant proportion of the money used by farmers to purchase water in some 
of the early drought periods was heavily subsidised by the rice processing companies (NWC, 2011f). 
Without such support it would not have made economic sense to grow rice crops compared to the 
relative value of selling that water on the water allocation market, despite reasonable commodity returns 
being in effect. 
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 Category Two—Small, diverse communities (e.g. Stanthorpe): These 
towns combine high value irrigation with tourism and other sectors. They are 
more insulated than Category One towns. Areas with such tourism assets can 
generate an increase in discretionary spending (e.g. tourism from high value 
wineries) and the population of most catchments in this category may thus 
remain static. However, to maintain stability in these areas high security water 
for viticulture will be necessary, as well as guaranteed water flow in rivers to 
attract tourists. Forms of mining also represent opportunities for these 
communities (Edwards et al., 2008b, EBC et al., 2011). As such, it is generally 
likely that the local service impacts will be limited for Category Two towns. 
 Category Three—Larger, dependent communities (e.g. Griffith, Moree, 
Robinvale and Loxton): These rural communities can be robust with current 
water levels, but would be vulnerable to reductions. Almost all such 
communities saw a decline of young people from 2004-2009; much of this due 
to the drought. During the drought period there was a population loss-related 
decrease in discretionary spending, despite an increasing percentage of 
indigenous residents in some areas. These areas also experienced an influx 
of lower socio-economic status people seeking cheaper housing; they were 
not well regarded and were seen as culturally incongruent. Overall, the loss of 
young people in particular had a serious impact on community groups and 
services. Category Three towns therefore face major challenges for service 
provision for the future. 
 Category Four—Larger, diverse regional centres (e.g. Toowoomba or 
Dubbo): These areas are relatively insulated from reduction in water 
availability issues. They experienced solid and sustained population growth 
over the period between 2001 and 2006. Further, there is evidence that they 
have soaked up the population of younger people who have left smaller areas. 
Many of them are quite independent of the economic impacts of irrigation, but 
many of them have smaller towns within their service catchments that remain 
dependent on farming. Category Four towns have typically witnessed a growth 
in many of their services. In support of these general conclusions, the NWC 
(2012b) found that—despite concerns about the impact of declining milk and 
agricultural production—Victorian communities of this category are quite 
resilient and have high adaptive capacity. This is due to their economic 
diversity and the presence of larger regional centres. 
Thus, as we might expect, less dependence on irrigated agriculture makes towns 
more adaptable and less vulnerable to the impacts of water entitlement buyback. 
However, the vulnerability of regional and local communities may be driven by more 
complex issues than simple water market intervention. For example, in specific 
agricultural sectors it can be difficult to disentangle the effects of market intervention 
from a range of current issues facing the wine grape or almond industries; such as 
exchange rate issues, a decline in commodity prices and/or the collapse of managed 
investment schemes (NWC, 2012b). Further, individual irrigator attitudes toward the 
benefits of water trade appear widely divergent from more general community 
attitudes, particularly among Victorian dairy irrigators, NSW rice growers and SA 
horticulturists—wherein the farming business benefits of water trade are strongly 
endorsed, in variation with community concerns about the impacts of such transfers. 
This may stem from wider community fears beyond individual farm issues to problems 
of population loss, employment reductions and economic stagnation/reduction as 
outlined below. 
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ABARE-BRS (2010b) categorised vulnerability of irrigation communities with the 
following important identified variables: irrigation intensity; irrigation incidence; % of 
work in agriculture; ratio of agriculture to total employment; proportion of households 
with agricultural employment; ratio of employment of agriculture to downstream agri-
industries employment. 
5.2.1.3. Population loss 
A great many rural community fears predominantly centre on population loss. The 
logic of this concern is that as farmers sell water, they will leave a district. This in turn 
means that local spending is reduced and that many services—such as schools—
reduce in size or become difficult to sustain because of fewer service users. The 
economic and service related effects are then argued to constitute a downward spiral; 
that is, fewer people leads to less spending, causing community businesses to close, 
leading to more population loss and therefore a greater decrease in local spending. In 
general, these impacts thus contribute to decreased employment opportunities for 
local residents (EBC et al., 2011). 
Further, in the opinion of many rural residents, population reduction resulting from the 
separation of land and water leads to fewer families, which in turn reduce the rates-
base available to local councils causing a further reduction in locally available 
services (Edwards et al., 2008b, Edwards et al., 2007). Declining population is also 
feared because it leads to declining house prices; and there is evidence that this has 
occurred in some rural settings (EBC et al., 2011). 
In addition, the population loss of long-standing farming families is viewed as 
changing local cultures and diminishing local community capacity by denying it a 
source of skilled, talented and volunteer labour (Edwards et al., 2008a, Edwards et 
al., 2007). Of particular concern is the effect on out-migration of young people who, 
when they go, take talent, skills, future leadership and the potential for family 
formation with them (Edwards et al., 2007). Finally, when membership numbers 
decline because of falling population many local community, sporting, recreational 
clubs and volunteer services struggle to maintain themselves. These manifold 
concerns about the impacts of water trading on rural communities are also associated 
with concerns about worsening psycho-social impacts for remaining residents, 
particularly farmers, as discussed below. By way of evidence, the ABS noted a 
population decline in dry-land farming areas during the 1990s among wheat-sheep 
belts and/or mining regions. However, this decline was not apparent in irrigation areas 
prior to the Millennium drought with the exception of Wee Waa and Narrabri (EBC et 
al., 2011). 
5.2.1.4. Fears of conversion to dry-land production 
Another concern expressed about both water markets and the impacts of climate 
change is that it will see previously irrigated areas converted to dry-land farming.16 
There are concerns that this will have adverse economic consequences. Irrigation 
farming generates a far higher level of demand for services than does the equivalent 
area of dry-land enterprises. A figure of $250/ha is accepted as a realistic figure for 
the annual operating expenditure per hectare for most dry-land crops. If we assume 
                                               
 
16
 Dry-land farming is essentially cropping undertaken with a reliance on opportunistic rainfall rather than 
certain water supply from irrigation supplies. While less costly in terms of infrastructure and water 
delivery expenditure, it is significantly more risky under existing (and expected) water supply variability 
and distribution changes under possible climate change scenarios. 
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that 75% of expenditure is spent locally, that will yield a local income of $185/ha. Most 
irrigated crops involve expenditure almost ten times this sum (EBC et al., 2011). 
Community representatives are thus concerned about a shift from irrigated to dry-land 
farming because it is nowhere near as lucrative, and provides fewer jobs directly and 
indirectly through processing opportunities. This then has flow on effects for 
depopulation and de-servicing, albeit with spatially diverse outcomes that in some 
cases are merely an acceleration of underlying trends apparent prior to this 
productive shift (Edwards et al., 2008a, Fenton, 2007). However, Miller (2011) and 
Grafton (2011) suggest that more funds could be diverted from infrastructure 
upgrades to direct community assistance, with better effect. Ultimately, a greater 
concern may be the current trend toward larger and more professionally operated 
farming businesses. In short, sMDB farms are reducing in number, getting bigger in 
terms of size, outputs and operating debt/costs, and they are holding larger water 
assets and taking more corporate attitudes toward farming. In such instances, water 
markets play a significant strategic role and add to the list of business tools available 
for income/risk management in a sector that has always faced uncertainty as a rule 
(Crase, 2012b). However, these strategies also impact on succession (or the need 
thereof), which in turn impacts on strategic decision-making over entitlement selling, 
farm structure and the need for permanent/temporary water trade product access 
(Wheeler et al., 2012a). Changing operations and lower total farm numbers also 
reduce the opportunity for agricultural sector employment or local people. 
5.2.1.5. Fears of labour/skill shortages 
The MDB employs about 10% of the total Australian workforce (around 920,000 
people), with around 96,000 of those persons employed in agriculture-related work 
(ABS and ABARE-BRS, 2009). However, it is unclear how many people specifically 
contribute to MDB irrigated agriculture (NSW Office of Water, 2012). Further, under a 
shift toward low/general security entitlements (perhaps as a consequence of water 
entitlement selling)—or smaller allocations as a consequence of climate change—
irrigation farms may experience reduced net farm production viability and/or some 
pressure to trade annually in or out of water markets. This may result in both a 
reduced requirement for unskilled farm labour coupled with an increased requirement 
for skilled managerial labour that can produce a range of commodities, coordinate 
operational activities as farms get larger and scan water markets for optimal trade 
activity. 
5.2.1.6. Fears about stranded assets 
Finally, a concern among community groups that is often discussed in relation to 
water entitlement buyback and community water loss is the issue of stranded assets 
and/or redundant infrastructure. A stranded asset is any component of the water 
delivery system (e.g. meter, off-take wheel, channel diversion box etc.) that is worth 
less on the market than it is on the balance sheet because it has become obsolete 
before being fully depreciated by an irrigation infrastructure operator (IIO). In irrigation 
areas, when there is a permanent decrease in the demand for water delivery services 
the assets of IIO can become unused or underused, and are then said to be stranded. 
This impact of Commonwealth water purchasing on stranded asset increases was 
considered in reviews of the initial RtB water purchasing tender round (Breckwoldt, 
2008), as untargeted purchases may produce stranded-asset or ‘Swiss-cheese’ 
effects from ad-hoc infrastructure removal and the spreading of operational costs 
across a reduced irrigator membership (Walsh, 2012). However, Cheesman and 
Wheeler (2012) surveyed up to one fifth of all sellers to the RtB and found that of the 
farmers who owned water in irrigation areas, 60% of them kept their delivery rights, 
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while 94% of those who stayed farming after selling water kept their delivery rights. 
These results indicate uncertainty about the reality that stranded assets are being 
created. There is also an argument that there is a need for a severe rationalisation of 
irrigation areas anyway, and that large amounts of area need to be removed from the 
system. 
Further diminishing the impacts of water purchasing and/or district water entitlement 
transfers outside the buyback program (which it should be noted still constitute the 
larger proportion of total entitlement sales (NWC, 2012a)), many IIO areas now 
impose termination or exit fees to cover the ongoing costs associated with stranded 
assets, where likely (Frontier Economics, 2008). These are a charge (often per 
megalitre) imposed on the permanent trade and subsequent loss of a water access 
entitlement out of an irrigation district or area. These fees are set by an independent 
body (ACCC, 2011) so that it will replace the selling irrigator’s annual contribution to 
the maintenance of the delivery infrastructure. Despite persistent concern about this 
issue and its recurrent mention within the wider water reform debate there is little 
empirical evidence of significant negative community impacts from stranded asset 
issues.  
ACCC (2012) report the most comprehensive analysis on terminations of water 
delivery rights in the MDB. In New South Wales and South Australia many irrigators’ 
rights to water have to be transformed before they can sell, because their rights are 
specified as a share of their IIO’s water access entitlements. There was an issue that 
IIOs had an incentive to impose high fees on irrigators who terminate their access to 
an irrigation network. The water market rules made it compulsory for operators to 
allow irrigators to transform rights by capping the fees that can be charged at 10 
times the current annual fixed charges for network access (ACCC 2012). Table 12 
below illustrates the terminations of water delivery rights by organisation. It shows 
that terminations were highest in 2009-10, with a greater terminations experienced in 
SA than other states. 
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Table 12 Terminations of water delivery rights, 2009−10 and 2010−11 
Irrigation infrastructure operator 
2009−10 2010−11 Percentage 
terminated 
since 1 
July 2009 Number 
Volume 
(GL) Number 
Volume 
(GL) 
NSW 
Coleambally Irrigation 0 0.0 18 12.3 2.51% 
Murray Irrigation (MIL) 124 65.4 13 2.9 5.87% 
Murrumbidgee Irrigation (MI) 28 18.6 19 11.2 2.81% 
Western Murray Irrigation (WMI) 37 1.9 17 3.1 8.30% 
Other NSW 1 0.6 28 9.5  
Total NSW 190 86.5 95 38.9  
SA 
Central Irrigation Trust (CIT) 192 15.2 21 0.9 10.20% 
Renmark Irrigation Trust 
(Renmark) 
39 2.6 2 0.1 6.06% 
Other SA N/A N/A 4 0.1  
Total SA 231 17.8 27 1.1  
Victoria 
Goulburn-Murray Water (GMW) 43 9.6 69 18.3 0.62% 
Lower Murray Water (LMW) 90 15.3 11 0.9 3.28% 
Total Vic 133 25.0 80 19.2  
TOTAL 554 129.3 202 59.2  
Source: ACCC (2012) 
The discussion above highlights a range of rural community issues that, regardless of 
their actual or alleged impact, drive much of the policy debate and direction 
associated with community attitudes and behaviour towards water reform, water trade 
and—to a seemingly lesser degree—climate change. The remainder of this section is 
devoted toward an assessment of rural community capacity to adapt to this range of 
social issues, as well as the strategies most likely to assist them in that process. We 
conclude by examining those communities best positioned to adapt to the effects of 
further water reform and climate change in future. 
5.3. Community adaptive capacity 
As discussed in Section 3 above, the need to adapt to change can arise from different 
sources, including economic drivers. In the context of sMDB water reform, historic 
economic water reallocation drivers have included: conflicts over river uses for 
irrigation farming versus navigation for freight transport (Musgrave, 2008); the 
imposition of caps on further water extraction from MDB river systems (MDBC, 1998); 
calls for water to shift over time toward higher value and/or economically efficient 
uses (Mainuddin et al., 2007); and requirements to assist irrigators cope with severe 
drought impacts in the sMDB between 1997/98 and 2009/10 (Kuehne et al., 2010, 
Loch et al., 2012). 
More recently, the emphasis for economic change has shifted again (Kiem and 
Austin, 2012) toward reallocating scarce water resources—both now and under future 
climate change impacts—between consumptive users for adjustment purposes and 
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from consumptive to environmental users in order to meet broader ecosystem 
sustainability objectives (MDBA, 2011a, DSEWPC, 2012). 
It is expected that communities with low adaptive capacities (for example, Category 
One or two communities as discussed previously) will be least able to cope with 
external stresses. Adaptive capacity is also known as social resilience. Resilience can 
be classified as stability, which offers a buffer capacity against change; as an ability to 
bounce back, and as having the ability to make a transformation. Communities’ 
adaptive capacity may be needed as a result of changes in the amount of irrigated 
agriculture due to water being traded in or out of the area. Figure 17 shows the 
variation in adaptive capacity across the sMDB. 
 
Figure 17 sMDB adaptive capacity index map, 2006/07 
Source: (NWC, 2012a) 
The basis for this index was ‘collector districts’ (CDs) each comprised of a population 
of 200 people or less within the sMDB (NWC, 2012a). From this index it is clearly 
evident that CDs with low adaptive capacities are spread throughout the rural areas of 
the basin and do not appear to be associated with a particular region or industry. 
However, higher levels of adaptive capacity are generally found closer to major towns 
and in the upper reaches of the catchment along major transportation routes and 
closer to the capital cities of Melbourne, Adelaide and Sydney.  
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Importantly, of the CDs with low adaptive capacities, many may not be highly 
vulnerable to changes facilitated by water trading because they have very little 
employment in irrigated agriculture or related industries. Rather, CDs with an adaptive 
capacity index in the lowest range and with more than 50% of the population 
employed in agriculture or manufacturing are most likely to experience a broader 
impact from any increases or decreases in the availability of water for irrigation. This 
analysis shows that in 2006 there were only 10 districts that stood out as having 
particularly low values of the adaptive capacity index. Looking at those CDs in greater 
detail, it is evident that there is considerable demographic diversity in the factors that 
contributed to their low adaptive capacity index scores. They include relatively high 
unemployment, the relatively low level of educational qualifications in the population 
and a high proportion of either low-income families, population in rented dwellings, 
labourers or people with English as a second language. Eight of the 10 CDs had 
some irrigation, ranging from just a few farms to most farms in the district (NWC, 
2012b). Therefore, the NWC report broadly concludes that: 
 Local and regional socioeconomic impacts depend on the adaptive capacity of 
rural communities. Some individuals and communities are better equipped 
than others to deal with, or take advantage of, changes due to water trading 
and climate change. Their adaptive capacity is influenced by their human, 
social and institutional capacity and economic diversity. 
 Economic and social outcomes may influence internal motivations to trade 
water. For example, if community services are in decline due to factors 
unrelated to water trading, that may affect the desirability of continuing to farm 
in a particular region, which may influence water trading decisions. 
 Other factors also drive agricultural production and local/regional 
socioeconomic outcomes directly. 
The NWC thus suggested a need to encourage planned adaptation to future water 
variability, focussing on how adaptation to water scarcity can increase profitability and 
strengthen the viability of the farm. Invoking climate change predictions and 
consequences may be counter-productive. Policy-makers will also need to consider 
how to develop effective strategies to communicate water use and adaptation 
strategies, along with developing policies to address farm succession issues, water 
market inefficiency issues, and continual structural adjustment packages to help the 
transition out of farming for many farmers. 
ABARE-BRS (2010b) categorised communities’ adaptive capacity according to the 
following important variables: % graduates; % in public sector; % over 15 with no 
qualifications; median weekly rent as a fraction of Australian median; median 
household income as a fraction of Australian median; income/mortgage differential; % 
one parent; % couple families; % single parent with family less than age 15; total 
unemployment; % 65 over; average number of persons per household; % lone person 
dwellings; % dwellings rented; % different address to 1 year ago; women in non-
routine occupations; % voluntary work; economic diversity index. 
5.4. Key points 
The major points from this section include: 
 Many rural communities have faced ongoing structural change (declining 
terms of trade, loss of people to urban areas – in particular young people, 
agglomeration of farms over time, and an aging farmer workforce) over the 
past fifty years; hence much change predates the introduction of water 
markets.  
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 Concerns about water trade include: community vulnerability and effects from 
water sales; impacts on community spending and reinvestment; population 
losses as farmers elected to move out of regional areas once water sales had 
been finalised; Impacts on current and future local employment prospects, 
especially for younger people; changes to the nature of production in regional 
areas (e.g. shifts to dry-land agricultural practices); legacy issues for 
remaining farmers such as higher variable farm operating costs, stranded 
asset problems, increased emphasis on the rationalisation of remaining ‘outer’ 
arm units etc.. 
 MDB communities that are small and/or dependent on irrigation are most at 
risk to water entitlement sales. Less dependence on irrigated agriculture 
makes towns more adaptable and reduces their vulnerability. It is expected 
that communities with low adaptive capacities will be least able to cope with 
external stresses such as climate change and water scarcity over time. Up to 
10 districts in the MDB have been identified as having a particularly low 
adaptive capacity index. 
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6. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF WATER MARKETS 
This final section examines perceived and actual water market impacts on 
environmental issues and outcomes in the sMDB. The introduction of access to water 
trade generated significant concerns among different water users about impacts such 
as increased salinity, reduced end-of-system outflows, water quality problems and 
system accounting problems. It has been suggested that that trade may have 
detrimental impacts on the environment because it could result in: i) concentrating 
water use in areas suffering from high water tables; ii) moving water into locations 
where its’ use could have a negative impact on river water quality; iii) moving water 
use upstream, thereby resulting in reduced river flow from the new point of extraction 
to the old point of extraction; or vi) activating previously unused water leaving less 
water in the river to support ecosystems. Concerns have also been expressed about 
the impact on the exporting land, which if abandoned and not farmed would have 
weed/pest consequences (Bjornlund et al., 2013). The remainder of this section 
addresses these issues. 
6.1. An overview of water, over-allocation and trade in the Basin 
As discussed in Sections 1 and 4, the sMDB is comprised of several major connected 
river systems (e.g. the Murray, Goulburn-Broken, Murrumbidgee and Lower Darling 
Rivers) with variable hydrological inflow characteristics. The sMDB is also comprised 
of different production regions with different water demand elasticity characteristics 
due to cropping patterns (e.g. elastic NSW water demand versus inelastic SA water 
demand). Finally, the sMDB has a variety of water storage types, water use products 
and water-sharing arrangements. The availability of water resources, suitable soils, 
close proximity to markets and historical development investment programs (e.g. 
water infrastructure provision and soldier-settlement schemes) has also seen the 
sMDB experience significant and rapid water entitlement growth. Over time this has 
created a situation of over-allocation of available water resources in the region (0). 
If we consider the sMDB specifically it is easy to conclude that water resources in the 
region are over-allocated. From Figure 18 we can see that total potential sMDB 
surface water extraction volumes equal 9,616 GL, or approximately 77% of the total 
LTAAY pre-development outflows. Given other estimates of LTAAY available surface 
water resources in the sMDB of closer to 11,000 GL (Young and McColl, 2009) this 
increases consumptive use closer to 87% of the total LTAAY. 
The pre-development sMDB environmental flow and system loss proportional 
requirement is estimated at around 37%. Therefore, at the 11,000 GL system outflow 
volume, an average 20% reduction in current sMDB consumptive extraction levels 
would be required to meet non-consumptive water needs—based on pre-
development conditions. However, since the sMDB represents post-development 
conditions with increased system losses, water quality changes and flow timing 
alteration the water volume requirement for environmental needs are more likely to be 
higher (Arthington et al., 2006). 
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Table 13 sMDB surface water outflows (LTAAY GLs)† & water entitlement 
shares 
Catchment Inflows 
(GL/y) 
Envir. and 
losses 
(GL/y) 
Outflows 
(GL/y) 
HS* Ent’s 
(GL/y)§ 
LS/GS* 
Ent’s 
(GL/y)§ 
Lower Darling/Lachlan    172 699 
Ovens 1,804 76 1,728 — — 
Goulburn-Broken 3,559 300 3,521 1,096 672 
Loddon- Campaspe 680 254 426 84 38 
Murrumbidgee 4,791 1,943 2,848 377 1,888 
Kiewa 689 7 682 — — 
Total Murray contribution 
(excl. Darling) 
11,523 2,580 8,943   
Murray River (NSW/VIC)‡ 4,436 1,628 11,751 1,330 2,404 
Murray River (SA)‡ 0 1,720 12,430 856 — 
Mt Lofty Ranges 120 47 73 — — 
Total sMDB 16,079 5,975 12,503 3,915 5,701 
† based on 1895 to 2009 without development LTAAY for surface water. 
‡ Relative to Wentworth in NSW. 
* HS = high security water entitlements; GS/LS = general or low security water entitlements 
§ Adapted from Figure 18 below. 
Source: (adapted from MDBA, 2010a) 
 
Figure 18 Location, volume & type of sMDB regulated water entitlements (ML) 
Source: (NWC, 2011b) 
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However, farm type diversity and variable water demand context in the sMDB has 
also resulted in significant (and increasing) water trade so that significant volumes of 
water are reallocated annually (Figure 19 and Table 14). 
 
 
Figure 19 Movement of water allocation 2008/09 & 2010/11 by volume (GL) 
Source: (NWC, 2011b) 
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Table 14 sMDB water entitlement and allocation trading by volume (ML/y), 
2001/02-2010/11 
 
Volume of allocation 
trades 
Volume of entitlement trades 
Regulated 
entitlements
a
 
Internal 
irrigation 
trades 
Unregulated 
trades 
2001-02 912 858 77 209 - - 
2002-03 1 102 680 62 193 - - 
2003-04 982 612 96 107 - - 
2004-05 831 268 75 656 - - 
2005-06 871 943 40 359 - - 
2006-07 716 214 139 169 - - 
2007-08 951 598 549 841 119 783 26 783 
2008-09 1 304 119 1 128 640 163 285 63 260 
2009-10 1 652 013 792 400 281 015 37 324 
2010-11 2 701 206 320 524 164 107 67 776 
Note: water entitlement data prior to 2007/08 does not include internal irrigation and 
unregulated water entitlement trades. It includes only trades of regulated water from 
the Lower darling, NSW Murray, Murrumbidgee, SA Murray, Victorian Murray, and the 
Goulburn and Campaspe-Loddon systems. Also excludes internal irrigation district 
trades.  
a Regulated entitlements are from waterways where users are supplied by 
releases from storages. A water access entitlement for a regulated stream 
specifies a base water entitlement defining the holder’s share of the resources 
from the stream. 
Source: (NWC, 2011b) 
Generally, during the drier conditions experienced in 2008/09 large volumes of water 
were traded toward SA and Victoria from NSW. In the relatively wetter conditions in 
2010/11 and as a consequence of carry-over rule issues (see section 4.2.2) trade 
activity appeared to be confined within state borders, except for large transfers 
between SA and Victoria to accommodate strategic water trading toward the end of 
the water year (SA Department of Water, 2011a). Table 14 makes it immediately 
clear that the volume of water traded in the market for water allocations has grown 
considerably between 2007/08 and 2010/11. 
6.2. Hydrological and environmental impacts from water trade 
Water trade can result in changes to the location and timing of water use, which can 
affect river hydrology and environmental outcomes (NWC, 2012a).17 The recent rapid 
increase in water trade activity has caused some to question the impacts of large 
                                               
 
17
 Refer to section 1.4.5 for the discussion on perverse activation and trade in sleeper and dozer water 
access rights following the introduction of the cap on further right approvals in the sMDB. 
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resource reallocation on sMDB environmental conditions and outcomes. Here we 
examine these concerns and their validity. 
6.2.1. Historical impacts and policy 
When the cap was introduced, each of the state governments chose to recognise 
existing unused ‘sleeper’ and ‘dozer’ licenses (Quiggin, 2006a, Crase and O'Keefe, 
2009). As the opportunity to purchase (and abolish) existing sleeper and dozer 
licenses was lost (Bell and Quiggin, 2008), and these licenses were subsequently 
activated through market trade, seasonal allocations for NSW and Victoria were 
reduced (DNRNSW, 2006). As a further result, there were increases in groundwater 
extractions which also impacted upon the security of water access elsewhere due to 
the interaction between ground and surface water (DEWHA, 2008). 
To accommodate economic and environmental concerns about trade, each state 
government has introduced a variety of trade restrictions and approval processes to 
minimise harm. Some of these historical policies include: 
 In SA buyers needed an irrigation drainage and management plan to show the 
intended use of the water would not have a negative impact on river water 
quality; 
 In Victoria limits were placed on how much water could be traded onto a 
particular parcel of land (with volumes dependent upon irrigation and drainage 
infrastructure and soil type – with later changes emphasising best practice 
irrigation management on suitable soils); 
 Placing spatial restrictions on water transfers; 
 Transferring of risk management from water management agencies to 
irrigators through a change in how seasonal allocations were calculated; 
 Water levies on transfers into high impact zones; and 
 Exchange rates were introduced in instances where water is traded between 
different locations on the river, in order to offset the impact on stream flow and 
transmission losses. 
These trading restrictions significantly increased transaction costs, and helped lead to 
unbundling of land from the ownership of the water entitlement (described in Section 
4). The transferring of risk management meant that the introduction of water trade 
initially transferred even greater risk to the environment. The increasing activation of 
"sleeping" and "dozing" licences meant water for the environment was more likely to 
be reduced. More historical research on the size of this activation would be useful. 
6.2.2. In-stream flow regime changes from trade in the late 1990s to 
2000s 
In summary, the hydrologic and environmental impacts of water trade between 
1998/99 to 2010/11 were small and largely positive; due to the downstream 
movement of water during the drought that reduced summer flow stress and created 
no change to winter flow patterns. Negative impacts tended to occur where water 
trade resulted in a detrimental change to the volume, location and/or timing of water 
use (NWC, 2012a). 
To assess the impact of water trade on in-stream river flows Sinclair, Knight Mertz 
developed an eco-hydrology ranking index capable of determining the flow stress 
experienced in various sMDB river systems (SKM, 2012). The index combined 
measures of low-flow conditions required to maintain in-stream habitat, high-flow 
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conditions that create periodic disturbance and connectivity, and variability factors 
(e.g. timing and location) that drive ecosystem composition, structure and responses 
to flow conditions. A score of 1 indicates that the system experienced near-natural 
conditions, while a score of 0 indicates conditions significantly different from natural 
(NWC, 2012a). Overall, the measures suggest that water trade has led to improved 
flow stress ranking scores for the river systems assessed, particularly with regard to 
natural flow variability and better flow patterns in summer months (Figure 20). The 
findings also concluded that water trade would have beneficial ecological flow impacts 
under dry conditions compared with wet (NWC, 2012a). 
 
Figure 20 Natural, observed and without water trade flows for Murray River at 
SA border 
Source: (NWC, 2012a) 
In support of these findings, Connor et al. (forthcoming) applied a dynamic 
optimisation model to examine the beneficial effects of water allocation trade by a 
Commonwealth environmental water holder. The model used improved ecological 
conditions in the Lowbidgee floodplain area as the desired outcome from flow 
changes as a case study. The model objective was to avoid upward and exponential 
trends in an environmental damage index (e-damage); that is, the flatter the line, the 
better. 
The study concluded that, assuming a 30% base reallocation of water entitlements to 
the Commonwealth for environmental use, water trade could be used to reduce 
environmental damage (i.e. reduce the duration between environmental flows of a 
level required to achieve either ecosystem maintenance and/or periodic freshes to 
rejuvenate habitat and species populations). Achieving such outcomes is indicated in 
the study results by realising flat (or flatter) lines in the variability of flows across time 
under different reallocation base scenarios and trade strategies. Figure 21 and Figure 
22 show the differences between trade and no-trade model scenarios in dry and wet 
conditions, assuming a base water reallocation point of 30%. Like SKM, Connor et al. 
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(forthcoming) concluded that greater environmental benefits could be derived under 
dry conditions, compared with wet. 
 
 
Figure 21 Low to moderate environmental flow impacts in dry conditions 
Source: Connor et al. (forthcoming) 
 
 
Figure 22 Low to moderate environmental flow impacts in wet conditions 
Source: Connor et al. (forthcoming) 
6.2.3. Salinity issues 
Groundwater salinity levels are significantly higher in downstream sMDB river 
sections (e.g. the SA Murray area) (Heaney and Beare, 2001). Therefore, as water 
trade results in larger movements of water to downstream areas (see Figure 19) 
higher on-farm water use increases groundwater recharge and seepage to rivers, 
raising the probability of increased in-stream salinity. Poor farm management and 
water application practices can further increase the freeing of salt from soils, and 
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transfer increased salt loads into watercourses (Marshall, 2004, CSIRO Land & 
Water, 1999)—although it is contended that water trade to higher value crops can 
assist in reducing the total level of poor farming practices by low value producers 
(NWC, 2012a). 
By way of example, Wheeler et al. (2012b) found that irrigators who had less water 
overall were more likely to sell because: they were exiting the industry; they believed 
that irrigation was going to be increasingly problematic for them; or lack of water 
allocation during drought has had a cumulative effect, leading them to sell water. This 
was argued to have implications for environmental factors, because the exit of 
marginal irrigators or those in marginal areas with highly saline water that change 
their farming practices would have less detrimental impacts on the local environment 
and river systems overall. 
The Basin Salinity Management Strategy is charged with managing sMDB salinity 
issues. The strategy has resulted in water trade limits, by identifying low to high 
salinity impact zones and/or preferred development zones across the three states, 
and restricting trade via higher development or salinity credit costs. Within each 
zones, a state must not exceed the salinity credits available under water use 
assessments and approvals. Salinity credits are generated by investment in salt 
interception schemes; and a unit of credit is measured using EC levels at Morgan, SA 
(NWC, 2012a). As credits are limited, a market on annual use-limits has established, 
and irrigated land developers have a preference for low-impact zones in the first 
instance. High-risk zones are managed through a variety of state-based approaches: 
 In Victoria a range of additional water capital charges in salinity risk zones (i.e. 
$33/ML in low-risk zones increasing to $335/ML in high-risk zones) result in 
higher development, transaction and ongoing water use costs. The money 
raised is available for state investment in salt interception schemes. 
 In SA available salinity credits are assigned to developers in low-risk zones, 
while in high-risk zones developers must propose methods to offset salinity 
impacts and generate site-specific salinity credits that will be enforced through 
licence or land-use conditions. 
 In NSW salinity risk zones have not been identified, but a range of preferred 
development areas are available. In high-risk areas development approvals 
may require additional assessments and transaction costs, which provide 
disincentives for applications to develop high-risk areas. 
Of particular note, Connor et al. (2012) observe that ignoring the combined effects of 
more variable (under climate change impacts) and increasingly saline water 
(potentially through trade impacts) may result in unexpected changes to agricultural 
water use—and subsequent flow-on effects for return water. For example, their 
modelling results suggest that irrigated areas with significant salinity concentrations 
(e.g. downstream sMDB areas) may require increased water application rates to 
leach salts through the soil and avoid substantial salt-related yield deficits. Further, in 
these downstream locations—where salinity impacts of reduced flows tend to be 
greatest—significant water use efficiency decreases may be needed to leach salt in 
more severe climate change scenarios. Therefore, while the current range of salinity 
credit and interception schemes may be keeping negative salinity issues at bay in the 
sMDB (MDBMC, 2008, MDBA, 2012a), under climate change these impacts may 
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increase gradually, requiring altered measures to manage their impacts.18 Overall, 
however, the impacts of increased water trade on salinity to 2010/11 appear to be 
inconsequential (NWC, 2012a). 
6.2.4. Increased water use/trade due to carry-over restrictions 
The inability to carry-over water for future use lead many consumptive users to adopt 
a strategy of either using all of their available water each season and/or trading 
surplus water allocation in the water markets (NWC, 2011f). Such strategies resulted 
in changes to the location and timing of water use, as well as generally increased 
water consumption each year with attendant potential environmental consequences. 
Further, anecdotal evidence from qualitative interviews with sMDB irrigators in 
2008/09 suggests that without carry-over access water users would typically allow 
some unused water to flow downstream from under-extraction each season, with 
possible environmental flow and dilution effects (Loch et al., 2012). 
Figure 19 illustrates the impacts on volumetric flow direction under trade impacted by 
carry-over rules. As discussed in section 4.2.9, access to carry-over and strategic 
behaviour by water users led to the large volume of water allocation trade from SA 
into Victoria in 2010/11—and multiple decisions to suspend late-season water 
allocation trade in the sMDB. This is now being addressed under rule changes aimed 
at providing greater transparency to the process of trade suspension and a better 
alignment between spill-rules and storage management arrangements (DSE, 2012). 
These changes are aimed at reducing the level of uncertainty in water markets, the 
drivers of sudden trade suspension in future years and are in line with a current 
review of the Schedule D trade arrangements under the MDB Agreement (Frontier 
Economics, 2012). 
6.2.5. Transmission losses 
Consumptive transmission losses can occur from evaporation from surface water, 
seepage from the bottom river channels, leakage through river banks or overbank 
losses (e.g. onto floodplain areas such as the Barmah Forest area surrounding the 
Barmah Choke during high-flow events.19 It is possible that combined water trade and 
regulated arrangements that provide flows across the entire spectrum of low in-
stream flows to high overbank flooding could provide enhanced ecological outcomes 
for the sMDB (Loch et al., 2011). However, changes to the location of water extraction 
from downstream water trade can create higher amounts of transmission loss as 
water is transported further along the river system. If an increase in transmission 
loses is not accounted for in the trade volume, it affects the general resource pool and 
environmental outcomes (NWC, 2012a). 
Water trade is expected to have minimal impacts on surface evaporation or seepage 
losses as the surface area and size of the water delivery route remain unchanged. 
Further, the volume of trade would not typically exceed riverbank limits to result in 
                                               
 
18
 Although it has also been argued that engineering solutions to manage salinity provide perverse 
incentives to expand water use, thereby partially offsetting the mitigation benefits (Adamson et al., 2007). 
Further, Beverly et al. (2011) argue that in some areas perennial vegetation management strategies may 
provide more effective and less costly measures of salt interception and management within an 
integrated surface-groundwater context. 
19
 It is necessary for the MDB to have large flushing flows to sweep saline water out to sea. Overbank 
flows are necessary for the health of the entire ecological system; rivers, floodplains, wetlands, lakes and 
estuaries must have regular flows over the bank to retain/regain ecological health (Williams, 2011). 
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significant overbank flooding losses (NWC, 2012a). However, since 2007/08 under 
increased levels of downstream water movement the potential for increased losses 
from leakage as the surface area of the river or channel will have increased (NWC, 
2012a). In general, however, there is insufficient evidence to evaluate this 
assessment one way or the other (SKM, 2009) and it would be useful to have more 
access to information relating hydrological flow to transmission losses along water 
delivery zones via improved stream-flow data. 
Issues related to transmission losses (as well as carry-over impacts) are also argued 
to be manageable under tagged trade or exchange arrangements (Etchells et al., 
2004), as discussed further below. 
6.2.6. Exchange rate and tagged water trade 
To limit the environmental and supply security impacts of water reallocation from 
water trade a system of exchange rates was applied to the Interstate Pilot Trade 
Program initiated in 1998 (Bjornlund et al., 2013). The system was applied to limit 
river channel and supply reliability losses from transfers between NSW, Victoria and 
SA. For example, an exchange rate of 1.0 applies to all downstream transfers from 
NSW to Victoria or SA. However, an exchange rate of 0.9 applies to upstream 
transfers from SA into NSW, Victoria to counteract reduced supply security where the 
point of extraction is moved to above the confluence of the Darling System with the 
Murray. Under that arrangement, the new extraction point cannot be supplied by the 
flow coming out of the Darling River or stored in Lake Victoria (DEWHA, 2009).20 
The application of exchange rates on water trades during the pilot program were 
designed to accrue net benefits to the environment, as any gains from the transfers 
are applied to the riverine environment. That is, transfers downstream were 
envisaged to leave water in the river environment for longer with expected positive 
environmental benefits. Victoria and SA subsequently signed an interstate trade 
agreement based on the pilot program exchange rate principles (DEWHA, 2009). 
Exchange rate trades must also be assessed against the sMDB salinity management 
strategy for credit or debit effects. High transaction costs associated with exchange 
rate trade have limited its expansion beyond the pilot interstate trade program, while 
tagged trade has increased. 
Tagged trade allows the source water entitlement to retain its original access right 
and use conditions but become ‘tagged’ for use elsewhere in the sMDB. Water 
allocations made against the tagged water entitlement are conditional upon the 
source arrangements, but can be used at the destination site. As such, tagging allows 
a water user to hold a portfolio of rights across the sMDB with different reliability/risk 
characteristics commensurate with their preferences. Naturally, tagged water trade 
requires reciprocal agreements between states and territories to ensure recognition of 
water access rights and conditions across the jurisdictions (DEWHA, 2009). Such 
arrangements exist, but the level of annual tagged trade is reportedly low. 
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 Exchange rate trades result in the cancellation of the original water right in the source area and its re-
registration as a new water access right in the destination area—with the characteristics of that new 
water use area. Importantly, where seasonal water availability between the source/destination areas 
diverges from the expected LTAAY, exchange-based trade can negatively impact on existing rights-
holders and environmental third-part rights. The magnitude of this impact will depend on the relative 
water availability, the exchange rate used and the volume of exchange trades that have occurred 
(ACCC, 2009). 
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While similar water allocation trade outcomes could be achieved via seasonal trade, 
tagged trade does not require annual or repeated approvals for water access and use 
(ACCC, 2009). Therefore, the transaction costs associated with tagged trade can be 
lower overall. In addition, third-party impacts (e.g. environmental flow reductions) 
potentially associated with exchange rate water trade is not likely to eventuate under 
the system of tagged trade arrangements. 
6.2.7. Return flows 
Different water use practices can have differing impacts on the return of unused 
agricultural water as surface-water runoff or ground-water recharge. Return flows 
affect river hydrology, with possible environmental impacts. Australia has never 
specified that water users should provide return flows but improvements in water use 
efficiency have seen less water returned to river systems over time. In most settings 
the response has been to decrease allocations proportionately to the efficiency gains 
achieved (Young, 2010). This is fundamentally a bad idea, as it collectivises the cost 
of the improvements and individualizes the benefits—sending poor economic signals. 
In the period from 1993/94 to 2009/10 the volume of return flows to environment have 
steadily decreased as a consequence of extended drought, water use efficiency 
improvements, changes to on-farm practices and drainage collection improvements 
(URS Australia Pty Ltd., 2010). Water trade is expected to reduce return flows to 
riverine environments further again (Heaney and Beare, 2001, Heaney et al., 2006), 
although actual measures and data on this relationship are not typically available. 
Studies have suggested that water buyers tend to be more efficient, have higher net 
farm income, use advanced technology and apply whole-of-farm planning to their 
operations (Young et al., 2000, Wheeler et al., 2010a, Wheeler et al., 2009, Zou et al., 
2013). If climate change reduces water availability, further improvements in water use 
efficiency may lead to even lower return flows. 
Interestingly, Qureshi et al. (2010) investigate the different outcomes of government 
policies to reallocate water toward environmental flows (i.e. water buyback versus 
investment in infrastructure efficiency upgrades). They conclude that infrastructure 
capital investments to improve on-farm irrigation practices and water conveyance 
result in relatively larger reductions in return flows under their modelled conditions. 
However, where irrigation losses produce little useful return flows (e.g. during drought 
condition or presumably under climate change impacts) efficiency improvement 
capital investments may provide some cost-effective options for government policy-
makers. In general then, between on-farm and off-farm capital incentives for further 
efficiency gains (especially in light of predicted climate change impacts), return flows 
from the trade of water are not expected to contribute dramatically to environmental 
gains or losses—although investments in efficiency improvement may alter return 
flow patterns dramatically in the sMDB (Adamson and Loch, under review). 
6.2.8. CEWH environmental water trade 
Another way in which water trading may have direct implications for the health of the 
MDB is via Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder (CEWH) sponsored trade of 
environmental water under proposed arrangements currently being discussed 
(CEWH, 2011a). Concerns have been expressed that while federal government 
purchases may look impressive on paper, the volume of water delivered to the 
environment is likely to be relatively small (Thampapillai, 2009a, Thampapillai, 
2009b). At present, estimates are that restrictions on water delivery and 
environmental works and measures mean that less than 50% of water available to the 
Commonwealth Water Holder was delivered in the sMDB to 2010/11 (NWC, 2012a). 
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There are further concerns that the purchases have not been strategic, heightening 
fears about poor links to environmental priority sites (NIC, 2010). 
Restrictions on the ability to apply environmental water when and where it is deemed 
necessary, or on the usefulness of purchased water entitlements to meet required 
environmental site watering needs, may provide motives for increased water trade by 
the CEWH. Dependent upon the volumes involved, which could be significant given 
the holdings accrued under previous purchasing rounds, additional impacts on flow 
regimes, salinity impacts, transmission losses and the requirement for tagged trade, 
could all increase. However, based on the discussions above, the probability of 
negative environmental consequences from such activity would appear to be quite 
low—with the caveat that in some instances (e.g. transmission losses and return 
flows) further data and measures of potential impacts are recognised as being 
required (NWC, 2012a). In addition, the CEWH appear to be carefully considering the 
implications of their trade activity to ensure that limited third-party negative impacts 
accrue from any action its decides to undertake (Costello, 2012). 
6.2.9. Seasonal Water Donations by Irrigators 
Another source of water for the environment is donation of allocation water by 
consumptive water entitlement holders. Donation of water has been an important 
method of acquiring water for in-stream flows by private environmental organizations 
in the US (Wheeler et al., 2013).This is where water can be donated for the benefit of 
the local environment, as well as water allocation and entitlement donations to 
environmental water organizations in Australia (such as members of the Water Trust 
Alliance). The federal government provided a grant of $705,000 for the development 
of a web-based environmental water trading system and mechanisms to facilitate 
water donations to approved environmental projects. Water donations over a certain 
amount are also now tax deductible; however there is still large transaction costs 
associated with donations. There is currently a threshold water value required to 
obtain a concession ($5,000), and a water valuation is required (which costs $800-
900). The role of water donations needs further consideration as part of the adaptive 
water management push in Australia. It could potentially form part of a localism model 
for the MDB, helping areas identify, control and manage their own environmental 
assets, along with assistance from CEWH (Wheeler et al., forthcoming-b). Bjornlund 
et al. (2011) found that between 6-17% of irrigators across the MDB stated they were 
willing to reduce their seasonal allocations to improve environmental flows (SA 
irrigators agreed the most, and NSW irrigators agreed the least). Such survey results 
indicate there seems to be strong support for the further development of water 
donation mechanisms, for the benefit of environmental flows. 
6.3. Discussion 
Although the advent of the water market may have initially caused inadvertent harm, 
on balance it seems to have proven effective at reallocating water among users 
without negative environmental consequences—although there are clear distinctions 
between the acquisition and management of environmental water that are yet to be 
fully tested (Wheeler et al., 2013). While it is always possible that the environmental 
needs for water will be sacrificed for consumptive uses of water (NWC, 2012a), and 
that in principle water markets have the potential to lead to adverse environmental 
consequences, Grafton (2011) contends that in comparative terms, water markets in 
the MDB are performing well in helping promote the environmental health of the 
basin. Nevertheless, Australia does require more complete scientific data to optimise 
effective water resource planning.  
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Available data are 'patchy' for some catchments and in some instances are not 
publicly accessible. One major advantage for all water users in the sMDB—including 
government holders of environmental water—has come from reducing the need to fall 
back on risk-sharing principles. This has arisen from the water market’s previous (and 
likely future) contribution to environmental water recovery via adequately 
compensated negotiation, and the clear scope for further adjustment through markets 
if necessary (NWC, 2011f). 
Finally, on balance the evidence presented above suggests that environmental 
impacts of water trade have been small in comparison with the effects of drought and 
water resource development. This has clear implications for future adaptability and 
policy emphasis under likely climate change scenario impacts. 
6.4. Key points 
The major points from this section include: 
 Common environmental concerns associated with water trade include that it 
may result in: i) concentrating water use in areas suffering from high water 
tables; ii) moving water into locations where its’ use might have a negative 
impact on river water quality; iii) moving water use upstream, thereby resulting 
in reduced river flow from the new point of extraction to the old point of 
extraction; or vi) activating previously unused water leaving less water in rivers 
to support ecosystems. 
 Historically, the existence of water markets meant that when the cap was 
introduced, many unused ‘sleeper’ and ‘dozer’ licenses were activated through 
market trade, which resulted in reduced seasonal allocations. A variety of 
controls have been put in place by state governments to limit further 
environmental harm from trade, which have increased transaction costs 
associated with trade. 
 Recent modelling suggests that the hydrologic and environmental impacts of 
water trade between 1998/99 to 2010/11 were small and largely positive; due 
to the downstream movement of water during the drought that reduced 
summer flow stress and created no change to winter flow patterns. Negative 
impacts tended to occur where water trade resulted in a detrimental change to 
the volume, location and/or timing of water use. Overall, the measures 
suggest that water trade has led to improved flow stress ranking scores for the 
river systems assessed, particularly with regard to natural flow variability 
outcomes and better flow patterns in summer months. The findings also 
concluded that water trade would have beneficial ecological flow impacts 
under dry conditions compared with wet. Groundwater salinity levels are 
significantly higher in downstream sMDB river sections. Therefore, as water 
trade results in larger movements of water to downstream areas higher on-
farm water use increases groundwater recharge and seepage to rivers, raising 
the probability of in-stream salinity. In the future, irrigated areas with significant 
salinity concentrations may require increased water application rates to leach 
salts through the soil and avoid substantial salt-related yield deficits. Overall, 
however, the impacts of increased water trade on salinity appear to be 
inconsequential. 
 The introduction of carry-over water for future use did lead many consumptive 
users to adopt a strategy of either using all of their available water each 
season and/or trading surplus water allocation in the water markets. Such 
strategies resulted in changes to the location and timing of water use, as well 
as generally increased water consumption each year with attendant potential 
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environmental consequences. Controls are now being put in place to address 
environmental concerns that, in accordance with the discussion about flow 
regime changes above, would likely be positive from water trade of carry-over. 
CEWH will also need to carefully consider the implications of their trade 
activity to limit any potential third-party negative impacts. 
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7. FUTURE CHANGES TO WATER MARKETS TO SUPPORT 
ADAPTATION 
7.1. Policy Responses for Adaptation 
Climate change and water management are arguably two of the most important policy 
challenges facing contemporary Australia, and in particular, are the most important 
issues for the MDB in Australia. Current water policy is well-positioned to aid the 
management of impacts from climate change, especially for irrigators. Reforms to 
water pricing, entitlements and the development of markets are some of the best-
practice examples of adaptation. 
Adaptation has been defined as adjustments in human-environmental systems in 
response to observed or expected climatic changes. It is influenced by a farmer’s 
willingness to adopt new strategies, and can be either incremental (relatively common 
decisions for a farmer to make) or transformative (a rarer decision, as it represents a 
major change in livelihood, location or identity). We suggest that in the situation of the 
MDB, successful policy should be designed to consider both aspects of adaptation. 
First and foremost, policy should be focused on adaptive change for farmers, to help 
them adjust to future water scarcity and manage their land and resources as 
sustainably as possible. However, policy also needs to recognise that we cannot 
expect change from all farmers, and that perhaps some parts of irrigated districts in 
the MDB should no longer be supported into the future, given environmental 
conditions, irrigation infrastructure, future costs and soil productivity. Hence, policy 
will also need to be designed to facilitate transformative and structural change. Small 
block irrigated exit packages are one example of transformative policy change, and 
the target buy-back of farms on certain inefficient backbone or spur channels, which 
would no longer be serviced or upgraded, would be another option. 
Policies and investment strategies related to climate change, energy and water are 
intertwined. It has both mitigation and adaptation strategies in its sights. While 
adaptation and mitigation responses are usually portrayed as dovetailing one another, 
they can be in conflict. For example, the adoption of irrigation efficient technologies to 
save water can increase energy use, increasing carbon emissions. On the other 
hand, a mitigation measure that can thwart adaptation is carbon capture and storage 
which can lead to increased use of and competition for water. Climate policy goals 
can be traded off in good and bad ways against other policy goals. For instance, 
promoting regional economic growth can lead to increased emissions. Until mitigation 
and adaptation strategies are on the same legal, financial, institutional and political 
footing there are likely to be serious imbalances in trying to harmonize them. 
7.2. Further Water Market Changes Required for Adaptation 
This report has explored a wide array of economic, social and environmental impacts 
of water markets, concentrating particularly on farmer adaptation of markets in the 
face of climate change. The potential for major structural changes in irrigated 
agriculture due to climate change, reinforce the need to fully implement best practice 
policies in relation to water planning and water markets. 
We have categorised three key areas (institutional, information, policy) where we 
believe changes are needed. 
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7.2.1. Institutional 
 Removal of trade restrictions: limits to inter-regional trade is likely to slow 
adjustment in regions that are seeking to sell water, while also potentially 
placing barriers in the way of irrigators seeking to maximise their farm income 
from selling surplus water allocations or buying additional water allocations for 
crop needs. 
 Groundwater entitlement and planning processes: As the demand for 
groundwater rises among existing and new users there will be a growing need 
to identify and regulate the sustainable level of aquifer use.  
 New water products: There are calls to introduce/further expand the range of 
water trade products such as the trade of water allocation for environmental 
benefits, water donations, and forward supply contract options in rural and 
urban markets. 
 New water markets: Increasing attention needs to be given to the 
development of water markets in other settings (e.g. urban) to greatly increase 
flexibility and adaption for future climate change impacts. 
 Trade approval processes: There is a need to reduce complexity in the water 
market, improve readily available information on processing, remove 
assessment factors, address complaint handling processes, and other critical 
requirements to reduce water trade transaction costs. Indeed, greater 
research on transaction costs and how to reduce them is needed. 
 Conflicts of interest: The continuing maturity of the water market means 
potential or perceived conflicts of interest in relevant agencies must be 
reduced. This includes understanding how actions of environmental water 
holders may impact on the water market, and having clear understandings of 
how they may interact—or be involved in—water trade. The water market 
would benefit from greater clarity around future water trade activity and its 
likely impact. 
 Overall leadership: There needs to be a debate in Australia over who is going 
to provide future leadership of water policy and change. Currently a variety of 
state and federal governments have responsibilities for water policy, and there 
may be benefits to be gained from an evolution of responsibility towards one 
key institution (e.g. the MDBA), particularly where the efficient and effective 
management of river resources becomes an increasingly important objective 
(Loch et al., under review-a). For example, the National Water Commission 
has recently noted that a whole-of-basin implementation strategy with 
attendant agreements between the MDBA and basin states will be required 
before establishing cooperative and collaborative arrangements for 
implementing the Basin Plan (NWC, 2013). Such findings reflect the 
importance of resolving water sector leadership issues in as timely a manner 
as possible. 
7.2.2. Information 
 Market price information improvements: Water price information is key to any 
economic assessment of trade activity. A significant hurdle to water market 
analysis remains a lack in the quality and quantity of water price information. 
Fragmented and inconsistent price data availability decreases people’s ability 
to manage their water needs efficiently and effectively. General information 
sharing can significantly improve multiparty adaptation to drought and climate 
change effects. One of the most publicly available and detailed broker 
information on prices and volumes traded in Australia’s largest irrigation 
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district of the GMID (WaterMove) is no longer available, which limits further 
academic analysis of institutional and economic drivers of water markets. 
Although the National Water Market System (resources available online at 
http://www.nationalwatermarket.gov.au/ ) may fill the gap in the future, its 
historical information will be limited and it is unknown whether bid and offer 
data will be made publicly available.  
 Allocation announcement processes: Improve transparency of allocation 
announcements. The system of allocation announcements requires both 
substantial up-front and periodic review. 
 Farm management responses: Improve information about potential adaptive 
responses and their effectiveness, across different industries and regions. 
 Further water market research: Needless to say, the authors believe that 
further water market research is needed to truly understand water demand 
and supply issues. Although as a field of research water economics is evolving 
rapidly, and there has been a significant increase in the area in Australia, 
there still remains many topics that need researching. The authors also 
believe that there is a need to go beyond most of the simple analysis that has 
been conducted on water markets (e.g. NWC, 2012a), and develop much 
more integrated, sophisticated analyses of the Basin’s trade as a whole. Such 
research will provide fulfil key informational needs for policy. 
7.2.3. Policy 
 Market intermediary confidence: Further licencing of water brokers may be 
required to reduce issues associated with unethical or inappropriate 
behaviour.  
 Greater incorporation of risk into decision making: The uncertainty and scale 
of future climate change means that policy makers must adopt greater risk 
based approaches to decision making to plan for drier climate across the 
MDB. Again, the environmental water management process needs to evolve 
such that annual Basin state objectives are developed and aligned to the 
Basin-wide environmental watering strategy (NWC, 2013). Trade to manage 
risk issues will likely constitute some of that process. 
 Further monitoring: Greater attention should be given to measuring and 
monitoring water diversions, as well as continuing to provide the ACCC with 
powers to monitor water trade, exit and variable charges of irrigation 
infrastructure operators. 
 More consistency in intertemporal water use: Increasing flexibility in 
intertemporal water use through improvements in carry-over rules.  
 Market-based instruments: There needs to be an extension of market based 
instruments to allow farmers to adapt to climate change. This may include 
increased policies to adopt sustainable agricultural practices, or further 
development of carbon farming policies. There also needs to be careful 
consideration of where the majority of government money is being reinvested 
in irrigation: in off- and on-farm infrastructure. The efficiency and effectiveness 
of such investment needs careful reconsideration, as well as examining the 
opportunity cost of such investment (for e.g., the return that may eventuate 
from spending on health or education instead). Regulation may be necessary 
in some instances. 
 Education: Policy should be targeted at helping irrigators adjust to future water 
scarcity. Rather than using the term ‘climate change’, it should focus on the 
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risk of future water shortages, and how planning for water shortages increases 
profitability and farm viability. It should be noted that the adoption of true risk 
water management strategies will help change beliefs – there is an important 
intertwined relationship between water behaviour and beliefs. 
A better understanding of trade behaviour, especially strategic trade issues that can 
lead to market failures, will assist to improve the future advantages of water trade. 
There remain many areas to further research in the area of water markets. For 
example, the water market is still not fully mature, hence its risk management 
potential is yet to be fully explored. The introduction of water markets in Australia has 
led to a wide range of economic, social, and environmental impacts, some of these 
positive, but also some negative. There are also lessons to be learned about 
participation in other resource markets (e.g. salinity trading, carbon farming, energy, 
etc.) and how these lessons might translate back to water markets (or from water 
markets to other areas).  
On the whole, we suggest that water markets have been of net benefit for Australian 
irrigators. In addition, in the future water trading is likely to be crucial to allowing new 
adaptation in the face of climate change. This report has highlighted the many 
lessons to be learned—both by Australian and international water managers—from 
sMDB experiences during the Millennium Drought, where access to water markets 
and political investments assisted consumptive, social and environmental water users 
to avoid catastrophic outcomes. Climate change and water scarcity management are 
intertwined, suggesting that policy, institutional and governance arrangements to deal 
with such issues should be similarly structured.  
Water users will adapt, either out of necessity or opportunity. The cost of that 
adaptation at individual, regional and national levels—particularly to future water 
supply variability—can be mitigated by the consideration of the existing advantages 
from and future opportunities for water markets in Australia. 
Flexibility and adaptability will be required to achieve future sustainable policy change 
in the MDB. As such, water markets will need to keep evolving to provide greater 
adaptive measures. One of the great benefits of water markets is that they allow 
participants to play active roles in the reallocation of water, but individuals’ ability to 
adapt is governed by institutional, information and policy issues. Hence, the ability to 
respond to future challenges needs a concerted effort across all levels to ensure 
future sustainability.  
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